Recent Responses
Why do I do things even when I don't want to? That is, why do I waste time on the internet when I know I should be studying for exams? If I know I should be studying, why aren't I?
Peter Lipton
March 30, 2007
(changed March 30, 2007)
Permalink
I would distinguish the question why you do things you should not do from the question why you do things you do not want to do. Both are interesting, but the first one seems easier to answer. It's just that sometimes you don't want to do what you should do. That may happen for various reasons... Read more
This question is about the moral obligation involved in a loving relationship. Assuming one has been in a loving relationship for a long period of time, (however, there are no attachments such as children or marriage), is it morally obligatory to tell this loved person if one has flirted/cheated slightly? Thank you.
Alan Soble
March 30, 2007
(changed March 30, 2007)
Permalink
In what follows, I ignore "flirting," perhaps merely arbitrarily, because flirting is ubiquitous and seems too innocuous for a serious moral investigation; others might well disagree, and I ask them kindly to fill in the lacuna(e) in my reply. (Perhaps this question and its replies can be added to... Read more
Is there any way for consciousness to be measured? What does it mean to say that my consciousness is at a higher level than that of my dog, or that my dog is at a higher level of consciousness than a flea, or that the flea is at a higher level of consciousness than a rosebush? What are we measuring?
Peter S. Fosl
March 29, 2007
(changed March 29, 2007)
Permalink
"Higher" and "lower" can be quite slippery terms, and your not likely to find philosophers using them in serious contexts. But one might say that different forms of consciousness can be distinguished by the different capacities they possess and the relative detail, discrimination, or complexit... Read more
Do you think that there are important differences between general thoughts (like "People are animals" or "Everybody must pay their taxes") and concrete ones (like "That cat is an animal" or "I must pay my taxes")?
Peter S. Fosl
March 29, 2007
(changed March 29, 2007)
Permalink
Well, there's "important" and there's "important," but I'd say that the most important difference is in the sorts of logical things one can do with each kind of thought. There are many different forms of argument that depend upon what logicians call fully "distributing" their terms. So, from... Read more
Is the sale of human organs ethical?
Peter S. Fosl
March 29, 2007
(changed March 29, 2007)
Permalink
It is difficult to give an answer that would cover all possible cases, and I suppose I can imagine an individual case where purchasing a organ would be permissible. But as a practice or policy, it is not ethically permissible--this because a market for organs would provide incentives for peopl... Read more
Does music have any intellectual content?
Peter S. Fosl
March 29, 2007
(changed March 29, 2007)
Permalink
As opposed, I suppose you mean, to affective or emotional content? Yes, both in the lyrics or librettos of various musical compositions and in the web work of meanings that have come to be attached to various sounds. Like most, if not all, artforms, music exists in an historical context, and... Read more
I've been reading lots of papers recently based around 'the Argument from Evil', its replies, the theodices and their objections. I'm agnostic but have always thought that the best reason for why non-human animals and children suffer in such terrible ways is because if they didn't we wouldn't question the existence of God. If we didn't have arguments based around a young fawn dying a slow, agonizing death in the forest then the Argument from Evil wouldn't be as effective as it is. We could come up with answers based on redemption from sin and so forth. The same can be said for AIDS, the plague, Auschwitz, whatever. The notion of mystery on the issue and freedom of thought that goes with it is in my mind one of our greatest gifts. If we didn't have these terrors then a beautiful sunset or a kind gesture or the stars would be enough to convince most of us (or at least a fair few of us) that there must be some kind of God. This doesn't seem to be covered by any of the theodices; the closest I can think of would be based on free will. I have two questions based on this: Firstly, do you know of anybody who has written along these lines? Secondly, can you think of any objections? The only one I can think of is why would God let the fawn suffer for 6 days in torture rather than 5. Surely they would both force anybody to question their belief. (Any answer to that objection would be nice as well.) Sorry this is a long one. Love the site. =) Thanks.
Peter S. Fosl
March 29, 2007
(changed March 29, 2007)
Permalink
The problem of theodicy is a marvelous one, isn't it. I can't tell you how much pleasure I've culled from it, as have my students. For myself, I can't think of anyone whose put your point in exactly this way--but I don't pretend to command the enormous literature on the subject. I think an o... Read more
All knowledge starts with axioms. Axioms are based on beliefs. Therefore, all derived "knowledge" is nothing more than a belief. Is this a correct conclusion? Thank you very much, Kobe
Sally Haslanger
March 29, 2007
(changed March 29, 2007)
Permalink
Hi Kobe: There are a lot of interesting issues packed into your question. Let me try to unpack a couple of them. Philosophers tend to think that knowledge just is a special kind of belief, e.g., a belief that is true and that one is justified in holding. So for most philosophers to concl... Read more
How do we account for the weird coincidence of math and science (e.g., physics)?
Mark Sprevak
March 29, 2007
(changed March 29, 2007)
Permalink
There is another question that might be worrying you: Why does the language of physics turn out to be mathematical? Why does mathematics turn out to be our best way of describing the physical world? I don't think that anyone has a good answer to this question. There may be no good answer, since... Read more
Recently, an American general was criticized for airing his personal belief that homosexuality is immoral. If we hold certain sincere beliefs but know that said beliefs may offend other people, are we obliged to simply be quiet about them? Is there a difference between hate speech against gays and simply stating that one happens to believe that homosexuality is objectionable? I can undestand how many may have found the general's attitude reprehensible; at the same time, however, criticizing him for that attitude makes about as much sense to me as getting upset over his liking vanilla ice cream. CCan we rightly blame people for what happen to be their preferences?
Roger Crisp
March 29, 2007
(changed March 29, 2007)
Permalink
There's an important difference between airing one's beliefs or preferences and merely possessing them. Many feel that criticizing people for beliefs is unfair, since beliefs aren't voluntary and one can be held responsible only for what's voluntary. But some philosophers doubt this (see e.g. Rob... Read more