Many people would agree that to use the word "gay" as a term meaning "bad" is disrespectful, or even homophobic. Only slightly fewer people hold a similar view of the word "retarded." However, there are also people who take a stronger position, according to which words like "insane" and "lame" are similarly degrading and inappropriate (I've heard these words described as "ableist"). Although the stronger position strikes me as incorrect, I can't say why. Is there any way to draw a distinction between the use of words like "gay" and words like "insane" as generally pejorative terms? Or will we one day agree that all such usage is comparable to racist or sexist language? What is it exactly that makes such usage problematic?

Words have meanings, but they also have histories. The term "Paddy Wagon" is defined in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as "an enclosed motortruck used by police to carry prisoners." That definition is adequate, if all you want to know is what people are talking about when they use that term. But if this definition is all you ever know about the term, you will be baffled by the fact that people of Irish descent usually take offense when they hear that term used. To understand why they have that reaction, you need to know where that expression came from. You need to know that "paddy" is a derogatory way of referring to an Irish person or a person of Irish descent, and you need to know that there used to be (and maybe still is) a stereotyped belief that people of Irish descent are more likely than others to drink heavily and to become rowdy and disorderly -- so disorderly that police must come and pick them up by the "wagon"-load. Originally, bigoted people who used the expression "paddy wagon" to...

I have a question concerning the gender of words that exist in many languages, except in English. What does the presence of grammatical gender in a language say about the mentality of its speakers? A different question is whether the features of a language reflect the characteristics of the societies where it's spoken in a largely unconscious and involuntary way. (Modern) Persian, spoken in Iran and Afghanistan, doesn't have the feature of grammatical gender (anymore), just as English. Many say that the languages that do have grammatical genders are sexist, and that they help to perpetuate the conviction that sex is a tremendously important matter in all areas. For Marilyn Frye, this is a key factor in perpetuating male dominance: male dominance requires the belief that men and women are importantly different from each other, so anything that contributes to the impression that sex differences are important is therefore a contributor to male dominance. Societies whose languages do not have...

As a matter of fact, there are some psychologists and psycholinguists investigating the very question you ask. Lera Boroditsky, at Stanford University, has data that suggest that speakers of languages that use broad gender marking do associate more feminine characteristics with things whose names are marked as feminine, and more masculine traits with things whose names are marked as masculine. You can read a summary of that research here: http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~lera/papers/gender.pdf She argues that these and other data show that language shapes thought. However, psycholinguists at U Penn (Lila Gleitman and John Trueswell), and at Delaware (Anna Papafragou) argue against the view that language shapes thought in this way. (Here's a link to a very readable paper by Gleitman and Papafragou on this topic: http://papafragou.psych.udel.edu/papers/Language%20and%20thought.pdf I don't think that Frye's case depends on how this particular debate comes out. Her point is that there are ...

Dear sir or madam, I have a question about language, epistemology, and truth. When I make the statement "it's hot in here" is that a statement about external reality or my internal perception? Is this an objective claim (i.e. there is such-and-such temperature and that qualifies as "hot") or simply my perception of an occurrence (i.e. I don't like how hot it is.) The former explanation seems compelling since we can argue about that statement: you can claim that it's not hot in here; I simply came inside from a room with air conditioning, so I *think* it is hot and am mistaken. On the other hand, the latter explanation makes sense since we are only perceiving the heat in the room and not taking any kind of empirical index. But, if this explanation is true, why do we use objective language about the room rather than our experience of the room? It seems to me like this might be a kind of "in-between" claim: based on my experience of the room and my understanding of the experience that would likely elicit...

The surface grammar of the sentence “It’s hot in here” suggests that the sentence is about an objective state of the room. Let’s start there. There are two features of the assertion of this sentence that make you think it might not be about the temperature of the room: first, the assertion is based on a subjective experience of mine, and second, it uses the vague term “hot”. Let’s start with the first consideration. Notice that any claim anyone makes about contingent states of the external world is, if it’s a justified claim, going to be based on that person’s sensory experiences. If I say “You forgot to turn off the burner on the stove,” my claim will probably be based on seeing the flame, but my statement is a statement about the burner, not about my visual experience. Or if I say, “Something’s burning,” it’s probably because I smell the scorched butter, but it’s still the butter I’m talking about. (Guess what I did this morning making breakfast.) Contrast these cases with cases where I...

My question is about poetry's relationship with the languages from which it is constructed. Many words from the vocabularies of natural languages are onomatopoeic (where words sound like sounds they describe: 'bang!'; 'crack'; etc.) and some argue that other words 'sound' like the objects they describe. In one of his novels' insightful footnotes, Terry Pratchett proposed that "There should be a word for words that sound like things would sound like if they made a noise, he thought. The word "glisten" does indeed gleam oilily, and if there ever was a word that sounded exactly the way sparks look as they creep across burned paper, or the way the lights of cities would creep across the world if the whole of human civilization was crammed into one night, then you couldn't do better than "coruscate"." (Equal Rites by Terry Pratchett, pg 207) Whether or not these observations can be considered correct is the first part of my question. Although "a rose by any other name would smell as sweet", it seems...

The project of "improving" "the" language is one that has captured the imaginations of many people over time, but it seems to me to be a foolish one to undertake. Let me explain, by explaining my use of scare quotes. First: "the" language. There's no such thing. If you look at speakers of so-called "English," you'll find that they will differ in their vocabularies, in their grammars, and above all, in the emotional and aesthetic associations they attach to their words. What binds us together is merely the fact that we can to a significant degree understand each other's verbal behavior. But the engines of linguistic change are perpetual motion machines. Slang, idioms, metaphors, abbreviations, invented words -- they all pop in and out of existence, and they're all good. Amidst all this variety, talk of "the" English language is nothing more than abstract idealization -- useful for some scientific purposes, perhaps, but not to be thought of as literally true of human linguistic activity....

Many different intellectuals have argued that using language in a certain way conduces to certain attitudes and beliefs in the speaker (I'm thinking mostly of feminist theorists who argue that our language both betrays and reinforces sexist and heteronormative worldviews). A great deal of literature presupposes the truth of this idea. I can see why this is such an attractive theory; it seems entirely plausible, and, if true, its implications would be deep. At the same time, however, I wonder if philosophers and theorists aren't overstepping their bounds in claims like this; if a certain way of talking inclines us toward a certain way of thinking and acting, isn't this in fact an empirical question? I can imagine how using masculine pronouns could instill sexist attitudes in a person -- but imagining is very different from proving.

I completely agree with you: it does seem plausible that noninclusive language fosters or reflects sexist thought and behavior, but it is in fact an empirical issue. This is, as it happens, a hot topic among psycholinguists at the moment. The research of Stanford psychologist Lera Boroditsky (view some of the work here: http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~lera/papers/ ) suggests that how we talk does affect how we think, and in particular, that the gender coding of nouns affects the properties we attribute to their referents. University of Pennsylvania psychologist Lila Gleitman has evidence, however, that how we talk has virtually no effect on how we think. I couldn't find a link to relevant work of hers, but here's her homepage: http://www.psych.upenn.edu/~gleitman/ There's probably a lot of relevant work in social psychology, among scholars who study the development of stereotypes and so forth, but I don't know that literature. Colleagues? Benjamin Whorf took the idea that talk...

Do men need speech in order to think? In other words, can we do the act of thinking without "speaking" to ourselves consciously or unconsciously? For myself, I use colloquial English, the language I am most fluent in, when I think in my mind. Does it have to be the case that one would use his or her most developed language to think?

There are two competing views on this. The first view -- possibly the more popular view among philosophers -- is that thought and language are essentially tied together, so that there cannot be one without the other. (Leave aside all the evidence from casual observation that it's all too possible to talk without thinking). The argument for this view appeals to the evidence we generally need for attributing thoughts to others -- namely, verbal behavior. (You can read a good example of this sort of argument in an article by Donald Davidson called "Thought and Talk." ) There is also the consideration you raise, that thinking sort of "feels" like talking silently to oneself. But the inconvenient thing about this view is that it requires us to deny that pre-verbal children and animals have thought. And while we don't have all the evidence for attributing thinking to such beings that we have in the case of fully verbal adults, we do nonetheless have lots of evidence that such beings think. ...