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Our panel of 90 professional philosophers has responded to

Question of the day

You're right that according to the JTB analysis of the concept of knowledge (it's really an analysis rather than an argument), propositional knowledge is identical to justified, true belief. Gettier cases, as you say, are meant to show that knowledge requires more than justified, true belief. But Gettier cases don't proceed by assuming a different analysis (or definition) of knowledge than the JTB analysis: if they did that, they would be guilty of begging the question against the JTB analysis.

Instead, Gettier cases involve scenarios in which intuitively the subject lacks knowledge of a proposition despite having a justified, true belief of the proposition. We're supposed to agree that, intuitively, Smith doesn't know the proposition Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, even if we don't have in mind any specific definition of "knowledge."

Compare: If I propose an analysis of the concept of a lie on which a lie is nothing more than a false utterance, you can refute my analysis by pointing to any case in which someone innocently misspoke and got the facts wrong. You can do so without having in mind a specific definition of "a lie."

What, then, is the correct analysis of knowledge? Good question. See this SEP entry for an excellent discussion of the topic.