Recent Responses
It seems that we adopt a formal ethical theory based on our pre-theoretical ethical intuitions. Our pre-theoretical ethical intuitions seem to be the product of our upbringing, our education and the society we live in and not to be entirely consistent, since our upbringing and our education often inculcate conflicting values. So how do we decide which of our pre-theoretical ethical intuitions, if any, are right? It seems that we can only judge them in the light of other pre-theoretical ethical intuitions and how can we know that they are right? If we judge them against a formal ethical system, it seems that the only way we have to decide whether a formal ethical theory, say, consequentialism, is right is whether it is consistent with our pre-theoretical ethical intuitions, so we are going nowhere, it seems.
Perhaps I can play the devil
Michael Shenefelt
October 10, 2015
(changed October 11, 2015)
Permalink
Perhaps I can play the devil's advocate and rebuild the case for thinking that systematic ethical theory gets us nowhere.
There are actually many different systematic theories--utilitarian, contractarian, deontological, etc.--but the trouble is they clash. Th... Read more
Should a brief history of the principles of the world religions and philosophers be part of public school curriculum?
I believe that if one's
Charles Taliaferro
October 9, 2015
(changed October 9, 2015)
Permalink
I believe that if one's education in public school did not include some attention the world religions (a study of their history, teachings), then one's education would be profoundly incomplete. I think that it would be impossible to claim to be well educated... Read more
If A throws a ball at B with the sole intent of injuring only B but after being thrown, the ball bounces off of B's helmet and hits C square in the face requiring stitches, who is guilty of injuring C, A for throwing the ball or B for existing/standing in that position?
Great question. Here I think
Charles Taliaferro
October 9, 2015
(changed October 9, 2015)
Permalink
Great question. Here I think legal and ethical reflection are united (they are not always, alas). With no other details added to your question, I believe that A is guilty both for attempting to injure B (A would be guilty of assault) and for injuring C even... Read more
Why do we consider lying to be illogical even when it can produce good? I can think of many examples where lying can do more good than harm especially when its used for the benefit of others and not for selfesh gain. CAL
I'm not sure that most people
Stephen Maitzen
October 9, 2015
(changed October 9, 2015)
Permalink
I'm not sure that most people consider lying to be illogical even when it can produce good. More likely they consider lying to be presumptively immoral, and they allow that the moral presumption against lying is overridden in some circumstances. Take a case... Read more
It seems that we adopt a formal ethical theory based on our pre-theoretical ethical intuitions. Our pre-theoretical ethical intuitions seem to be the product of our upbringing, our education and the society we live in and not to be entirely consistent, since our upbringing and our education often inculcate conflicting values. So how do we decide which of our pre-theoretical ethical intuitions, if any, are right? It seems that we can only judge them in the light of other pre-theoretical ethical intuitions and how can we know that they are right? If we judge them against a formal ethical system, it seems that the only way we have to decide whether a formal ethical theory, say, consequentialism, is right is whether it is consistent with our pre-theoretical ethical intuitions, so we are going nowhere, it seems.
Perhaps I can play the devil
Michael Shenefelt
October 10, 2015
(changed October 11, 2015)
Permalink
Perhaps I can play the devil's advocate and rebuild the case for thinking that systematic ethical theory gets us nowhere.
There are actually many different systematic theories--utilitarian, contractarian, deontological, etc.--but the trouble is they clash. Th... Read more
I admit that my knowledge of philosophy is very limited; not advanced, yet it is my overall second favorite subject after science. If one accepts the proposition, "I do not know anything with absolute certainty," then is it actually self-refuting or logically contradictory? The reason, is that, if one accepts it, then one must know something with absolute certainty, which is the proposition itself. Therefore, one knows with absolute certainty that one does not know anything with absolute certainty. However, it seems to become infinitely (pun intended) problematic if one thinks about it deeply enough. For instance, if one knows with absolute certainty that one does not know anything with absolute certainty, then one must also know with absolute certainty that one knows with absolute certainty that one does not know anything with absolute certainty. I think that one knows where I am going with this. It could be extended ad infinitum. If one, however, accepts that one does not know with absolute certainty that one does not know anything with absolute certainty, is it still self-refuting or contradictory. How would the most radical skeptics reply to the above? I hope that this makes sense, because it does not to me.
Nice question! It's one with
Yuval Avnur
October 9, 2015
(changed October 18, 2015)
Permalink
Nice question! It's one with a long history, as something like what you're saying was one of the main objections to the ancient skeptics and their intellectual decedents. Let me just say a couple of things. First, to answer your question, I don't think your obs... Read more
Some states mandate an automatic death penalty for murdering a law enforcement officer. How can this possibly be just when it elevates the victim above that of common civilians? I agree with the Aristotelian conception of justice as only partially overlapping that of morality but consistency is crucial to rationality in both judgment and conduct. Actions ought to be judged similarly unless there are morally relevant dissimilarities between them so a law-abiding or even a vindictive police officer, already armed and aware of the risks of his profession, is the same as any other civilian, both legally and morally. Common law jurisdictions work on the basis that all citizens are equal in intrinsic worth--wouldn't the imperative be to either entirely repeal the death penalty for murder or use it in every single instance?
I'm going to largely duck
Michael Cholbi
October 8, 2015
(changed October 8, 2015)
Permalink
I'm going to largely duck your last question: I doubt even the most enthusiastic proponents of the death penalty believe it should be imposed for every murder. Most jurisdictions distinguish between first-degree murder, second-degree, etc., precisely because not... Read more
Is horny an emotion or a feeling
Depends on what you mean,
Allen Stairs
October 8, 2015
(changed October 8, 2015)
Permalink
Depends on what you mean, doesn't it? But even after we sort that out, the answer may still be that it depends.
A headache is a feeling but not an emotion—at least, not as most people use the word. Anxiety, at least a good deal of the time, is also a feeling rather tha... Read more
We all know beyond the universe, there's nothing. How come is that possible? Theory says the big bang happened, and that theory has been accepted since it was "released". But where was the energy that caused it? And how did it existed, if there was nothing? Is there anything in the "nothing"? And, if we talk about religion, how did god exist? Who made it? How was he created if there was nothing? Some people say it created himself, but how the heck that happened if there was nothing?
I realise this may not be
Michael Lacewing
October 5, 2015
(changed October 5, 2015)
Permalink
I realise this may not be satisfactory, but many philosophers and scientists think that we cannot know the answers to your questions.
You start by saying that we know that beyond the universe there is nothing. But this may be one of the things that we cannot know.... Read more
I have been reading Stanford Encyclopedia's article on the "non-identity problem". I find it very interesting, but in the whole article it is assumed that one person is the same person in two alternative realities if and only if he or she came out of the same egg (genetically and perhaps atom by atom) produced by her biological parents. I find this idea very wrong. Consider an alternative reality where a man named Nelson Mandela did the same important things that Nelson Mandela did in our reality, but who was conceived and born two months later than our Nelson Mandela. Does it make any sense to say that he would not have been Nelson Mandela? It doesn't, it makes sense only for philosophers who don't want things to make sense at all.... And what if the same egg produced a person completely different from our Nelson Mandela and with a different name? Would that person be Nelson Mandela? I am sure he wouldn't, for no reason, except if you *stipulate* that it has to be that way. Now you may ask: where do you stop? What if the alternative Nelson Mandela was born 5 years later than our Nelson Mandela? What if he had been given another name? What I feel is that it all depends on what is relevant for some subject. I don't believe in "identity" without some purpose or context.
I'm pretty confident
Michael Cholbi
October 1, 2015
(changed October 1, 2015)
Permalink
I'm pretty confident philosophers do want to make sense of personal identity. But you are taking issue — not unreasonably, in my estimation — with a claim many philosophers make in motivating the non-identity problem.
Let's review the reasoning that's supposed to gen... Read more