Interesting question! Please forgive me for replying with what is probably the classic philosophical response: it depends what you mean by "faith." If by "faith" you mean something like trust, then I think philosophy must involve trust. One must (at a minimum) trust one's own faculties / thinking / reflection. Linda Zagzebski has been arguing recently for the essential role of self-trust in all thinking. This is also an area that Keith Lehrer has contributed to. If by "faith" one instead means a body of religious beliefs or convictions, then a lot of philosophy does function independent of faith though not all philosophy. For many medieval thinkers and some contemporaries Anselm (1033-1109) and Nicholas Wolterstorff today philosophical reflection can take place from the standpoint of faith. This does not mean such philosophers thereby cut themselves off from philosophers who are not working from any faith perspective. Rather, it means the scope of what counts as philosophy becomes broader. And...

Your question is excellent. Though I am afraid your proposal is not completely novel insofar as Plato initiated a philosophy of ideal forms in all areas of life (the good, the true, the beautiful, the just, and so on), though of course he was working long before we began carving up inquiry into the different natural and social sciences. At many points in the history of ideas, philosophers have worked with ideal or what has come to be called paradigm cases. So, in the theory of knowledge, a philosopher might describe an ideal or paradigm case of what it is to know some internal state (the feeling of pain) or see a remote object and then use that paradigm to assess different, more controversial knowledge-claims. So, one might entertain an ideal case of what it is to see a person, and then ask whether claims to see or perceive a sacred reality (God) in religious experience is similar or too remote to count as evidence. And in ethics we often use thought experiments to try to capture the different values...

I suggest that no matter how developed our brain sciences become, we will still have philosophy because the sciences themselves rest on philosophy, a scientific worldview. Without a concept of ourselves, causation and explanation, concepts of observation, and so on, we would not have any science. As for whether philosophers will have to be accomplished neurologists, I think that those philosophers working on human nature will at least need to have a general understanding of the methods and findings of the brain sciences and the general state of play in physics, chemistry, biology and psychology, but not to the point of actually being a scientist in any one of these domains. There are many issues that cannot be settled within the brain sciences themselves, including the nature of thought, emotion, desire, sensation, and so on. I suggest that whether or not machines can think or that human thinking is identical with brain processes is a philosophical matter that cannot be determined scientifically.

The medieval philosophers used to think of existence in terms of degrees, and some in modern philosophy entertained such an idea (Kant, for example, described God as the most real being). but usually existence is not treated as something that comes in kinds or degrees or in different senses. Actually, some philosophers seek to avoid the term 'exists' unless really pressed upon. So, for example, a philosopher might think it less misleading to say that Dumbledor is a character in Rowlings' novels rather than to say that Dumbledor exists in Rowlings' novels. There are, however, two areas when 'existence' as a term / concept gets a bit tricky: some theologians believe that to claim 'God exists' is to treat God as simply one of any number of things that exist. Some of them, therefore, prefer simply to refer to God without the word 'exist' or 'existence' (e.g. affirming there is a God of love rather than claiming there exists a God of love). One philosopher in the last century speculated about whether...

Wow. I am also 57 and I admire your candor and your question(s), but I am troubled by your situation. Your mention of the social contract brings to mind one of the problems with political and ethical contractarian theories. They are usually based on some form of psychological or ethical egoism or at least self-interest (Hobbes assumes we all wish to avoid premature violent death and the best way to avoid this is to form a community of mutual restraint). But once the culture or community ceases to serve our self-interest or, worse, it actively undermines our welfare, the motivation for conforming to laws, etc, seems to vanish. From the standpoint of Hobbesian contract theory, you are not being a bad person, but acting in accord with rational self-interest. Some forms of natural law might also cut you some slack: unjust contracts are not inforceable. If you are currently being preyed upon by unjust institutions, they may have waived some of their rights --just as if you are held up by a thief and you...

Great question, though "create" may not be the best term when you might refer to giving birth to a child. It seems that without considerable details, it would be very difficult indeed to answer your question. Still, one can identify some of the values that are in play. In adopting a child, it seems that you are exercising your voluntary will (it would be odd or unusual to adopt a child by accident or be compelled to do so) whereas in some cases getting pregnant may not be a choice or a voluntary one. In adoption you also may be acting to prevent harm (e.g. if the child is not adopted, perhaps she would remain in an orphanage until she comes of age) and bring about good to someone who (in most cases) already exists, whereas the child you have would not exist unless you and your partner had intercourse and the pregnancy came to term. In some respects, I suggest that giving birth to a child is the primary good. Every person, whether they will be adopted or remain with their birth family, has been, is...

Very interesting! Your specific interest seems to be vulgarity as opposed to blasphemy (e.g. using 'God' or 'Jesus' in cursing) or insults in general. I am not acquainted with much philosophical work on vulgarity per se, but there is some literature on politeness and respect that may be relevant. Some have argued that politeness is a virtue itself (what Hobbes called small morals) while others have contended that politeness is a reflection of greater virtues (the shadow of great virtues, to use G.K. Chesterton's expression). I suggest that vulgarity may be used for a host of reasons: to insure familiarity with someone, to use as an insult, to simply get attention, and so on. There was an important Supreme Court case in the USA --I believe it was Cohen versus California-- in which it was argued that a person had a right to wear a shirt that had the words "Fuck the Draft" on it because only using the explicative was the person able to fully express his convictions and thus it was protected under our...

This raises a number of issues. Perhaps the categories you are identifying (most wanted, where you want to be, most useful, most needed, more rational) need to be subordinated to the concept what is good, irrespective of who wants what. So if you are choosing between two partners (to take your example) you might think first and foremost about whether the relatioship would be good (contribute to each other's flourishing, for example) for one or both of you and, once you have determined that, it will follow naturally (presumably) that you will want that which is mutually satisfying and fulfilling. Without identifying the context of a decision in terms of goods, just being needed by a person or thing would not itself be a good reasons for you to pursue or want that person or thing. I think the same is likely true in terms of wants. Merely wanting X (without any other information) may not be a sufficient reason to pursue X or to think it good for you to pursue X. If, however, you secure some concept of...

Good question(s)! I suggest the idea of a person living on in the memories of others is somewhat problematic, especially given that (assuming you are correct) death involves a person ceasing to be. But it may be that your life still has meaning in at least two ways: while you would not live on in others' memories, the significance of your life and the values you had might well live on with others. Of course if modern astronomy is correct all life on earth will end in about 4 billion years, so this bit about living on indefinitely will be a bit tricky. A second way to approach your question would be to refer to the point of view of the universe or the point of view of some ideal observer. This is also a little problematic, however, as it seems that the universe cannot (literally) have a point of view and if the ideal observer is merely hypothetical (viz. there is no God) and so this might also be a difficult foundation to secure meaning. Perhaps thre is a third option: four dimensionalism. According...

Actually, art and tragedy in particular had an ambivalent role in some ancient Greek philosophy. In the Republic and the Ion, Plato presented a critique of art based on his imitation (mimetc) account of art. For Plato, art was merely imitatory and tragedy in particular involved the magnification of evil. Plato held that if X is evil, the imitation of X is evil. In the Republic he spoke of the warefare between poetry and philosophy. But art and tragedy had a major defender in Aristotle who thought imitation is itself the key to education and he further proposed that tragedy was an essential instrument in the purification of our moral judgments. In the history of philosophy, outside the ancients, probably the leading defender of Greek tragedy is Nietzsche. Among more recent philosophers, you might consult Gadamer on art.