There is something disrespectful about such a claim alright: one is not engaging with the opponent's expressed view on its merits but is dismissing this view as not based on conscientious, reliable reflection. But then such a claim may be true: some people do indeed hold views that are unconsciously motivated by the kind of factors you mention. In any case, one may conscientiously reach the conclusion that another's view is so motivated, and stating such a conclusion may not then be disingenuous.

A case very similar to the one you imagine is found in Kant's writing. The case is so widespread in academic life that we can be pretty sure that Kant was speaking from experience. An author comes up to you and asks: "How do you like my publication?". Well, you actually don't think much of it at all. So what to do? Kant considers that there may be some (perhaps humorous) way of avoiding a straight answer; but it must be found very quickly, because the author has his eyes firmly fixed on you and will be distraught at the slightest hesitation. So is it alright to mislead this poor author -- perhaps with adjectives such as "interesting", "amazing", "unexpected", "special", "solid", "painstaking", which, in his hunger for confirmation, he will understand as praise for the quality of his work? Is it alright to stretch words beyond ordinary vagueness, saying that it's a "good" book, or at least a "decent" one -- or that you "got a lot out of it" or "enjoyed reading it"? Kant doesn't answer his question....

In first approximation, the fair price is the one that would emerge in a well-structured open market if the existing distribution of socio-economic positions were replaced by the one that would exist in the absence of historical wrongs under just social institutions (leaving all else -- and especially the current stage of technological and economic development -- constant). This answer accepts the libertarian position for the special case of just social institutions but rejects it for conditions of injustice. Stated in this way, most libertarians would agree. They would agree, for example, that transactions in a feudal society (which leaves landless persons no choice but to subject themselves to the authority of a landlord) do not establish fair prices even when buyer and seller agree. Still, libertarians, Rawlsians, socialists, etc., have quite diverse views about what just social institutions would be like. So, while they can all formally accept the answer I have given, they will not thereby be...

Versions of this Golden Rule appear in various cultures, and modern philosophical scrutiny can easily make fun of this Rule. Thus Kant asks what the judge should do with a defendant guilty of murder -- she wouldn't like to be jailed for many years, so she should presumably let him go. Amusing counterexamples could be multiplied endlessly: is the mother obligated to suck the breast of her infant son? Is the greedy adolescent obligated to write a will in favor of his rich aunt? And is one really obligated to bestow upon others all the myriad kindnesses that one would like others to bestow upon oneself? Much has been written about the Golden Rule -- also about it's "negative" version that you should not treat others as you would not want them to treat you -- in an effort to find an interpretation that is plausible. It is probably not possible to find a formulation that is plausible across the board and still a credible interpretation of the Rule you cite. Even if the Golden Rule is not workable as...

The existing situation is bad in at least two ways. First, your lover is deceiving her husband and the father of her child who is, as you put it, a reasonable man. He deserves better. If his wife does not love him, he should know this and have a chance to plan the rest of his life in light of this knowledge. Second, your affair is likely to come to light at some point, and this might have much worse consequences for all involved, including the child, than a frank confession. I see two potential ways out of the problematic situation. First, you can agree to end the affair. You can still write each other, see each other occasionally, perhaps, but you should then try to meet the husband and make quite sure that there is no return to a romantic relationship. If this is unworkable, this first option would call for a complete end of the relationship. Second, you could agree to marry each other after a divorce. You write that this was not workable earlier "because of the social issues". I don't know...

Your rent-free lifestyle does not wrong your parents who can easily afford you and are apparently willing to do so. And there's also nothing wrong with refusing to live like everyone else does -- some of the most admirable people in human history did just that. If everyone in this world were as well-off as you are, then there would be nothing immoral about your way of life. It would merely be lackluster, irrelevant, and boring for everyone but yourself. Pretty much everything worthwhile and interesting in this world is there thanks to human beings living with more than your level of ambition. But then not everyone in this world is as well-off as you are. And in this case, I think, your lifestyle does qualify as immoral. There are lots of people in this country and even more so abroad who are vastly worse off than you are, and you have a moral responsibility to do your share to fight these deprivations -- as many others are doing, through volunteer work, donations, and so on. If you had a job,...

From the description you give, it does not sound to me like your husband is, or ever was, in love with you. You might at least consider the possibility that his insistence on marriage -- "he could not be my friend without marring me because he was in love with me" -- was driven more by his immigration issues than by any combination of love and religion. Should this be the case, then you have no substantial obligation to stay. You are under no obligation to marry someone to help him get a desired citizenship. Nor do you have strong moral reason to stick to a commitment you once made to him if in making it you relied upon deceptive or misleading statements by him. Even if he is, in some sparkless way, in love with you, you are not in love with him. You should have a real chance to be an A student again, to fall in love, to have a bright life with sparks. What you are missing seems rather more substantial than the benefit he derives from your sacrifice. Moreover, by deciding against giving even more...

Kant believed that you should only permit yourself to do what you could will all others to be permitted to do as well. So you are to ask yourself: what if the maxim on which I am about to act were available to all others as well? Here is an example. Hijackers are holding 200 passengers hostage in a plane. They are threatening to kill passengers one by one unless their demands are met. Being the designated police negotiator, you might be able to win time by telling them, falsely, that the government is making arrangements toward meeting some of their demands. Here Kant would say: suppose your proposed maxim -- lie to hijackers to postpone the execution of hostages -- were universally available. Then everyone would understand that such lies are permissible. And then hijackers could not be influenced by such lies -- they, too, would know that in a situation like the present you are permitted to lie. So the lie you are about to permit to yourself can work only because this permission isn't universal...

I disagree with Oliver's response to this question. In my view, "letting happen" is best understood as remaining passive when one might instead be averting harm from others by helping or protecting them. The failure to save a drowning swimmer would be an example, as would be the failure to prevent a child from running into a busy road. But the case you described is not one in which the agent remains passive. He actively escapes the camp and then the country, thereby knowingly triggering the events that lead to the deaths of his immediate family. Had he remained passive, his family would not have been killed. It is normally wrong to act in a way that one knows will lead to the deaths of innocent people -- even if one does not intend these deaths. It is wrong, for instance, to buy up a lot of corn in poor countries for ethanol fuel production when one can easily foresee that this will lead to many starvation deaths among the poor due to higher food prices. In the case you describe, two special...

The justification goes something like this. The United States is under various current and potential threats from foreign sources. It is the government's responsibility, as a matter of national security, to keep these threats at bay and perhaps to neutralize them. This task can be made easier or much harder by public attitudes within the US itself. The US failed to prevail in the Vietnam War, for example, because many of its citizens were no longer willing to accept the aerial bombardment of villages with napalm and cluster bombs. To effectively safeguard the national security of the United States and to protect its citizens, it is necessary, then, to establish and maintain a widespread willingness among the American people to support US foreign and military policy. This in turn makes it necessary to withhold from the American people, or to sanitize, any information that might adversely affect their support. Concealing war crimes committed by US soldiers, US contractors or US allies is often as...