Recent Responses
Can we call some thinkers like Baudrillard philosophers? If not, what is their writings, and if answer is yes, it means that philosophy is just a game!
Louise Antony
October 29, 2005
(changed October 29, 2005)
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"We" can call anyone we like a "philosopher". No one owns the term. The term "philosophy" has a broad meaning in public discourse -- it means something like "a systematic consideration of fundamental questions about meaning and existence." By that definition, Baudrillard (who I have neve... Read more
Who is the "I" that is "in control"? I read that in split-brain patients (post lesion of corpus callosum), instructions given in the left visual field - and therefore processed in the right hemisphere - are interpreted by the fluent left hemisphere as being of its own design. If the instruction says "Stand Up", the patient stands up but claims "I decided to stand up" or "I was getting uncomfortable so I stood up". Therefore is the "I" a cheerleader rather than an active player? Should one think of "oneself" as a plurality of agents? Thanks, Grant Masel
Louise Antony
October 29, 2005
(changed October 29, 2005)
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The question of the unity of the self is one that has engaged the attention of a lot of philosophers, particularly in light of phenomena such as the ones you cite. Advances in techniques for investigating the brain have also stimulated philosophical interest. This is all by way of stallin... Read more
How do philosophers address the nature-nurture controversy?
Louise Antony
October 29, 2005
(changed October 29, 2005)
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Let me add some comments to Mitch Green's and Gabriel Segal's. (And a quick plug: you might want to check out my entry on "Nativism" in the new edition of the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, due out soon.)
Two quick points, and then a longer one.
First: Showing that a trait has a "... Read more
Is it better to incarcerate someone who will not voluntarily take a necessary medication (anti-psychotic) or force them to do so? (How do we define "necessary"? Person is disruptive, person may commit a murder, person may commit suicide...) In other words, if they won't take the drug, they have to stay locked up. If they want to be free, someone will administer it to them as a condition of release. Thanks.
Jyl Gentzler
October 29, 2005
(changed October 29, 2005)
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The details of specific cases matter, but a general rule of thumb that many ethicists would endorse is that one may restrict another (adult) person’s freedom only if a significant harm will thereby be prevented. Further, one should use the least restrictive option compatible with preventin... Read more
Which is more important, the question or the answer?
Alexander George
October 28, 2005
(changed October 28, 2005)
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I'm not sure how to rank questions and answers by their importance. But I do think that if you focus exclusively on the questions and answers in philosophy you'll miss half (well, maybe a third) of the fun. Because one of the joys of philosophy is its arguments. Sometimes, the point o... Read more
Shouldn't the punishment for attempted murder be as severe as the punishment for murder no matter your ethical scheme? If your ethical scheme is based on universal moral principles (deontological?), then surely whatever is inherently bad about firing a gun at someone with the intent of ending their life is present whether or not you have good aim. And if you are a utilitarian, then it would seem equally risky to the populace to release a person who has expressed a tendency to try and kill people back on the streets.
Matthew Silverstein
October 28, 2005
(changed October 28, 2005)
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There is at least one good consequentialist reason for punishingattempted murder less severely than murder. If the two crimes arepunished equally, then the law will not deter someone who has tried andfailed to murder from trying again!
To the extent that the"successful murderer" is si... Read more
While I'm aware there are a number of theories of ethics (relativism, utilitarianism, consequentialism, etc.) is there any one that is favoured currently by philosophers (and if so, why)? It would also be extremely useful to see why/where each of these theories break down (often the correct hypothetical situation provides this).
Matthew Silverstein
October 28, 2005
(changed October 28, 2005)
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Most of the standard ethical theories have a decent following amongprofessional philosophers. You'll find compelling arguments for andagainst all of them. I tend to lean in a vaguely consequentialistdirection, and so I'll just mention my favorite anti-consequentialist hypothetical: th... Read more
Is there a good refutation of Ayn Rand's philosophy anywhere? Today it seems as though more and more people are using a simplified version of her approach to justify being completely selfish. Is there a philosophical defense of selfless service, or is this just naive idealism?
Matthew Silverstein
October 28, 2005
(changed October 28, 2005)
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I'm only moderately familiar with Rand's work, but one of my colleagues at the University of Michigan has a webpage devoted to refuting some of Rand's most well-known arguments. If you're interested, you can find it here.
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What is the definition of love? Can you define love without listing characteristics of love?
Alan Soble
October 30, 2005
(changed October 30, 2005)
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What a relief! Others have decided to add to this thread. The search for the fine gold thread of love -- the property "common to" and possessed by all types or forms of love -- has gone on for centuries. Another problem with Gert's succinct account is that it doesn't apply to our love for thin... Read more
I am reading a logic book which discussed the differences between Aristotelian Logic and Boole-Russell (modern) Logic. If the Boole-Russell logic leaves 5 valid moods out, which Aristotelian Logic covers, why do we continue to use Boole-Russell logic if it is "incomplete" per se?
Richard Heck
October 31, 2005
(changed October 31, 2005)
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There are some syllogistic figures that at least some Aristotleansregarded as valid that are not treated as valid by modern logic. Anexample would be: All Fs are G; all Gs are H; therefore, some Fs are H.This is valid if,but only if, one supposes that "univeraljudgements are existentially co... Read more