The reason that Pascal's Wager doesn't seem convincing to me is that to me it seems that you can't assign a probability to something that doesn't have any empirical evidence. So all gods seems equally improbable. And so I would be equally likely to suffer eternal torture if I chose Islam, Mormonism or nothing. Although on further thought, I don't feel so sure any more, largely because of the same reasoning that lead me to the question I'm about to ask.
But, after I read the thought experiment "Roko's Basilisk," it seems to me that you could also make a Pascal's Wager-style proposition without metaphysical claims, one that would involve probabilities. Something along the lines of this:
Biologists know a lot about the human body.
Those that know a lot about the human body are more likely to have the capabilities to torture me for eternity.
Those that are more likely to have the capabilities to torture me for eternity are more likely to torture me for eternity.
If I go spend time near biologists it is...
I guess I am a bit more skeptical about getting anything of value from arguments like Pascal's wager. What makes the wager go, at least as the argument is under discussion here, is the threat of eternal torment if you don't pick correctly. One problem with the wager may be seen if we imagine two dieties who are in complete and implacable conflict over what they want from us. One of these dieties mandates honoring mothers and fathers; one mandates dishonoring mothers and fathers...and so on. Each one is associated with the threat of eternal torment if we fail to live in accordance with their mandates (or, if we fail to believe in them). It may seem that choosing either one "is superior to atheism/agnosticism" if these are our only choices, since if we don't choose either, we're damned either way, but if we choose one, we have what appears to be a 50/50 chance. But to see why this is wrong, bring in a third diety, who mandates that you believe in no dieties, and who would comdemn you to eternal...