Ethically, what is the difference between a sex object and a sex symbol when talking about a person? Why is the latter term considered less degrading and even beneficial? Is a symbol merely a representation of an object or actually an extension of one?

This is a great question I hadn't thought of. One response perhaps is to acknowledge how it reflects the fundamental ambiguity our society has toward ALL matters sexual. Sexuality is both good and bad, in various ways/senses, at least for many. Profoundly religious people of a certain sort might not agree, but then they would not be so likely to see the distinction you raise between object/symbol above -- both would be equivalent and equally bad. But for others, who DO see your distinction, we can admit that being sexually attractive is something we desire and thus, in a sense, approve of; a sex symbol is someone who represents an ideal of sexual attractiveness that we all would love to instantiate ourselves, so a "sex symbol" is good, all else equal. But of course human beings are MORE than physical, sexual animals -- there are other aspects to ourselves that we value -- and insofar as we treat or think of someone as MERELY a sexual 'object' we are failing to value those other features...

Analogous to freedom of speech, one supposes that everyone is entitled to express their opinions concerning the character of any person. However, my personal view is that it is reprehensible for a group of people to indulge in an overt celebration of the death of a person - especially in the presence of bereaved members of her family. I have in mind the recent death of erstwhile British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, whose family would probably have seen TV news shots of revellers in Glasgow opening bottles of champagne in ribald celebration of her death. I noted that a prominent political opponent of Mrs Thatcher commented that this behaviour was despicable. I would like to know whether it is feasible/permmissible/desirable for a philosopher to provide objective guidance on the propriety or otherwise of this behaviour?

Interesting question! I don't know about giving 'objective' guidance, but it does seem to me that on the scale of despicable or reprehensible actions, this one would be pretty low, if on the scale at all! It also seems reasonable to me to suppose that very public figures -- in particular politicians, whose actions affect large masses of people directly and indirectly -- ARE appropriate objects of (civil) scorn, both in life and in death. Perhaps it isn't exactly tasteful to cheer the death of a hated political figure, but I just don't see that it's actually wrong. Is it insensitive to the bereaved family? Possibly, but then you might argue that the politician's choice to live that public light automatically puts the person's family in the position to see explicitly how people feel about him/her. Of course, there might be some distinction made between current/retired politicians too -- given how long PM Thatcher has been out of office, how old she was, etc., it might be less acceptable to cheer her...

You are a single male, a highly attractive female asks you to engage in a sexual relationship with her. However, they are already in a long-term, albeit unstable relationship. Do you accept or decline the offer? I have declined on the basis that should I accept there is a likelihood that the pleasure I would gain is less than the suffering I would cause to their partner (who I do not know) and there is a possibility I am being used to hurt their partner. From canvasing the opinion of my friends I am almost unique in my decision. Am I wrong or do I just need better friends?

Curious whether your friends accept the empirical part of your reasoning, about the likelihood of gained pleasure/suffering. Assuming that they do then this issue nicely seems to come down to the classic debate between utilitarian and deontological ethics, it seems. Others are much more expert than I on these matters, but you seem to be using basic utilitarian reasoning -- see what maximizes happiness/pleasure (or minimizes unhappiness etc), and then that's the right thing. But of course the other way to look at hte situation is this: the female in question (one presumes) is adult, mature, etc., and capable of making her own autonomous decisions. To respect her as such is to recognize that, in effect, if it's okay with her then it could be okay with you. What you are considering is the harm you're doing to her pre-existing partner -- but then a separate argument needs to be made perhaps that YOU have any obligation to that partner if she does not. (By the way: is or was her view that the partner was...

Is it morally wrong to eat my pet dog? Why is it right to eat beef and pork, but our pets?

Who thinks that is right to eat beef/pork but not dog? Certainly many cultures do. No doubt our culture is squeamish about it -- dogs being so cute, and all, and enjoying such intimate personal relationships with them -- well that would suggest that if we cuten up pigs and cows and get to know them better we'd be opposed to eating them too! But anyway, what does cuteness and intimacy have to do with the permissibility of slaughter and consumption? there are plenty of non-cute humans with which I am not intimate, but that hardly seems a grounds for eating them; but then lack of those things is not be a grounds for eating them either. What I'm getting at is that whatever grounds you choose to be a vegetarian almost surely apply equally to all non-human animals (or at least those with advanced enough sentience to be worthy of earning 'rights' or 'interests)' -- so the disintcitno between the dog and beef/pork cases one is not likely to withstand scrutiny .... hope that helps ap

Do we have a duty to strive towards a life without contradiction? Can a person, for example, both eat meat and hold the belief that animals should not be willfully killed for private gain?

Well, one CAN do that, since I myself in fact do (and many, many others) .... But of course what you're asking is more like "is it morally permissible to violate one's own principles?", or something like that ... Assuming that one's principles are correct (i.e. that you are right to believe that animals shouldn't be willfully killed etc.), then it seems clear that the answer must be no, because it's not morally permissible to do that which is morally impermissible! But that seems so clear that I wonder if that really is, ultimately, your question. Weakness of will is a well-known (and much discussed phenomenon), and a paradigm case of weakness of will is precisely that where you cannot bring yourself to do that which is right (and so when I succumb, and eat meat, I condemn myself for not being able to live up to my own standards). But you seem to be getting at a much deeper question, which the weakness of will case is merely a simple case of: is there a moral obligation to avoid contradictions, to...

Concerning the ethics of self-defense: If a convict, about to be executed, finds and seizes the opportunity to kill one of his executioners, is this ethically permissible self-defense? (Of course, even if it was, that wouldn't benefit him in any way. I still find the question interesting.)

Great question. My first thought is that moral rules are invariably qualified ("all else being equal") -- certain actions may be permissible in certain conditions, but presumably not when doing them overrides some other moral obligation. Since (one assumes here) the convict was indeed guilty, and justly convicted, and if (one assumes here) capital punishment is itself permissible, then I'd be inclined to hold that this would NOT be a case of permissible self-defense -- self-defense, yes, but here the only way for him to defend himself is to do some harm which clearly overrides whatever value is in the self-defense -- given the assumptions above, the executioner is by no means guilty of any wrong-doing in performing the execution, so this would amount to killing an innocent person in order to defend a guilty one ... Self-defense is permissible all else being equal, but this sort of case does not strike me as one where all else IS equal ... hope that's useful ap

Many of those who favor online piracy (or who oppose restrictive laws meant to combat piracy, at least), argue that piracy does not actually hurt movie and music producers. They claim that most pirates would be unlikely to buy the products in question even if they were unable to download them for free. In restricting piracy, we aren't actually restoring revenue to the producers or anything of the sort. Those producers would be just as successful or unsuccessful whether piracy were allowed or not. Is this sensible? Let's say that I download a movie. If it is really true that I would not buy the movie in any case, does that make downloading it okay?

Great issue. If you think about it on an individual level, of course "piracy" is wrong: you are stealing that work from its producer. (The word "piracy" pretty much reflects that!). And as long as there are specific copyright laws that forbid it, then doing so is obviously wrong (at least in the sense of violating the law), whether or not you would have purchased the work anyway. But maybe we should think of it on a collective level, and ask questions such as "Are the laws in question themselves good/just laws?" (which I take Allen to be raising) and "Would a better system overall allow free downloading?" (where "better" obviously has many facets, including ethical ones). To be sure, part of answering those questions involve empirical considerations: do "producers of work" collectively do better, make more money, etc., when one allows liberal copying of their work? Think Grateful Dead, just for one select example: the 'bootleg' industry they themselves supported seems to have worked out pretty...

Is it wrong for little children to play "cops and robbers," wherein they simulate crime and violence?

It's hard, in general, to 'blame' children for anything, being not yet responsible and beneath the 'age of reason' ... but perhaps we might blame their parents for allowing them to learn about such things and engage in them? Perhaps -- but as the father of three small boys who turn every toy into a weapon, whose favorite form of play is 'fighting bad guys' (which often include each other), it's hard to imagine STOPPING this behavior. We do our best to shield them from it, but it's everywhere -- in kid's programming, in kid's toys, in kids' lunchbags's patterns, and in their peers at school -- you cannot shut it out, short of homeschooling and utter social isolation. So I'm not sure one can blame the parents much, either .... (and perhaps one ought to focus on restraining/steering the behavior: i.e. make sure they understand it is just play, and you cannot REALLY hurt someone, and perhaps promote the creative/fantasy elements of it .....?) best, ap

One of the formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative is that we should never treat humanity as a mere means to an end. I wonder, then, whether this means that horror film directors are behaving unethically. After all, in a horror film, terrible things are made to happen to human beings, solely for the purpose of frightening/pleasing the audience. The human beings may be fictional, but it is nevertheless the fact that they are fictional *humans* that makes horror films effective (as opposed to a horror film where the victims are all robots). It seems to me that the humanity of the fictional characters is being used as a tool to manipulate the audience's emotions. Does this fall under the umbrella of the humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative? If not, why not? It certainly seems that it is the humanity of the victims (including their emotions, their aspirations, their mortality, their ability to suffer) that is key to the function of horror films.

A very interesting question -- and while I know next to nothing about Kantian ethics, I might chip in here the observation that in a (clearly 'fictional' film) there is no particular, actual, individual human being who is being used as a 'means to an end' (unless of course the actors etc. are being exploited in some way by the director/producers etc...!). Perhaps humanity in some general way is being used, but no individual humans -- so I would imagine that the Kantian proscription wouldn't apply .... (Now if, in a film, the actors were representing actual particular individuals, even if in a fictional way -- like a highly fictionalized biopic, for example -- that might be a different story ....) hope that's useful- ap

Couldn't all marketing that implements psychological techniques to influence behavior without the subject realizing it be considered unethical? It seems to me that advertisers have an unfair advantage over consumers who have not had the opportunity to study the psychology used in marketing campaigns.

That's a great point, but of course partly it depends on what it means to "have the opportunity": in the general sense everyone is free to study whatever they want in this country .... (of course in practical terms not everyone is free to do very much, perhaps, but at least in principle; and anyway even if far more people were "freer," in practical terms, how many would actually choose to study the psychology of marketing?) .... And, anyway, a lot of the fascinating results exploited by marketers are pretty robust: ie they persist even AFTER the people are informed .... (For great examples see Dan Arielly's book Predictably Irrational and Daniel Kahneman's recent book Thinking, Fast and Slow) ..... ap

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