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What is the I who watches what the mind does?
Good question! For what it is
Gordon Marino
September 1, 2016
(changed September 1, 2016)
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Good question! For what it is worth, it feels to me like the I. Freud would call "it" the observing ego. Kierkegaard famously stated "the self is a relation that relates itself to itself". So Kierkegaard would say it is the self and the self is a process. Sure... Read more
Hi there, I have a very basic question about Frege's object/concept distinction. Please don't make fun of me as I'm new to early analytic philosophy. This question has been bugging me for a while, so I'd appreciate a thorough answer. In sentences like "the cat is grey" or "the cat is in the park," do the words 'the cat' designate an object? If you were to formalize these sentences, I would think it would go as something like: there is some x such that x is a cat and x is grey/in a park. There wouldn't be a uniqueness clause, I would think. If the words that designate an object have to pick out something unique, does that mean the words 'the cat' cannot designate an object (since they are not specified enough)? If they don't designate an object, then what is their logical status? Thanks.
Frege did think that definite
Alexander George
September 1, 2016
(changed September 1, 2016)
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Frege did think that definite descriptions, such as "the President of the United States" or "the cat," are (what he called) proper names, or what are more usually now called singular terms. And he thought that singular terms do denote objects. So I think... Read more
Should gamespersonship be accepted as part of sport?
It already is part of sports.
Gordon Marino
August 31, 2016
(changed August 31, 2016)
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It already is part of sports. I can't imagine how it could be excluded from the world of contests in that gamespersonship implies that you will do whatever you can WITHIN the rules to triumph. However, someone who practiced gamespersonship would seem to me to lac... Read more
When we explains darkness to a blind, he will fail to recognize it even If he is experiencing it. May be contrasts and differences in sensations are the basic things in understanding a sensation and applying consciousness to it. If we are hearing the same sound since our birth we will fail to apply consciousness to it. What do you think about it philosophers? I'm too young forgive me if its fallacious.
Always great to hear from a
Charles Taliaferro
August 26, 2016
(changed August 26, 2016)
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Always great to hear from a young philosopher!
I take it that you are wondering if a person has only experienced some state (darkness, for example) and not experienced a contrary state (light), whether or not they would know the state itself / the state they ar... Read more
It is often said that biology, chemistry and other high-level sciences cannot be reduced to physics, e.g. laws governing evolution are irreducible to anything on offer in physics. On the other hand one often reads in descriptions of what a deterministic world would look like something akin to this: If one has a complete description (of every particle) of the universe at time t and knows all the physical laws that govern it, then one could at least in principle deduce the state of affairs obtaining at another time t2, where t2 could either be a future or past point in time. Since causation is a debated concept, I take it that that the main aim of scientific theories is prediction rather that (causal) explanation. But how can we reconcile the fact (?) that higher-level sciences cannot be reduced to physics and with this common description of determinism.
I think the way to sort this
Allen Stairs
August 25, 2016
(changed August 25, 2016)
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I think the way to sort this out is to be careful about some relevant distinctions.
A theory is a certain sort of construction that we use for prediction/explanation etc. Theories are at different levels. A biological theory or a psychological theory is at a quite d... Read more
In America, many people join the military as a means to socio-economic advancement (e.g. in order to pay for college). Is this ethically defensible? Is there any difference between someone who enlists for career advancement and a mercenary?
Consider two people who join
Allen Stairs
August 25, 2016
(changed August 25, 2016)
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Consider two people who join the military.
Person A's motive is socio-economic advancement. Joining the military seems the best path to a good career. But s/he also accepts the country's values, thinks the country needs a military, and thinks that being in the mili... Read more
I am puzzled about questions that ask if a Creator can create Itself. Look at a circle <I>after</I> it is drawn: at that point, it has no beginning and no end. Look at a circle <I>while</I> it is being drawn: during its construction, you can see it does have a temporary beginning. Only after construction is complete, does its beginning seems to disappear. If time is cyclical, then why couldn't a similar analogy apply? Maybe I'm not expressing myself as clearly as I could, I hope someone here can upgrade the quality of my observation to get at its essence and not be stuck with the poor quality of my language choices.
Speaking of recurrence (!),
Stephen Maitzen
August 25, 2016
(changed August 30, 2016)
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Speaking of recurrence (!), this topic has come up rather often on this site in recent months. My own answers appear at Question 25260 and Question 25648.
In reply to Question 25260, I conceded that we can tell a story featuring a causal loop in which -- alleged... Read more
What is the ”I” who watches what the mind does? When reading about philosophy of mind, I encounter expressions like ”I (or we) think”, ”I percieve”, ”I remember”, ”I see red”, ”I feel pain” etc. Isn´t it the mind that performs these actions, not the "I"? What is this ”I”? Is it some separate compartment of the mind, identical to the mind, or outside the mind? Should we modify Descartes and say: ”The mind thinks, therefore it is”?
I'm not sure I'm getting your
Jonathan Westphal
August 25, 2016
(changed August 25, 2016)
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I'm not sure I'm getting your second question. Why should the I that says 'I feel pain' be the mind and not the I? Unlike Descartes, who thinks that both of these things are the same as consciousness, and as himself, not to mention his soul (Berkeley... Read more
Some scientists say that there is a part of the brain that is responsible for consciousness. If we replicate that part of the brain on a computer, will it too be conscious? Surely an inanimate object can't be conscious, right?
I think you have to ask what
Jonathan Westphal
August 25, 2016
(changed August 25, 2016)
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I think you have to ask what "inanimate" means. If it means what the root word "anima" (Latin for the Gk. "psyche") suggests, then if consciousness requires a psyche or anima, mind or soul, the answer to your third question is 'Right; an inanimate object can't... Read more
In today's physics, the cutting edge theories require multiple spacial dimensions to work. Bosonic String Theory, for instance, requires 26 dimensions, while the five basic types of String Theory seem to need at least 11 dimensions. How can a person mentally visualize these extra spacial dimensions? Do they only exist as complex mathematical Calabi-Yau shapes, that only Hawking can imagine, or is there a more simple way a person can envision a sixth dimension, etc?
My short answer is that we
Allen Stairs
August 21, 2016
(changed August 21, 2016)
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My short answer is that we don't need to be able to visualize higher-dimensional spaces in order to reason about them. I'd be quite astonished if Stephen Hawking could visualize 11 or 26 or even 5 dimensions. In fact, visualizing even three dimensions is not as easy... Read more