Recent Responses
What do philosophers mean by the term 'mental content'? My initial reaction to the phrase was to take it to mean something like 'the meaning of a thought, belief, etc.' But this interpretation seems...unexplanatory. It seems to me that things don't just MEAN; rather they mean TO some individual/group. (X doesn't just mean Y; X means Y to Z.) For any given thought/belief/whatever (X), we could imagine infinite different Zs, and through these Zs, infinite different Ys. Which Zs are the relevant ones? Why is whatever distinction is drawn between relevant and irrelevant Zs drawn as it is? Or is my vague conception of mental content as the meaning of a thought, belief, etc. not in line with how philosophers use the term? If so...what do they mean by it?
Peter Lipton
October 25, 2005
(changed October 25, 2005)
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Carrying on from Joseph's answer, part of your question is whether content is relative to the person entertaining that content. One sense in which this is right concerns representations involving ingredients like 'I', 'here', or 'now'. These so-called indexical terms have the interesting f... Read more
If someone murders many people, is it fair that they die once for their multiple victims?
Alexander George
October 25, 2005
(changed October 25, 2005)
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I'm not sure that fairness enters into it. Whom would one be treating unfairly by condemning a murderer to just one death? His victims? Once dead, they are not being treated in any way at all; so they're not being treated unfairly relative to the murderer. Perhaps you mean that it wo... Read more
It seems that many thinkers commit the naturalistic fallacy in thinking about human engineering and enhancement. That is, when thinking about human engineering (e.g., germline engineering) many have claimed that it is "unnatural" to pursue such options or that we "ought" not do such things because it would damage the human race. My question is this: if we take evolutionary theory seriously (with constant change, adaptation, etc.), why ought we not pursue human engineering, especially if larger issues of justice can be adjudicated?
Richard Heck
October 25, 2005
(changed October 25, 2005)
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Some people surely do commit the naturalistic fallacy here: Simply to say it's "unnatural" isn't an argument. Couches are unnatural.
The worry that genetic enginerring might "damage the human race" is quite different, however, and I for one take it seriously. The worry, very simply, is that... Read more
If philosophy is engaged in a hunt for eternal verities, why does it so often seem as faddish as a clique-obsessed 13 year-old? For instance, in the 1920s logical positivism ruled and their answers seemed on the mark -- until, of course, everybody realized the Vienna Circle was engaged in narrow-minded bilge. Then it was Ordinary Language philosophy -- good on J. L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle -- until of course folks realized that close study of ordinary language revealed little of interest and certainly no grand metaphysical truths. Then it was the Gang of Quine (to be is to be the value of a bound variable) which seemed to have the handle on reality in the 1960s and 1970s -- but does anyone today still recall why anyone thought Quine's work mattered? Where are the eternal truths? Does no one in today's philosophy pursue work designed to last?
Sean Greenberg
October 27, 2005
(changed October 27, 2005)
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I'm inclined to think that what leads the questioner to worry about the changing estimation of particular philosophical approaches in the twentieth century is that s/he seems to think that the fact that philosophy is engaged in the hunt for eternal verities should imply that philosophical... Read more
In your response to the question on Twin-Earth, you said that descriptions can be used to fix reference. (E.g.: This colourless, odourless, thirst-quenching object is water.) But if I'm not wrong, Kripke in <i>Naming and Necessity</i> said that definite descriptions can't be used to fix the reference. He said reference fixing proceeds by an initial baptism. Where did I go wrong? My second question is about Kripke's and Putnam's essentialism. Is their essentialism limited to proper names and natural kind terms or does it include non-natural kind terms too? For example, in post-Kripke philosophy, do philosophers believe that terms like "game", "beauty", "chair" have essences? If these terms have essences, what are they?
Richard Heck
October 25, 2005
(changed October 25, 2005)
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Kripke argues in Naming and Necessity that it isn't, in general, true that every proper name is associated with some description that is used to fix its reference. He is prepared to allow that some names might, for some speakers, have their references fixed in that way. Perhaps "pi" is an ex... Read more
Is it possible for one to possibly know what exists after death? As humans, with a mind that exists solely as physical matter (and a soul, if religion is counted), when we die, how is it possible for this purely physical mind to keep on functioning, and allow us to realize that we are dead? As well, if we have souls, how can an entity created purely of energy (or whatever you think a soul is made of) have senses and detect that it exists, or even think?
Richard Heck
October 25, 2005
(changed October 25, 2005)
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Some people think they do know what exists after death. As Alex notes, "Nothing" is one option, and some people believe they have strong enough evidence for this view to make it a reasonable belief, and perhaps even to count as knowledge. On the other side, there are people who would claim t... Read more
Are there any arguments against allowing gay marriage that aren't religious or bigoted or both?
Tamar Szabo Gendler
October 30, 2005
(changed October 30, 2005)
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Here (http://examinedlife.typepad.com/johnbelle/2005/10/anti_same_sex_m.html)is another attempt to offer such an argument, with second thoughts bythe author here(http://examinedlife.typepad.com/johnbelle/2005/10/uncle_kvetch_is.html).
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What do philosophers mean by the term 'mental content'? My initial reaction to the phrase was to take it to mean something like 'the meaning of a thought, belief, etc.' But this interpretation seems...unexplanatory. It seems to me that things don't just MEAN; rather they mean TO some individual/group. (X doesn't just mean Y; X means Y to Z.) For any given thought/belief/whatever (X), we could imagine infinite different Zs, and through these Zs, infinite different Ys. Which Zs are the relevant ones? Why is whatever distinction is drawn between relevant and irrelevant Zs drawn as it is? Or is my vague conception of mental content as the meaning of a thought, belief, etc. not in line with how philosophers use the term? If so...what do they mean by it?
Peter Lipton
October 25, 2005
(changed October 25, 2005)
Permalink
Carrying on from Joseph's answer, part of your question is whether content is relative to the person entertaining that content. One sense in which this is right concerns representations involving ingredients like 'I', 'here', or 'now'. These so-called indexical terms have the interesting f... Read more
I've been told that your eyes only see what your mind imagines is there. So how do we know what is there and what it looks like? Do people see other people differently? But if all this is true and people saw what they thought then if they were a negative person then everything would go bad for them; in this sense, in a football game the negative person would see a dropped pass when a positive person would see a touch down. Hope you can answer. DJ
Peter Lipton
October 25, 2005
(changed October 25, 2005)
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I agree with you: people don't seem to see only what they are thinking, because negative people sometimes see positive things, and because we are all sometimes surprised by what we see. But to this one might reply that we can be surprised in dreams, even if in dreams we see only what was in... Read more
What is the definition of love? Can you define love without listing characteristics of love?
Alan Soble
October 30, 2005
(changed October 30, 2005)
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What a relief! Others have decided to add to this thread. The search for the fine gold thread of love -- the property "common to" and possessed by all types or forms of love -- has gone on for centuries. Another problem with Gert's succinct account is that it doesn't apply to our love for thin... Read more