Do Catholic hospitals have a right not to perform abortions?

Actually, the Catholic Church has always held that abortion -- understood as deliberately ending the life of an ensouled human being in the womb -- is gravely immoral. The changed view to which Andrew refers is the result of changed understanding of when ensoulment occurs. Remember that relative to the history of Christianity, biology has only recently revealed what happens in conception and gestation; Thomas Aquinas, for example, thought that life began at "quickening," or the mother's awareness of fetal movement -- typically after (what we now know is) 15-20 weeks of life and growth! As for your question, I'd refer again to Aquinas: everyone has a moral right to refuse to act against his or her conscience. To deliberately do what your conscience forbids would be morally wrong, always. (The converse doesn't hold, by the way: it is not always morally right to do what your conscience permits. Your conscience could be in error. But on the negative side, even if it is in error, if you do what it...

Does the "ethics of care" have a special relationship with Feminism? It seems that Feminism can be justified under lots of ethical theories. A Utilitarian could argue that since women experience pain and pleasure, their welfare should be factored into our felicific calculus. A Deontologist could argue that women have rights, and it is wrong to violate those rights. So what makes the ethics of care a more Feminist theory than other moral theories, like Utilitarianism and Deontology?

To expand a little on Charles' answer, some theorists draw careful distinctions between "ethics of care," "feminine ethics" and "feminist ethics." An ethics of care is one in which the locus of moral goodness is in relationship; as such its emphasis is on particular, embodied individuals in concrete, historically-situated patterns of interaction. As Charles points out, it is generally taken to arise from Carol Gilligan's work in moral psychology (as opposed to ethical theory, and this is an important distinction also; moral psychology is descriptive -- saying how things are -- while ethical theory is normative -- saying how things ought to be). Gilligan observed that women are more likely to assign moral value to relationship, and so care ethics is often described as "feminine ethics," although it is certainly not the case that all or only females think this way. "Feminist ethics," as those who draw the distinction understand it, takes care ethics a step further, and focuses on lived relational...

Mother Theresa accepted donations for her work from all sources - regardless of the background of the donors. She said that once the money was in her possession, she would put it to good use - its origin was irrelevant. The same argument has also been put forward by academic institutions who accept large sums of money for capital works from, e.g., donors with a known history of arms dealing. Was Mother Theresa wrong to accept this money? Should universities not accept such donations?

The only reasons I can imagine for it being wrong are consequentialist ones (i.e., the wrongness resides in the consequences such acceptances produce), and they strike me as weak reasons at that. First. the acceptance might encourage illegal or immoral activity, by creating a demand or outlet for such activity. Second, the acceptance could be interpreted by some as an endorsement of the activity -- drug or arms dealing, gambling, prostitution, etc. But you'd have to show (1) that the acceptance really is being interpreted as endorsement, and (2) that the perceived endorsement is causing something bad to happen. Now, in Mother Teresa's case, I'd have to say these reasons don't hold. Both of them constitute what Mother Teresa would have considered the serious sin of scandal, and I doubt that she would have willingly committed it. Most university administrations don't share those sensibilities, so whether (1) or (2) is a danger is something to consider. Perhaps, though, I'm overlooking some...

I cheated on my girlfriend with another girl for about a year. She doesn't know about it, and is very happy with me. Besides that I am a very good boyfriend, and when we are together we are happy. Now, my close friends have told me that I should tell her what I've done, because it was wrong, and she has the right to know. I agree that it was wrong, and that she indeed has the right to know; however, I also feel that at this point, it is over with. She has never known, and is all the happier. Meanwhile, I am eaten up inside every day with guilt. I knew I shouldn't be doing what I was doing, but I did it anyway; I have no excuse, and what I did was wrong. If I told her what had happened, I would no longer feel guilty, but it would crush her. I would rather live my entire life feeling like the worst person in the world, if maybe she would never have to find out and go through that. I would never do what I did again, because I learned that under no circumstances is it worth it to cheat. Am I right...

This sounds like a classic "Consequentialist vs. Deontologist" dilemma. A consequentialist defines morally right action as whatever produces the best consequences. In this case, you predict that the best consequences will be produced by keeping your infidelity to yourself and resolving never to do it again. But a deontologist defines morally right action as whatever is required by duty, and if someone has a right, then there is a correlative duty binding someone somewhere. In this case, you acknowledge that your girlfriend has a right to know, which would entail your duty to tell her. So the consequentialist "right thing" and the deontological "right thing" are at odds. Or are they? Perhaps your predicted consequences are incorrect. Your girlfriend may find out without you telling her, especially if several friends think she should know (things like this do happen, and not just in the movies). Then in addition to being crushed by your infidelity, she will be further hurt and alienated by your...

When dealing with people and the way they are, I always try to put myself in their shoes, and try to see things in their perspective. seeing things in this way, I always find a way to justify anyone's actions that would otherwise be considered wrong, hateful, dumb, etc. If someone does something insulting towards me, I'll find a way to not dislike that person, again, by thinking deep into what kind of reasoning goes on in the mind of the person who caused me harm. It seems like there's always a reason behind someone being the way they are... Whether it's their culture, their geographical location, their friends, music they listen to, clique, past experiences, political stance, something wrong with the wiring in their head. Being this way can both be a good thing and a bad thing. Good in a sense where I feel like there's always a good person behind their questionable actions, but bad in a way because... well... anything that anyone does can be justified (in my mind), and that just can't work, for...

On balance, I think the habit of trying to find the most charitable explanation for another person's action is an admirable one. And empathy can be a valuable tool for understanding people, heading off prejudice, rash judgment, undeserved condemnation. It also can be a vigorous intellectual exercise; some actions are so questionable that you have to tell an outlandish narrative to justify them. You have to realize that although you can think up an ethically sound justification (and the more you practice, the better at making them up you're likely to become), that justification may not express the person's actual motivation or rationale. To the extent you forget this, and really believe the excuses you're imagining, then yes, I'd say you're being naive. Is it fair to be this way? On the face of things, it's heroically fair. But look deeper, and perhaps it is not. Your imagined justifications may preclude blame, but only at the cost of the person's responsibility. It may be more unfair to...

When confronted with so many varied competing philosophical theories in the realms of truth, mind, free will, identity, etc, I find myself lacking the abilities (and the time) needed in order to properly evaluate them and to decide upon my own personal opinions. As such, I end up being a bit of a fence sitter on many subjects, sometimes left with residual beliefs I can’t really justify nor feel able to explain how I got them. This doesn’t bother me much as I’m sure I’m not on my own in this, and it doesn’t really affect my day to day decisions. But in other areas, such as religion, politics and ethics, it would seem I have to stand somewhere. With religion I’ve done lots of thinking and reading and feel fairly comfortable with my position, deciding long ago that time could be better spent thinking about other things (I’m not persuaded by the theistic arguments I’ve encountered and I could spend an eternity exploring all religions). But with politics and ethics I feel a responsibility to hold an opinion...

Whether people need to examine the foundations of their moral beliefs in order to live well depends on what we mean by living well, doesn't it? Socrates said the unexamined life was not worth living, so presumably he'd answer your question with a resounding YES. I suspect many philosophers would, since examining these kinds of things is something we're drawn to...or we wouldn't be philosophers. I'd say yes, as well; I think living well is a matter of living rightly, and living rightly is at least in part a matter of living in a rationally consistent way. So I'd take rational consistency as a kind of baseline requirement for ethical reasoning. How might you go about sorting through the overwhelming variety of theories? Let me share a nutshell version of what I teach undergrads who are compelled to take an ethics class, and see if any of this helps. There is no way to avoid answering the moral question, "What ought I to do?" The answer to this question (let's call it "Q" for short)...

How obliged are we to our friends? If my friend is horribly depressed, how far do the bonds of friendship oblige me to counsel and listen to him constantly, even if I care deeply for him, and even if it's affecting my own health? Ultimately, should we protect ourselves? I feel that I'd be doing something immoral by abandoning him.

To be a friend is going to mean, among other things, wanting what is best for your friend. It's unlikely that abandonment is what's best, which is probably why that option feels immoral to you. On the other hand, if you wear yourself down to the point that you have nothing to offer him (or perhaps anyone else), or that you resent him, then that's not best for him, either. Sometimes doing what's best for another is not the same as doing what the other wants. It sounds to me like your friend needs more help than you can reasonably supply, and the most loving course of action might be to facilitate this, by putting him in touch with a professional counselor. I hope it works out.

Generally student-teacher romances are frowned upon, but what about this? The facts: He (male) is 56. I am 59. I'm not in a degree program, as I already have a BA and an MA, too-- taking classes in music for fun and personal enrichment. We're both single. I'm widowed and he is recently divorced. There is definitely chemistry and a terrific vibe between us. Lots of "Oh yes, THAT'S my favorite book/food/movie, too!" He has same number of pets as me. He has shared favorite poems with me even. He is THE best teacher in his particular field, and I will want to take at least three more courses with him. (One each semester, as I work also.) Does anyone see any ethical obstacles to our dating before I finish taking all of these classes?

The general proscription against teacher-student romance is based first on the power differential in their respective roles. Even if both parties claim that the relationship is one of mutual consent, the presumption is that the teacher may direct it to his/her own advantage, because the student needs the teacher more than vice versa. That you're both not only adults, but more mature adults, ameliorates this presumption somewhat, as does the fact that you already have an advanced degree. Still, it is a factor. A second basis for the proscription is the potential for the teacher's partiality toward his/her romantic partner, which would be unjust to the other students. Even if there is no actual favoritism, the perception could damage the ethical environment of the classroom. I think most professors would agree that it's a matter of simple prudence to avoid becoming romantically involved with a current student. Afterwards, of course, is fair game, and many successful romances had just this...

The phrase "You must forgive" is often bandied about - especially in religious teachings. Surely this is not fair - the wrong-doer has an entitlement from the wronged? What if the wronged is unable to forgive? Is forgiveness an emotion?

There is a lot of really interesting philosophical work currently being done in the area of forgiveness (in fact, the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association next November is planned around the theme of forgiveness; and its consideration won't be limited to religious teachings). So what I say here should not be taken as the last word, or even anywhere close to it. The wronged party is indeed owed something ("has an entitlement from") the wrong-doer; voluntarily foregoing this entitlement is precisely the essence of forgiveness. If this is so, it is simply inaccurate to tell someone, "You must forgive." Forgiveness is not an obligation, or else it wouldn't really be forgiveness. It must be a freely chosen act. I would say that forgiveness is NOT an emotion, but rather a deliberate movement of the will -- a free choice to waive the entitlement owed by the wrong-doer. Sometimes that entitlement will consist in compensation, material or non-material, sometimes...

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