Recent Responses
Abraham Lincoln once made this argument that white people have no right to enslave black people: "You say A. is white, and B. is black. It is color, then; the lighter, having the right to enslave the darker? Take care. By this rule, you are to be slave to the first man you meet, with a fairer skin than your own." If I understand Lincoln correctly, he is arguing that because some white people have darker skin than other white people, skin color is not sufficient justification for slavery. Isn't this a fallacious conceptual slippery slope argument? Let's say we have three men. The first has only a few dollars, the second is a multi-millionaire, and the third is a billionaire. The third one is richer than the second. But that does not change the fact the the first and second are both rich and the first is not. In the same way, it might be true that some white people have darker skin than others. But this doesn't change the fact that there are white people and black people (as well as borderline cases.) And it doesn't undermine the premise that white people have the right to enslave black people. Am I misunderstanding Lincoln? Or is Lincoln's famous argument a bad one?
Richard Heck
November 13, 2008
(changed November 13, 2008)
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First, I need to applaud your engagement with this argument. Many people would hesitate to criticize, simply because they agree with Lincoln's conclusion. But, as you implicitly note, whether we agree with the conclusion is quite independent of whether the argument is any good.
The questio... Read more
How does the temperature ever change? If we assume that temperature is a continuous measurement, then we know that it has an infinite number of potential values. In order for temperature to transition between two values, it must then pass over the infinite set of values that lies between whichever two values the temperature is transitioning between. It now seems that temperature should not be able to change at all because before it may change to a given value, it must first reach a value between the desired and the current. Since we can make this claim infinitely, it would seem that temperature becomes "trapped", in a sense, at its current value, unable to change at all. Of course this problem can be applied to other concepts as well, and we might easily draw comparisons to Zeno's ancient thought experiment of Achilles and the tortoise. But the logic here is slightly different; the desired temperature is not continuously fleeing from the present as the tortoise is from Achilles. I simply raise the question as to how Achilles would be able to change his position at all as long as we observe the concept of infinity.
Allen Stairs
November 13, 2008
(changed November 13, 2008)
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I'll have to confess that I'm one of those people who was early on seduced by a particular sort of solution to this sort of problem, and since then I've never been able to feel the force of the puzzle. Here's a somewhat fanciful example that conveys the idea.
Suppose that we have a body w... Read more
Is it normal after reading philosophical material to feel like you've been blind for some time of your life? I'm asking this because I was never interested in anything that had to deal with philosophy. After I read some philosophical material I felt like I didn't really know anything. Not only that, but my views on religion have changed. It's almost like I've lost my faith after I read some topics on philosophy. Is this normal or more of a personal experience?
Miriam Solomon
November 13, 2008
(changed November 13, 2008)
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Years ago when I entered the field of philosophy I might have written exactly the same thing as you. Doing philosophy (well) means being willing to challenge those things previously taken for granted. This is exciting (eye opening) as well as, sometimes, troubling. If you are the only... Read more
What is the difference between mathematical logic and philosophical logic? Yes I know, one has more math than the other. Is Gödel's incompleteness in mathematical logic? Is modal logic in philosophical logic? Can you give other examples of different logics or questions each asks in order to distinguish the two?
Peter Smith
November 12, 2008
(changed November 12, 2008)
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Gödel's first incompleteness theorem says that, for any suitable formal theory which is consistent and includes enough arithmetic, there will be an arithmetical sentence -- a "Gödel sentence" -- which that theory can neither prove nor disprove. This theorem is a bit of mathematics: its pro... Read more
American Protestant fundamentalists who are against abortion frequently say they are for a "culture of life." It seems that many of them also support the death penalty and have a low threshold for a willingness to wage war. Does anyone know how they justify this seeming contradiction? What is remarkable to me is that fundamentalist Christians who are against abortion seem to hold this value of "unborn life" above almost all else, saying that they are "single issue voters." Not only do I wonder how this is reconciled with their not seeming to value the lives of convicted criminals and those will die due to wars that we easily enter, but also how they put the value of a fetus' life above all the other things that Christians are supposed to value, that, if one is a single issue voter, one gives up fighting for. I guess what I mean is, how is this favoring of one class of lives justified philosophically/religiously against the valuing of other classes of lives and other "Christian" values? Thanks.
Jasper Reid
November 8, 2008
(changed November 8, 2008)
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I think it comes down to a question of guilt or innocence. A criminal has committed a major sin, and hence deserves a major punishment: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life. Even just an ordinary adult will have some track-record of sin behind them -- none of us are p... Read more
I have an old copy of whateleys logic (1840s) is it still worth reading?
Jasper Reid
November 8, 2008
(changed November 8, 2008)
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Well, it all depends on what you're hoping to get out of it. If your interest is in the history of philosophy, and you want to find out about the state of logic and philosophy in nineteenth-century Britain, then sure, go ahead and read it. (Although, given a choice, I'd actually recommend Joh... Read more
Is there any kind of knowledge that could be called certain?
Jasper Reid
November 7, 2008
(changed November 7, 2008)
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One suggestion that philosophers have come up, for measuring people's degrees of certainty, is to relate it to their willingness to place bets. Of course, there are all kinds of factors that undermine this approach: in the real world, some people avoid gambling altogether for ethical or relig... Read more
There are some strong arguments that if a computer appears to possess intelligence similar to a human's, that we must assume it too has self-awareness. Additionally, one could make a strong case that lesser animals have self-awareness, because they have the same type of brain as humans (just in a less sophisticated form.) My question is this: if we assume that a) computers of seemingly human intelligence are self-aware, and b) that animals of lesser brains are self-aware, must we logically conclude that computers of lesser "intelligence" are also self-aware? In other words, are all computers self aware? Is my toaster self-aware?
Jonathan Westphal
November 6, 2008
(changed November 6, 2008)
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Why should the possession of intelligence (whatever we mean by this, but say it means winning chess games against the world chess champion, winning bridge games with bad partners against the world bridge champions, issuing correct diagnoses for car repairs, predicting stock market fluct... Read more
Is there any kind of knowledge that could be called certain?
Jasper Reid
November 7, 2008
(changed November 7, 2008)
Permalink
One suggestion that philosophers have come up, for measuring people's degrees of certainty, is to relate it to their willingness to place bets. Of course, there are all kinds of factors that undermine this approach: in the real world, some people avoid gambling altogether for ethical or relig... Read more
Working as a scientist one encounters very similar pressures to those encountered by members of religious groups or political parties (pressure to conform, interpersonal relationships being used as leverage etc.), as well as somewhat similar reasoning (appeals to authority, ad hominem attacks etc.). What advice would you give to a junior scientist who wishes to pursue the 'truth', but finds that doing so can lead to personal criticism, isolation and ultimately loneliness (which is not good for his health)? Is it better to be accepted by one's peers or is personal integrity of important when the two clash? Are charges of naivety and quixoticism relevant here? I know these are all somewhat different questions, but an answer to any or just one of them would be most helpful. Thank you in advance.
Allen Stairs
November 6, 2008
(changed November 6, 2008)
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The best piece of advice I ever heard on this issue came in a talk I heard years ago about Darwin. Darwin wanted to convince us of something that wasn't at all obvious when he introduced it. But more to the point, he wanted to be taken seriously by the scientific community. How did he do it?... Read more