Recent Responses

Okay, so I'm currently taking a philosophy of religions course at a community college. Anyway my teacher had asked where morals come from and I responded with a social-evolutionary type of theory and his response was: Teacher: "Your faith in reason is matched only by the most devote religious believers." Me: Let's examine that word 'faith'. Faith by definition can mean two different things, one definition of faith is confidence. For example, I have faith in my abilities to win at a sport competition or something like that. The second is belief in something without any proof at all, like for example God. It is important that we note where this difference in usage, because depending on context - they mean two different things and using them interchangeably in the same way is equivocation. If one were to say - well you have faith in science, just like I have faith in god - this is an example of equivocation. Teacher: For the record, dictionary definitions are great for learning general senses of a term, they are terrible for understanding the etymology of a term. Hence, I do not agree that faith has different meanings, and as you offer no reason why one should believe that, I will give everyone a reason why they should not believe that. As one who has worked in religious studies for years, I am quite confident that faith is NOT equivocal with confidence, hence, there is no problem of equivocation as if I meant confidence I would have said confidence. As to whether faith is merely belief, if that were the case we wouldn't have had to create a word to keep the two apart would we? Now as to supporting this, I studied attic Greek and Latin, plus while studying medieval mysticism I had to struggle with a bit of Middle English. So I have a pretty good sense of how the term evolved. Now doxa--which is attic greek for belief/opinion--was a broad term that basically stood for any logos--account--that remained limited to koin doxa--common opinion. For example, Sparta held the doxa that killing the weak was good. Athens held the view that you need all levels of humanity--though don't make any mistake, the Athenians hated what was believed to be weak as well, just differently--thus they held different doxas. Interestingly, for much of the early development of humanity, doxa was enough. No one really cared if you were "right" about your opinion, if you were willing to defend it--often physically--that was more than enough. But then something changed, doxa was juxtaposed with episteme--knowledge. Episteme was the attic Greek term for "informed" opinion, i.e., a doxa that rested on some sort of support--and here many argue this is directly linked to the discover of mathematics; why the hell does 2+2=4?? Basically from that point forward one could either claim to "know" something, or to simply hold an opinion about something. That is basically the Intro course, so I will stop there. As to faith, it gets linked to hope, which is SUPER important for keeping in mind how/why faith is NOT mere opinion--and even less so knowledge as Kierkegaard so nicely explains it. Rather, faith extends beyond both opinion and knowledge in terms of the conditions under which it shows itself. Therefore, philosophically we limit knowledge to something akin to repeatability--warranted is sometimes used--that can be reproduced under the proper conditions. For example tin's melting point is 449.47 degrees at one atmosphere. That is a good example of knowledge as I can both repeat it and use it. Do I NEED to believe in melting points, not at all, only if I want things made of ores. But wait, what does that mean about knowledge? Is knowledge too limited to mere human opinion--interest perhaps? That is a loooooooong dark path so lets leave it there. Wanna follow it, dive deep into philosophy; and good luck. As to opinoin, I can be of the opinion that climate change is being directly influenced by human activity, but can I KNOW that is happening? I am not sure, at least not in the same way I know tin's melting point, or 2+2=4; see the difference? That said, someone that claims to KNOW climate change is NOT being influenced by humans is just as dogmatic--from the term doxa--as the one that claims to KNOW it is; they simply hold different opinions. Now is one more "informed" than the other, yes I would say so, but again looooong story. Lastly comes faith. I don't have to have faith in tin's melting point, nor do I necessarily have to have faith in my opinion about climate change. But what about what it means to be me? What about what it means to be a finite being destined to die? Are such things limited to mere opinion? They clearly stand beyond knowledge, so how do we deal with them? We have faith; we hope. And at that moment, doxa and episteme can suck it. End of Teacher's response. Okay so here's my problem with his argument, I don't see how he's not equivocating faith. I'm arguing that faith and belief are not synonyms and he seems to have missed that point. He says it's because of the etymology of the term faith, which for some reason he never gets into. But even if he did, I can't see how that isn't the etymological fallacy and I certainly don't see how doxa or episteme figure into the etymology of faith. This part too: "As to faith, it gets linked to hope, which is SUPER important for keeping in mind how/why faith is NOT mere opinion--and even less so knowledge as Kierkegaard so nicely explains it. Rather, faith extends beyond both opinion and knowledge in terms of the conditions under which it shows itself." He says it's super important, but doesn't explain (and again I never argued that faith was either of those things, I argued that they aren't synonyms for those things, but I digress) and this bit ""...nor do I necessarily have to have faith in my opinion about climate change." I cannot see a way in which this is not giving up the whole game to me. I was not talking about "what it means to be me"; I was talking about scientific theories about the natural world, of which climate change is surely a prime example. So I guess my question here is What exactly is faith and is my teacher correct or is he equivocating terms?

Gordon Marino August 8, 2014 (changed August 8, 2014) Permalink A fascinating reflection. You should write it up in the form of a Socratic dialogue. Perhaps your prof meant that your belief in science amounts to a faith in reason which is basically unsupported by reason or I suppose empirical data. Therefore, it is in the same league as faith in God. I have... Read more

One of the major criticisms that many cite against increased spending on "social safety nets" in America is that individuals in other countries are much worse off than even the poorest in America. While I have always been very supportive of policies that increase social mobility and economic opportunity, I have often found troubling countering this argument. While one could invoke such principles as equality or special compassion for fellow Americans, I can't seem to invoke another argument for why we should care so much about the plight of poor Americans. Does such an argument exist? Or are we forced to rely on those aforementioned principles, which not everyone may accept?

Oliver Leaman August 7, 2014 (changed August 7, 2014) Permalink The proposition that countries with safety nets have poorer poor people than those without is generally false, but even were it true there would need to be some connection between the safety net and the level of poverty before it could be concluded that this was a relevant issue. It would have... Read more

Can we assume that our pet dogs feel love towards us?

Jonathan Westphal August 7, 2014 (changed August 7, 2014) Permalink There are numerous complex issues here in the philosophy of so-called animal cognition or comparative ethology, but it seems to me that the burden of proof is with anyone who says no. The same issue arises, clearly, for human beings. So if we say that we do not know that the beagle feels lo... Read more

Is murder illegal because its wrong? Or is murder wrong because its illegal?

Andrew Pessin August 19, 2014 (changed August 19, 2014) Permalink a great question -- a deep one, and an old one -- basically grounded in the classic theistic question addressed by Plato (in Euthyphro) and many others since -- does God command us not to do things (such as murder) because they're wrong, or are they wrong (simply) because God commands us not... Read more

Is mathematics independent of human consciousness?

Stephen Maitzen August 7, 2014 (changed August 7, 2014) Permalink I'm strongly inclined to say yes. Here's an argument. If there's even one technological civilization elsewhere in our unimaginably vast universe, then that civilization must have discovered enough math to produce technology. But we have no reason at all to think that it's a human civilization... Read more

Is adultery really immoral? The act itself is mostly legal, so why can't it be mostly moral? I'm a male bachelor, so I can only argue from my point of view. Adultery is a simple biological urge that manifests itself onto two persons, one or both of whom are married. Marriage today is becoming more and more a simple legal contract, routinely terminated and routinely redefined by judges and plebiscites. The ease with which marriages can be terminated either on paper or in practice is just a reflection of the fact that people often change in their feelings towards one another--love fades within marriage and sometimes erupts outside marriage. Making it with a married woman can be very thrilling and the same woman would not be equally exciting if she were single; the supposedly unavailable is always more desirable than the easily attainable. Married women accept advances because their husbands can no longer give them excitement, romance or adventure, so why not a net utilitarian gain for two people, and no change for the unknowing cuckold?

William Rapaport August 5, 2014 (changed August 5, 2014) Permalink Because, for every X, there is a philosophy of X, it should come as no surprise that a well-known philosopher has written a book on this subject! I refer you to Richard Taylor's Having Love Affairs (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1982), isbn 0-87975-186-X, http://www.amazon.com/Having-Love-Aff... Read more

Is adultery really immoral? The act itself is mostly legal, so why can't it be mostly moral? I'm a male bachelor, so I can only argue from my point of view. Adultery is a simple biological urge that manifests itself onto two persons, one or both of whom are married. Marriage today is becoming more and more a simple legal contract, routinely terminated and routinely redefined by judges and plebiscites. The ease with which marriages can be terminated either on paper or in practice is just a reflection of the fact that people often change in their feelings towards one another--love fades within marriage and sometimes erupts outside marriage. Making it with a married woman can be very thrilling and the same woman would not be equally exciting if she were single; the supposedly unavailable is always more desirable than the easily attainable. Married women accept advances because their husbands can no longer give them excitement, romance or adventure, so why not a net utilitarian gain for two people, and no change for the unknowing cuckold?

William Rapaport August 5, 2014 (changed August 5, 2014) Permalink Because, for every X, there is a philosophy of X, it should come as no surprise that a well-known philosopher has written a book on this subject! I refer you to Richard Taylor's Having Love Affairs (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1982), isbn 0-87975-186-X, http://www.amazon.com/Having-Love-Aff... Read more

Hi, I'll just share my experiences as below and would just like to ask what principle or theory that could possibly explain the phenomenon? And what term you call it? I'm a computer programmer. Sometimes there are program logic related problems that I was trying to solve for hours, and yet cannot figure out the answers. But when I ask a colleague regarding the problem, in an instant, even before my colleague answers my question, I was able to draw the answer from my mind. Then, I'm going to tell my colleague, "uhm, ok, I know already! Thanks". It always happen. Sometimes, just the presence of another person would help you to resolve your problem.

Jonathan Westphal July 31, 2014 (changed July 31, 2014) Permalink You have described a fascinating phenomenon that I think is remarkably common, though I don't agree that it always happens It certainly happens frequently in my experience. Perhaps we both have very bright colleagues whom we happen to know very well, and can anticipate what they will say! I a... Read more

Hi, I'll just share my experiences as below and would just like to ask what principle or theory that could possibly explain the phenomenon? And what term you call it? I'm a computer programmer. Sometimes there are program logic related problems that I was trying to solve for hours, and yet cannot figure out the answers. But when I ask a colleague regarding the problem, in an instant, even before my colleague answers my question, I was able to draw the answer from my mind. Then, I'm going to tell my colleague, "uhm, ok, I know already! Thanks". It always happen. Sometimes, just the presence of another person would help you to resolve your problem.

Jonathan Westphal July 31, 2014 (changed July 31, 2014) Permalink You have described a fascinating phenomenon that I think is remarkably common, though I don't agree that it always happens It certainly happens frequently in my experience. Perhaps we both have very bright colleagues whom we happen to know very well, and can anticipate what they will say! I a... Read more

I have a question about reading certain philosophers, specifically Kant in my case, as "pre-requisites" for other philosophers. I'm not particularly interested in Kant, but I've been interested in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger for a long time now. I've heard though that to appreciate any of these three, you have to understand Kant first, so I recently started to read A Critique of Pure Reason. I'm sure I'll get something worthwhile out of the book if I stick with it, but I'm wondering whether you think it's worth taking on this demanding project just to prepare me for reading other philosophers. I'm also curious, in general, do you think there are certain cases where it is vital or important to read one philosopher's work before taking on another's? I've heard too that before you read A Critique of Pure Reason, you should read Descartes' Discourse on the Method, which would be another demanding project.

Nickolas Pappas July 31, 2014 (changed July 31, 2014) Permalink In the full sense of the word this question is unanswerable. I don’t know a serious educated person who does not worry about it. On the one hand, if you do not read philosophers in the right order you are bound to miss the significance of something the later person says. I’m not saying you r... Read more

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