The reason that Pascal's Wager doesn't seem convincing to me is that to me it seems that you can't assign a probability to something that doesn't have any empirical evidence. So all gods seems equally improbable. And so I would be equally likely to suffer eternal torture if I chose Islam, Mormonism or nothing. Although on further thought, I don't feel so sure any more, largely because of the same reasoning that lead me to the question I'm about to ask. But, after I read the thought experiment "Roko's Basilisk," it seems to me that you could also make a Pascal's Wager-style proposition without metaphysical claims, one that would involve probabilities. Something along the lines of this: Biologists know a lot about the human body. Those that know a lot about the human body are more likely to have the capabilities to torture me for eternity. Those that are more likely to have the capabilities to torture me for eternity are more likely to torture me for eternity. If I go spend time near biologists it is becomes more likely that I will be tortured for eternity. I ought to minimize my chances of eternal torture. Therefore I ought to avoid biologists. So then you might say "If you fervently try to avoid biologists, they will be more likely to pick you, because that is how sociopaths function, and a biologist who would torture you would surely be a sociopath". So then I should spend more time around biologists? Even if you say, I should act normally to have the smallest chance of getting picked, it still seems weird to do anything *because* of something that has such a small probabilty and for which there is so little evidence that supports it. I just seems like, that once you have any evidence at all, there is always a larger probability of eternal torture for some choice. Of course all this seems absurd, but there is still some internal conflict within me, and I am feeling very uneasy, because the premises seem acceptable. Eternal torture seems like it's worth minimizing the chances of, no matter what, and I don't want to throw my life away, hiding on the North Pole, or following whatever course of action that would seem to have the lowest probability of eternal torture. Any help you'd be willing to provide would be greatly appreciated.

If there is no god, why do people behave in a moral and ethical manner? One answer might be long-term self-interest: if you never tell a lie, for example, you will develop a favorable reputation among other people which will allow you to participate in all sorts of activities of which you would never be a part otherwise. Another answer might be "big picture" self-interest: people usually achieve more and have higher standards of living when they collaborate compared to when they compete: "competition" only works as a motivator when embedded in a broader collaborative structure first (i.e., if everyone plays by the rules, we aren't deliberately trying to injure a competitor because we don't want them trying to injure us and so we all place voluntary limits on our behaviors to promote a better outcome for all). While these answers are all well and good, there seems to be something missing: to be motivated SOLELY by self-interest, no matter how you dress it up, seems like a somewhat barren life. People also have passions, which one might consider to be supra-rational: while they may not be fully "rational" they are not "ir-"rational they transcend rationality. Passions, not logic, provide us the determination to persevere in the face of obstacles. People who believe that there is something greater than the self, of which we are a part, can draw upon this belief for a sense of connectedness with other people that provides a backdrop against which many great things can be accomplished. Much of what I just wrote, however, seems to me only to make sense in a spiritual tradition. If I understand correctly, atheists claim to reject these traditions. Other than "enlightened self-interest", is there anything else that would motivate an atheist to behave in a moral and ethical manner?

Isn't evil prove that God exist ? 1. Evil exists. 2. Evil is a departure from the way things ought to be. 3. If there is a departure from the way things ought to be, then there is a way things ought to be. 4. Therefore, there is a way things ought to be. 5. If there is a way things ought to be, then there is a design plan for things. 6. If there is a design plan for things, then there must be a Designer. 7. Therefore, there must be a Designer. If the universe is the product of chance as opposed to intelligence, then there is no design or purpose built into the universe. Since one can rationally apply a standard of goodness to an object only if that object was designed with the purpose of meeting that standard, isn't evil which itself is a deviation from that standard of goodness prove that God exist?

Religious people often claim that human rights must come from God. It seems to me that they could be wrong about their claim because of the objection posed by the Euthyphro dilemma. Am I right about this? Can we have a solid grounding of human rights even if there is no God?

Okay, so I'm currently taking a philosophy of religions course at a community college. Anyway my teacher had asked where morals come from and I responded with a social-evolutionary type of theory and his response was: Teacher: "Your faith in reason is matched only by the most devote religious believers." Me: Let's examine that word 'faith'. Faith by definition can mean two different things, one definition of faith is confidence. For example, I have faith in my abilities to win at a sport competition or something like that. The second is belief in something without any proof at all, like for example God. It is important that we note where this difference in usage, because depending on context - they mean two different things and using them interchangeably in the same way is equivocation. If one were to say - well you have faith in science, just like I have faith in god - this is an example of equivocation. Teacher: For the record, dictionary definitions are great for learning general senses of a term, they are terrible for understanding the etymology of a term. Hence, I do not agree that faith has different meanings, and as you offer no reason why one should believe that, I will give everyone a reason why they should not believe that. As one who has worked in religious studies for years, I am quite confident that faith is NOT equivocal with confidence, hence, there is no problem of equivocation as if I meant confidence I would have said confidence. As to whether faith is merely belief, if that were the case we wouldn't have had to create a word to keep the two apart would we? Now as to supporting this, I studied attic Greek and Latin, plus while studying medieval mysticism I had to struggle with a bit of Middle English. So I have a pretty good sense of how the term evolved. Now doxa--which is attic greek for belief/opinion--was a broad term that basically stood for any logos--account--that remained limited to koin doxa--common opinion. For example, Sparta held the doxa that killing the weak was good. Athens held the view that you need all levels of humanity--though don't make any mistake, the Athenians hated what was believed to be weak as well, just differently--thus they held different doxas. Interestingly, for much of the early development of humanity, doxa was enough. No one really cared if you were "right" about your opinion, if you were willing to defend it--often physically--that was more than enough. But then something changed, doxa was juxtaposed with episteme--knowledge. Episteme was the attic Greek term for "informed" opinion, i.e., a doxa that rested on some sort of support--and here many argue this is directly linked to the discover of mathematics; why the hell does 2+2=4?? Basically from that point forward one could either claim to "know" something, or to simply hold an opinion about something. That is basically the Intro course, so I will stop there. As to faith, it gets linked to hope, which is SUPER important for keeping in mind how/why faith is NOT mere opinion--and even less so knowledge as Kierkegaard so nicely explains it. Rather, faith extends beyond both opinion and knowledge in terms of the conditions under which it shows itself. Therefore, philosophically we limit knowledge to something akin to repeatability--warranted is sometimes used--that can be reproduced under the proper conditions. For example tin's melting point is 449.47 degrees at one atmosphere. That is a good example of knowledge as I can both repeat it and use it. Do I NEED to believe in melting points, not at all, only if I want things made of ores. But wait, what does that mean about knowledge? Is knowledge too limited to mere human opinion--interest perhaps? That is a loooooooong dark path so lets leave it there. Wanna follow it, dive deep into philosophy; and good luck. As to opinoin, I can be of the opinion that climate change is being directly influenced by human activity, but can I KNOW that is happening? I am not sure, at least not in the same way I know tin's melting point, or 2+2=4; see the difference? That said, someone that claims to KNOW climate change is NOT being influenced by humans is just as dogmatic--from the term doxa--as the one that claims to KNOW it is; they simply hold different opinions. Now is one more "informed" than the other, yes I would say so, but again looooong story. Lastly comes faith. I don't have to have faith in tin's melting point, nor do I necessarily have to have faith in my opinion about climate change. But what about what it means to be me? What about what it means to be a finite being destined to die? Are such things limited to mere opinion? They clearly stand beyond knowledge, so how do we deal with them? We have faith; we hope. And at that moment, doxa and episteme can suck it. End of Teacher's response. Okay so here's my problem with his argument, I don't see how he's not equivocating faith. I'm arguing that faith and belief are not synonyms and he seems to have missed that point. He says it's because of the etymology of the term faith, which for some reason he never gets into. But even if he did, I can't see how that isn't the etymological fallacy and I certainly don't see how doxa or episteme figure into the etymology of faith. This part too: "As to faith, it gets linked to hope, which is SUPER important for keeping in mind how/why faith is NOT mere opinion--and even less so knowledge as Kierkegaard so nicely explains it. Rather, faith extends beyond both opinion and knowledge in terms of the conditions under which it shows itself." He says it's super important, but doesn't explain (and again I never argued that faith was either of those things, I argued that they aren't synonyms for those things, but I digress) and this bit ""...nor do I necessarily have to have faith in my opinion about climate change." I cannot see a way in which this is not giving up the whole game to me. I was not talking about "what it means to be me"; I was talking about scientific theories about the natural world, of which climate change is surely a prime example. So I guess my question here is What exactly is faith and is my teacher correct or is he equivocating terms?

Hello there. Some contemporary philosophers say that Aquinas' arguments for the existence of God are good arguments (eg John Haldane), whilst others think they are no good. Lots and lots of philosophers and philosophy books seem to not understand the arguments properly (I can remember being taught the arguments in the philosophy department of one of the most prominent universities in my country where, looking back, with hindsight I am pretty sure the teacher did not understand the arguments well at all). So who to believe?? Any suggestions would be interesting! Thank you in advance.

I have a question about atheism and semantics, although I'm not sure I can phrase it properly, as it also includes the concept of "belief" separate from "doctrine." Here goes: atheists claim that they do not believe in "God" while they do believe in ethics, morality, a concept of right and wrong. It seems to me that anyone who says they believe in right and wrong also implicitly believes that there is something more important than one's own personal ego gratification (in other words, everyone "should" curtail their own gratification to the extent that such gratification harms other people). To me, that seems semantically equivalent to a belief in God, except that the concept of "God" also includes an association in most people's minds with a particular doctrine. It sounds to me that atheists are merely rejecting all the doctrinal beliefs that accompany organized religion, while at the very root or core of the situation, do accept that they need to defer their own gratification to something greater or more important than themselves. How can a person say on one hand that they believe that something is more important than the self and also say at the same time that nothing exists that is more important than the self? [my assumption being that "something more important than the self" = "god" and the rest of the debate is only about terminology and doctrine). Thanks for any clarifying insights you can provide.

Hello philosophers , recently in a debate with Christians , I made a point that if one claims a relationship with a God or being that can't be seen , heard or touched that they are suffering from a delusion; is this an unfair statement and if so why ?

Hi Philosophers, I have a burning question that is troubling me relating the religion versus science debate. I hope I articulate it well enough. Here goes. Mathematically, physicists are close to proving that a multiverse exists. Assuming they do prove this, and that as part of this proof it is deemed that infinity universes exist with both every conceivable and inconceivable possibility and outcome occurring throughout, then is it not fair to say that God certainly exists in at least one of these infinite possibility universes? Adversely, it is also fair to assume that God certainly does not exist in at least one of these universes? Then consider that if God certainly exists in at least one universe, and he is the all-seeing, all-knowing God that religion states he is, then how can he certainly not exist in at least one of the infinite universes? To say that God definitely exists is to, by definition of God, say that he exists everywhere and created everything, yet this notion within the multiverse theory eliminates the possibility of infinite outcomes as there can be no single constant to infinite possibilities. By definition of infinite outcomes, there must be at least one multiverse outcome where God doesn't exist. Will the theory of the multiverse, if proven, both unequivocally prove and unequivocally disprove the existence of God at the same time?

Is it right to call a believer rational even if she cannot prove articulately or give good arguments for her belief in God? Let's just say I ask a believer "Why do you believe in God?" and she simply answered, "Because I've experienced God's grace in my life," and she needs no arguments or other evidences for her belief, is her position justifiable? I personally thinks it is but if that is the case, then what would make belief in God irrational, if simply certain personal experiences can justify such belief?