Recent Responses
I suppose it is very difficult do define "truth" in an informative way (without just giving a synonym or something like that). Can you explain why it is so? Or is it easy?
One reason that it's
Stephen Maitzen
July 14, 2016
(changed July 15, 2016)
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One reason that it's difficult to define "truth" might be that the word stands for a concept that's too basic, too fundamental, to be informatively defined in terms of other concepts. I myself think that truth is a property of some propositions and therefore, derivative... Read more
Is there really a strong distinction between understanding what a proposition means and believing or disbelieving it? It strikes me that if I believe a proposition while my opponent does not, one way to explain the disagreement is to say that he misunderstands either that proposition or some related proposition. And so if we really did both understand all of the propositions in question, we'd have to agree about them as well.
I'd say that in many cases
Stephen Maitzen
July 14, 2016
(changed July 14, 2016)
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I'd say that in many cases there's indeed a difference between grasping a proposition and believing the proposition, i.e., believing it to be true. To take a well-known example from mathematics, Georg Cantor believed that the Continuum Hypothesis is true, whereas... Read more
If something cannot be defined, can it exist?
Usually, when we use the word
Allen Stairs
July 11, 2016
(changed July 11, 2016)
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Usually, when we use the word "defined," it's about words. We might ask, for example, whether the word "chair" can be defined. If a definition is supposed to rule in exactly the things that are chairs and rule out exactly the things that aren't, then I doubt that "chai... Read more
Pre-reflexively, I find myself of the intuition that many matters in life simply fall outside the scope of moral concern, even if we can subject them to moral reasoning. For example, there doesn't seem to be any moral question to be had about the simple act of buying a cup of coffee in the morning, even if that money spent could've been donated to charity instead. On reflection of the particulars, some moral considerations might come to bear on that purchase or on a habit of purchases, but, ceteris paribus, morality just doesn't seem to bear on the mere act of buying coffee. Even describing the act as "morally permissible" sounds a little strange, as if permission were needed in the first place. Moral reasoning seems simply out of place here. My sense is that while some normative ethical theories (e.g., Kantianism) are relatively hospitable to this intuition, utilitarianism cannot be, at least in its traditional forms. After all, the utilitarian calculus can easily be applied to just about any human action, even the mere act of buying coffee, and given utilitarianism's emphasis on outcomes and consequences, there seems to be no principled reason, internal to utilitarianism, not to apply that calculus to the universe of human activity. Of course, there are actions so trivial that the utilitarian, being utilitarian, would find them unworthy subjects for moral reasoning. Moreover, the utilitarian may reason that it would be morally for the best not to subject too many human actions to moral reasoning, which sounds sensible enough--but he can only reach this conclusion after applying the utilitarian calculus to his moral reasoning, which would require him to compare the consequences of applying the utilitarian calculus to the universe of human activity against the consequences of applying that calculus only to some circumscribed spheres of human activity. Thus, it would appear that, for the utilitarian, just about all human actions actually are moral matters, even if, thank heavens, some human actions can be properly ignored. I was wondering, however, if there might be more to be said on the utilitarian's behalf. Are there other ways in which utilitarianism can be reconciled with the intuition I've described above? Has much been said in philosophy on the scope of morality and the dividing line between moral and nonmoral matters, and how questions of scope come to bear on different normative ethical theories?
You ask an excellent question
Allen Stairs
July 11, 2016
(changed July 11, 2016)
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You ask an excellent question and I'm sympathetic to your point. Since this isn't my field, I don't have much to offer by way of readings, but there's a paper from some years ago by my former colleague Susan Wolf that might be at least somewhat relevant. It's called "M... Read more
Consider a machine that generates numbers at random. Let's say it generates the number 12. Is there is a reason why 12 was selected rather than another random number?
Let's suppose that the
Allen Stairs
July 10, 2016
(changed July 10, 2016)
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Let's suppose that the machine is my computer and I'm using the function =TRUNC(100*RAND(),0). Then as I put the function in more and more cells, I'll get a list of integers between 0 and 100 that pass various tests for randomness. Let's suppose that the fifth integer o... Read more
Why do many, if not most contemporary philosophers (especially naturalist analytical ones à la Quine) believe in the existence of a set of unchanging natural laws despite the fact that this assertion has not, and probably cannot, be substantiated? By 'natural laws,' I mean laws like those associated with physics, etc. rather than laws dictating which sorts of inferential deductions are valid/invalid. Would this belief fare better when faced with a Russell's teacup-style argument than theism does?
I'm not sure what, exactly,
Yuval Avnur
July 8, 2016
(changed July 8, 2016)
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I'm not sure what, exactly, leads philosophers to believe in "unchanging laws," and I'm also not sure in what sense such laws cannot be substantiated. I'll focus on the latter. If nothing else, can't they be confirmed to some degree? You should expect that a world with... Read more
How is it clear that religious thought and philosophy were totally intertwined during the Middle Ages? Why was it this way?
Interesting question. Many
Charles Taliaferro
July 7, 2016
(changed July 7, 2016)
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Interesting question. Many of the seminal figures in medieval philosophy (from Augustine to Anselm to Aquinas) were members of the Christian church. The earliest universities where philosophy was practiced were centers of theological practices (the art of disputati... Read more
Can a society exist without a concept of time? If a society was forced underground, cut off from cycles like day and night, without any time-keeping technology, would one be invented at some point or would people simply dictate everything by the "now," eating when they are hungry and sleeping when they are sleepy etc.
What an inventive thought
Charles Taliaferro
July 7, 2016
(changed July 7, 2016)
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What an inventive thought experiment, though a bit scary (it is hard to imagine that a society would undergo this transition due to creative, peace-time reasons). I take it that you are suggesting that we often measure time in terms of the sun, moon, and other above-g... Read more
Would it be better to have set punishments for crimes (Ex. murder = 20 years imprisonment no matter the circumstances) or to have the punishments be defined with the individual that caused it? Would it also be better for punishments to be more "aggressive" than needed (Ex. littering = 5 years imprisonment)
Not better in any sense I can
Allen Stairs
July 7, 2016
(changed July 7, 2016)
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Not better in any sense I can think of.
On the "set punishment" question: I'm struggling to think what the point of inflexible sentencing laws would be given that the circumstances can vary in ways that seem clearly to be relevant.
On the second question: the way you phr... Read more
Many astrophysicists speculate that everything came from nothing. How can something come from nothing? The above speculation would break the law of conservation. Either something has always been here or what we call something is actually made of nothing (nonmaterial.) Please give me your prospective. Thank you, Awareness1963
For the record, I'm far from
Stephen Maitzen
July 7, 2016
(changed July 7, 2016)
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For the record, I'm far from happy with Krauss's way of putting things, which is why in my response I linked not to Krauss's book but to Albert's (scathing) review of it, the same review later linked to by Professor Stairs.
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