Does justice necessarily have to be equality?

Interesting! In certain respects, when treating persons in terms of criminal justice, most of us believe that persons should not be given unfair, special treatment because of wealth, gender, ethnicity, family, and so on.... And in many areas, we assume that, in a just society, identical or similar cases should be treated equally. If you and I both earn the same amount of money from the same job and our conditions are similar (that is, it is not the case that, say, I am childless but you are supporting three children), we naturally expect that what we pay in taxes should be the same (or equal). But in a just society, there still may be inequalities in different areas: not all members of a society will be equally healthy or strong, equally intelligent, equally loved by care-givers, you may receive massive attention by fashion magazines because of your irresistible smile, while I get no attention at all, and so on. One way to make progress here would be to think in terms of justice as fairness. ...

Hello, I am currently studying philosophy and ethics at my school. We are doing an assignment at the moment on human nature and three element of human nature and how they link in with society itself and help to form and maintain it. I was wondering, could selfishness (a definite part of human nature) in any way, benefit society? As in, would it be able to help form or maintain a society? Thankyou for any responces.

Good luck in your studies! Philosophers have thought quite a bit about self-interest and selfishness. What is often called psychological egoism is the thesis that humans always act in ways that they believe to be in their self-interest (either directly or indirectly), while ethical egoism is the thesis that people ought to do what is (either directly or indirectly) in their self-interest. One point to clarify here is the difference between "selfishness" and "self-interest." If psychological egoism is taken as the view that all persons are selfish because all people act in their self-interest, this seems either false or to involve an odd use of the notion of "self-interest." Clearly many people are interested in living lives of justice, compassion, humility, and so on, but to call such people "selfish" would seem to be quite the opposite of what they are like: namely, they are generous, caring, non-vain, non-pompous, humble. So, I suggest that we use the term "selfish" in ways that pick out traits...

What is the difference between justice and morality? Evidently, the concepts overlap each other, and in many cases they appertain to each other. I have made some observation, though I am not quite sure whether they are of any relevance, in terms of difference. Firstly, it appears to me that morality deals with the means of an action, in most of the cases, rather than the ends, where the motive of your action is of major, if not absolute, significance (whereof Kant suggested good will as the basis of morality, or something done out of reverence of law). In justice, however, the means are scarcely ever mentioned, and all we hear about is the ends. It appears to me that some ends are in themselves the measure of justice, independent of intention. Also, the word justice, apparently, from the word "jus", which means law, which certainly does make it easier to approach. However, it does not appear to be the case that law is equal to justice. Laws can, supposedly, also be unjust. It really bothers me that I...

Your frustration is understandable! In English, we used to have fine distinctions between the terms ethics and morality, duties and obligations, labor and work, recklessness and negligence..... but we English-speakers seem less keen about the finer distinctions at work. One might easily conflate the terms just and moral; saying a law is unjust seems the equivalent of claiming that a law is immoral (or the establishment of the law is morally wrong). But, there is still some distinctions to observe: justice usually pertains to matters of governance and human rights. And there are different domains of justice: Distributive justice concerns the distribution of goods and burdens; Retributive justice refers to matters of punishment; Restorative justice refers to compensation for past wrongful harms, and so on. Such forms of justice are related to rights, distributive justice may concern itself with a person's having a right to health care, retributive justice needs to address respecting or violating a...

I'm in the middle of writing a thesis on tourists negotiating confrontations with poverty while on holiday in third world countries. It is easy to see that these confrontations touch on ethics and justice as the tourists are (relatively) rich, their hosts are poor and tourism is about enjoying luxuries (hedonism) while around the 'tourist bubbles' people are struggling. Considering this I focus on how tourists 'legitimise themselves', using discourse analysis (which discursive techniques do tourists employ) following Foucault on power and truth within constructivism, making sidesteps to Baumann (exclusion), Stanley Cohen (states of denial) and Zizek (cultural capitalism). Do you have any more ideas on how I could elaborate on these issues using philosophy? Please point me in the right direction of interesting (modern, postmodern, critical) philosophies!

What a fascinating project! It seems as though you are very good on resources! I have only two suggestions that you may (or may not!) wish to explore: you might consider how to assess and perhaps how to educate tourists on issues of global justice. Amartya Sen's The Idea of Justice and Martha Nussbaum's Creating Capabilities might be good resources and provide an accessible set of terms to consider. It may be that tourists to places that are poverty ridden do want to help alleviate these conditions, and could be directed to make (an at least symbolic but perhaps substantial) contribution to making lives better. You also might include some attention on how tourists might gaze (and interact) with those they encounter, taking into account Jacques Lacan's notion of the gaze as articulated in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Good wishes on your project!

I've been trying to learn a bit about communitarian philosophy, but I'm having a hard time wrapping my head around it. The thrust of the line of thinking seems to be that individuals are socially constituted beings and that the community should therefore be the focal unit of ethical and political action, rather than the individual (which is what is advocated by the liberal theorists communitarians criticize). That is, at least, the impression I'm getting. I may be confused, but there seems to be a problem here. Communitarians seem to want to exclude contingent "lifestyle enclaves" from their thought, defining community instead in geographical, historical and familial terms - i.e. communities we can't escape being defined into, no matter how hard we might try. But just because a person is part of a particular racial, geographical, linguistic and socioeconomic community does not mean logically imply that that community is the best place for them to flourish in the way they desire. What does...

Excellent set of concerns! The history of communitarianism is a bit complex; the term was first introduced by a German sociologist F. Tonnies (d1936), but the term did not really get a lot of philosophical attention until we get the mature work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. I suspect that the form of communitarianism is a very radical one that rules out appeal to concepts of human flourishing that may be used to critique or evaluate communities. Both MacIntyre and Taylor stress the vital importance of communities as philosophically significant contexts for moral, religious, and political reflection but both embrace moral theories that go beyond what a community happens to value. Although I am not positive, MacIntyre seems closest to an Aristotelian perspective in his latest work. Taylor may lean a little more toward the Platonic tradition, but for both of these figures who have promoted communitarianism, religious values (both philosophers are Roman Catholic) are viewed as having a great...

If an intellectual who publicly advocates for justice and claims to practice fair ethics commits a plainly unjust act (e.g. if it's a professor, sexual harassment and assault of a student), does that discredit the merits of his work?

I wager that most philosophers would say 'no.' In fact, the term "genetic fallacy" is used when someone seeks to discredit a view due to its origin (or genesis) and if you were to say some professor's philosophy lacks merit because he assaults a student, you would probably be told that you are making an ad hominem argument (an argument against the person and not what the person argues or believes). A classic case in the 20th century has been to condemn Heidegger's philosophy because he was (at least for a while) a Nazi. Still, if someone is unfair and unjust in their action, I suggest that is one reason to raise a question about whether the person has been unjust or unfair in his thinking or beliefs. If I fail to respect my students--important people whom I am supposed to respect and honor-- I think that would be a good reason to question whether I have respected and honored the very practice of philosophy. It is also worth noting that there is a tradition in philosophy going back at least to...

It seems today that in mainstream media and political discourse proponents of neoliberalism equate freedom with consumer choice. Many arguments about the restructuring of safety net programs, such as social security and medicare, along market logic of private competition and less government involvement, usually mention how this would bring about more "choice" for individuals and thus more freedom. Neoliberalism has brought a shift in discourse about freedom and liberty more inline with market type of discourse. The shift seems to be from having the freedom OF choice, to freedom IS choice. Much can be said about this from many different philosophical perspectives (an interesting one that comes to mind being Foucault and governmentality), but I want to go back to further, to Kant. My question is what would Kant say about this idea of freedom, that freedom is equated with choice - specifically- consumer/market choice? This type of questions plagues me because this neoliberal logic seems to reduce,...

Interesting! I am not acquainted with the term "neoliberalism," but I think you are correct that Kant's notion of freedom was not developed with an eye to consumer / market choices. However, his view of freedom, autonomy in general, and both versions of the categorical imperative would have implications for one's behavior in the market, e.g. one would not have a healthy market if there was no promise-keeping, for example. For Kant's views on politics and markets and freedom, you might look at his work on history from a cosmopolitan point of view. You will find something like the liberalism of Adam Smith at work, the idea being that if persons are rational in their pursuit of interests the good of the whole will be served. FYI : Kant's work on history influenced President Wilson and his aim of spreading democracy throughout the world with the help of the League of Nations (a term that I believe was used by Kant). Perhaps a good counter-point to what you are calling "neoliberalism" may be...

There are certain people who, when hearing of a person's complaints about their working conditions, are fond of saying that those complaining should "just leave" and get work elsewhere, instead of demanding that employers foster better working conditions (which would presumably amount to restricting the freedom of the employers). In some cases, the suggestion might be even more extreme, telling the person that they ought to change fields entirely. My question is, is a system in which people's only options for improving their quality of life on the job is to leave and hope to find work somewhere better a fair system? Are the conveniences of employers more important than the needs of the employees?

A great question! I believe (perhaps wrongly) that the question, especially the last one, does not have a single, general answer, however there are factors we can identify and find some agreement about. Some of these factors seem to involve loyalty, reasonable expectations, gratitude, fairness, and the availability of alternative employers and employees. So, in terms of loyalty: if a worker has faithful in executing her job and done so with integrity and then requests that, say, the uncomfortable temperature of a room be adjusted or that there be longer and more regular breaks in order to prevent injury due to tiredness, the burden would seem to be on the employer to change, whereas if the employer requested regular, fully paid trips to Disney world there would seem to be little reason to take this seriously. Matters of fairness might also rightly give reason for an employer to change; imagine an employee works with others who are free riders (not pulling their fair share) or, worse, what some call...

Many pundits speak about the erosion of personal responsibility by the "nanny state". But personal responsibility isn't exactly fun; it can be taxing and costly to have to suffer for your mistakes, your free choices or even your nature. Why shouldn't the government ease the burden of personal responsibility on citizens?

Great question. I suppose that the general assumption in liberal democracy is that there should be a presumption of liberty in most areas of life except in cases of harm or extreme offense or in some cases where there is a substantial risk of avoidable suffering. So, in most states in the USA I believe that motorcyclists do not have a choice about whether to wear a helmet, something that may reduce head injuries. And motorists are required to wear seat belts in order to cut down on harm. These do not appear to me to be cases of when the state is acting as a "nanny' --a metaphor (I take it) of treating adults as though they are children. These might be good cases of when the government rightly eases the burden of personal responsibility on citizens (to use your language). And perhaps the government rightly restricts the freedom of people to make some choices such as the choice of whether to sell organs or blood or (in an extreme case) their very freedom (slavery is illegal, even if an individual...

I have a question regarding moral philosophy as it relates to political viewpoint. I can understand why philosophers in general might have some affinity for an argument that says those of us who are relatively 'well off' have a moral duty to assist those who are temporarily (or permanently) 'in need' of assistance. However, I want to look at it from the perspective of the person who needs the help. Many of us talk about improving ourselves so that we can make a difference to others. Why do we deny the opportunity to make a difference to those who need help? Isn't that demeaning and stultifying to them? Isn't there an implicit message that 'you are not competent to take care of yourself, and so you have to rely on us to do that for you?' My father says that is because career politicians are cynical and are merely using 'we have to help others' as a reason to entrench themselves in power indefinitely at good salaries with nice benefits. He points out that certain programs are based on income...

Interesting! The case of not allowing the patients of the psychiatric hospital to produce goods seems clearly wrong, though perhaps the worry was that in cases of severely damaged persons who might not even know what they were doing this was in some way exploitive. Still, I know a terrific half-way house for emotionally damaged persons (Spring Lake Ranch in Vermont) in which labor is encouraged and patients produce food and other goods (maple syrup has been important), and I believe this activity is actually part of the therapy. Addressing your father's point more directly: one of the reasons why a state government goes beyond mere subsistence in terms of benefits (for the unemployed, say) is because this is a temporary measure and providing more than subsistence contributes to a more stable culture. A neighbor lost his job and was out of work for about 11 months. He received benefits during that time which (along with his savings) meant he did not have to sell his apartment and (now that he is...

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