In a code of intellectual conduct in a truth-seeking argument between A and B for positions X and NOT X respectively, starting a new thread of attacking the person A either by B or by the some members of the audience is definitely a fallacious argument (Argumentum ad Hominem) for the context under discussion. What about glorifying tributes to person A by some members of the audience as a part of the SAME thread of discussion? It obviously is irrelevent to the argument or the issue under discussion. How far is it inappropriate, sinister, or otherwise in the code of conduct in an intellectual truth-seeking debate between two participants A and B in front of the gallery of audience? My strong gut sense is the behaviour is inappropriate because it does not contribute to the strengthening or weakening of arguments in favor or against X. What do the panel of distinquished philosophers have to say on this (not so much the irrelevance but the inappropriateness as an intellectual conduct)?

If you're after truth, it's often a big win to trust people. And in deciding whom to trust, the reports and evalutions of others can be of great value. So there's nothing specifically about truth-seeking that makes it inappropriate to support, or indeed to attack, the reliability of someone who claims to know the answers. However, if a person is trying to establish something not by asking you to trust their word but by claiming to provide reasons which, independently of their source , ought to convince you, then you seem to be right that testaments to their character are as out of place as personal attacks. Similarly, there are two different ways to evaluate the validity of a mathematical proof: you might rely on the expertise and good will of the person who supplied it, or you might evaluate it step by step. In the former case evidence as to the person's character and track record is obviously relevant; in the latter, not. But maybe that's too simple. Even if the propounder of an...

Two eight year old children keep their rooms in immaculate condition. One does it because she believes Santa is coming. The other does it because she simply believes it's the right thing to do (i.e., helping out her parents, being responsible, etc.). Both girls behaviors are identical. Which is the more moral? Thanks, Jeff

I take your point to be that motivation matters to our moral assessment: the latter child, unlike the former, is acting for admirable reasons. Sure. However, as a parent, I reject your first premise: that two eight year old children keep their rooms in immaculate condition.

My question is about the relationship between God, determinism and ethics. In my opinion if there is no God, then it looks like people do not have any non-physical "soul". I think most people would agree with this, partly because people usually reject God in favour of a naturalistic worldview in which the soul similarly has no place. But if people do not have any "soul" then that must mean that that people do not have free will, because they are entirely physical. But if people do not have free will then I don't understand how any ethics could exist, because ethics surely requires that people can choose. So, if this is correct, then if you want to argue for some kind of ethics, then you have to accept the existence of God. But there is clearly an endless amount of Philosophers who don't believe in God and do argue for some kind of ethics, such as David Hume or Bertrand Russell. But how can they do this? What I think you will say is that maybe ethics can exist even without free will. But surely this...

Most of your question is an excellent formulation of a major philosophical issue: whether minds, if they are merely parts of the general causal order, can possibly have the sort of authorship of their actions that would be required to hold them responsible---how can right and wrong get a foothold if we're just machines? Some say there's no problem here; others are more concerned. Rather than attempt a paltry paragraph on current views about this, let me point you to Timothy O'Connor's article in the Stanford Encyclopedia. One thing I will say, though, is that it is not clear that the worry would be lessened if it turned out that our minds were immaterial "souls". Souls would have to work somehow or other---a full ("God's-eye") understanding of their workings would presumably involve an inventory of the various states, structures, and processes that souls host, together with the "supernatural laws" that describe how these change over time. These laws might be deterministic or indeterministic,...

Since life first evolved on Earth, a huge number of species have developed only to subsequently become extinct, a key feature of Darwin's 'survival of the fittest' model of evolution. A number of species face extinction today - is it right for mankind to intervene to try and stop this process?

Saying that natural selection favors the "fittest" creatures makes it sound like interfering would obviously be bad because it would risk diminishing a good thing, namely fitness. But first of all, there is nothing in Darwin's explanation of natural selection that assigns any value, positive or negative, to reproductive fitness. The central idea, of course, is that when genetically passed-on traits cause members of a species to have more descendents than others, the traits become more common. That has nothing at all to do with whether the outcome is "for the best" in any sense. It's just what will in fact happen. And secondly, the role of humans in a way changes nothing: we are part of the enviroment, and our behavior affects the natural selection of other species fundamentally no differently from any other environmental factor. Our fondness for juicy oranges or annoyance with intrusive coyotes can explain why certain organisms have more or fewer offspring than others in the same way...

Is it morally wrong to tell children that Santa exists? Regardless of how much joy and excitement kids get from believing the Santa myth, it is an outright lie, so how can it be regarded as morally right? Should we always take the moral high ground and tell the truth where children are concerned, or should we make exceptions? When they find out the truth, aren't we teaching children that no one, not even their parents, can be trusted?

This is an interesting question about which I have no settled view. I was relieved when my kid tricked the truth out of us early on. Probably it's true that when a kid discovers the Great Santa Lie their disposition to assume that their parents are always telling the complete, literal truth diminishes somewhat. But surely the big question of trust is not whether parents can be counted on always to tell the complete, literal truth, but whether they can be counted on to act in the kid's best interests. Intentionally misleading the child in a way they're sure to discover may normally undermine this trust (and so it does seem a bad idea in general), but I see no reason to assume that it always would. And indeed I think kids often react to their growing awareness that there's no magic, no Santa, and so on, not with resentment for being convinced otherwise but with a wistful attempt to keep up the charade just a while longer. In a context where it's an obviously exceptional case against a...

What are the limits on my obligation to be sure about something before acting? I know that my life is finite, so I can't study economics, history, sociology, and psychology, as well as law (this last is what I do professionally). And yet I am called on to comment on laws or problems that, to provide a sure answer to would require knowledge of all of those things and more. So do I do nothing, and let the problems of the world go by, people starve and murder and so on, or do I act knowing that I may in fact cause more harm because I am factually incorrect about something, for example the harmfulness of GM crops, or the likelihood of re-offending, or the weight to be given to tribal rituals.

This is a very good question. My thinking about it owes a lot to the philosopher Michael Bratman. The obvious, quick answer is that there are few or no certainties, life is a gamble, and so you have to run with the odds. But this answer really doesn't get us very far. How much time should you spend acquiring evidence and assessing the odds of various outcomes for your options? Too little, and you're at fault for not having explored and deliberated more; too much, and you waste your time at best, and at worst miss the chance to do anything of value. So, the obvious, quick answer is that you should explore and deliberate just the right amount. But again that doesn't get us very far. How much time should you spend exploring and deliberating about how much time to use exploring and deliberating about your options? You see the worry---there is no hope for you if you commit yourself to providing an answer to every question of this kind. But is there any alternative, apart from being irrational...

What's the moral problem with pornography? As far as I can understand it, it hinges on the concept of 'objectification', which seems to mean treating someone else as a means to your own ends rather than as an end in themselves. But if I go to the corner shop to buy a pint of milk, aren't I treating the guy behind the counter as a means to my own ends (buying a pint of milk) rather than as an end in himself? Does buying milk have the same ethical status as pornography?

You allude to the Kantian view that we should never treat humanityas a means only, but always as an end in itself (see Robert Johnson'sexplanation in the wonderful Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#8 ). Kant didn't think that we should never rely on people as means to our ends at all ,but just not at the expense of regarding their humanity as an end initself. Slavery is presumably a clear case on one side, and on theother might be a trade wherein both parties aim for mutual (not merelyselfish) benefit. Whether, and in what cases, a user of pornographymight be said to treat the model as an end in herself, is obviouslycomplicated, but these considerations might well be relevant: Is the user aiming at benefitting the model? Is headequately keeping in mind the effects on the model, on himself, and onthe women with whom he will interact, as well as the effects on peoplegenerally of a culture in which pornography is prevalent? The latter...

I have a 12 year old dog. She's no longer in great health, doesn't qualify as cute or attractive, and has rightfully been accused of stinking up any room she remains in for more than a few minutes. Still, she's my dog and I love her. Unfortunately, I am in a situation that requires that I move to a place that won't allow me to bring her. I can't find anyone to take her and am pretty sure that if I take her to the animal shelter she will spend a terrible 2 weeks there, not be adopted and then be euthanized. I've been thinking of taking her to a veterinarian who will put her to sleep with a painless injection while I'm there with her. I know this will break my heart, but is it the right thing to do?

You have what is known in the industry as a Hard Problem. You apparently have already weighed the interests and responsibilities that favor (or as you say, require) your moving without your dog against any prospects of your staying put or moving with her. Presumably also you have exhausted every avenue in searching for a new owner or a rescue operation that might take her. So let's assume that you really have no alternatives besides immediate euthanasia and a two-week shelter stay probably followed by euthanasia. As far as "in principle" considerations go, the latter course has the advantage that you would not be killing your pet while there is any way of not doing so, while the former has the benefit of avoiding preventable misery. But to my mind this is a "weighing" situation, where those aspects of your options need to be assessed in conjuntion with any number of other things: the odds (such as they are) that she would find a new home in those two weeks, the value of the life she'd...