Probably the best known philosopher who thinks along similar lines is Thomas Nagel. While he believes that consciousness cannot be accounted for or understood in light of our current conception of the physical world, he is hoping (or has faith?) that we may eventually have a conceptual revolution that would anchor consciousness in the natural world without resorting to dualism. You can get to some of Nagel's work through his home page at the New York University website for him. Colin McGinn would be another promising thinker for you to engage. A number of other philosophers believe that our current concept of what it is to be physical is problematic, including Galen Strawson and Noam Chomsky. On Descartes, you might consider a slightly different angle. He does not give center stage to the claim that the concept of a non-spatially extended thing provides a more intelligible grounding for our mental life. The way I read him (setting aside the so-called Cartesian circle) is that he first establishes...

I am tempted to ask: What would you think if the roles were reversed, and you were the one who took the $100 from a stranger and what you would hope the stranger's response would be if it was discovered that you took the money and then gave it back? But I will try a different approach. Taking the case as you describe it: I suggest you would be within your rights (and not wrong) to report this as a theft and the stranger would then face whatever penalty the law specifies for petty theft, but I think you would also be within your rights (and not wrong) to not report this. Imagine that the stranger changed his or her mind within just two minutes and apologized profusely to you, perhaps even offering you the lottery ticket he just bought (and did not steal) and this gives you a finite chance of winning millions later in the week. Still, a theft or stealing has taken place even it the funds are returned. Imagine that the stranger stole millions from a pension account for hundreds of vulnerable, retired...

I cannot resist at least trying to respond to your question, but please know that this is a rather personal matter and many would think this is a matter for you to consider in light of respecting your partner and your own judgment about the consequences of making such a disclosure. Perhaps, though, I can be helpful in highlighting some factors to consider. I suggest that promises to others can be (but are not always) binding even if the relationship ends. So, while obviously after a divorce or break-up one is not bound to (sexual) fidelity with one's x even if that had been promised with a vow, but there may be promises such as promising not to disclose information or secrets that were shared with the understanding that this was to be strictly confidential. I suggest that if the relationship you had (or you are about to break off) was built on the basis of trust and an explicit (or implicit) understanding that either of you would disclose any infidelity if it occurred, that would be a good...

Much appreciate! I believe that the assessment of whether any particular event is the result of God's provident will rest on one's background beliefs. If, for example, one has plausible reasons for thinking theism is true (based on any of the classical or contemporary arguments, for examples of these see the entry, Philosophy of Religion in the free and online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), then there will more openness to accepting a theistic account of, say, a healing than if one has independent reason for thinking theism is false and naturalism is true. However, I suggest that it would be best to see any argument for (or against) God based on ostensible miracles as a component in a comprehensive case for theism based on religious experience. There are a host of defenders of such an argument: Kai Man Kwan, William Wainwright, Caroine Davis, William Alston, Keith Yandell, Richard Swinburne, and others. Of course, as in all interesting matters, there are serious critics, but my point is to...

A difficult question! There do seem to be clear cases of when jealousy is a vice, especially when it leads to violence and inordinate, misplaced rage. Imagine I am so possessive of my partner that I constantly read his emails to others (secretly and without permission), I rarely trust him and so I regularly interrogate him when he comes back from a trip and I suspect there may have been some dangerous flirting. But as with envy, there seem to be appropriate and inappropriate kinds of jealousy. Imagine I have been a good father to my son, but when he is in college he becomes fixated on an alcoholic, pro-pornography, racist philosophy professor whom my son idolizes and calls "Daddy." Probably my response would not be jealousy, but to seek to expose "Daddy" as a fraud, but I think I might well feel that the affections my son should have for me (or, dropping "should," my son having emotions that are fitting in a father-son relationship) and directing them to a kind of rival, surrogate bad Dad figure. ...

Interesting! Philosophers from Plato to Bertrand Russell and to more recent thinkers, have addressed the value and significance of sexuality. Whether you agree or disagree with his conclusions, Roger Scruton has a book Sexual Desire with terrific examples and very interesting arguments. Thomas Nagel has a very short paper on sexual perversion which I think is quite illuminating. I think that probably the most sustained case for linking sex with reproduction comes from a Roman Catholic perspective, which should not be confused with "the Christian point of view" as many Christians think the telos or value or function of sexual union is valuable for its own sake or is an integral part of the good of intimate love. On that point, it is interesting that the story of creation in Genesis that blesses the union of man and woman before the fall notes that the two shall "become one flesh" (as it is usually translated) and there is nothing added like "the two shall become one flesh so that they may have...

Great! Some journals do blind reviews and so your identity and thus your not being a professional philosopher in a department would not be know to those who are evaluating the work submitted. Though the initial review would be by the Editor in Chief or an assistant to her or him, and that would probably be transparent. To get started I highly recommend your reading a handful of journals in your area of choice, possibly reading the last 10 years of issues. So, if you are interested in ethics, there is the journal Ethics as well as Philosophy and Public Affairs, the Journal of Value Inquiry. If you are writing on philosophy of art, you might start reading both the British Journal of Aesthetics or the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, and if philosophy of religion Faith and Philosophy, Religious Studies, the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Philosophia Christi, and Sophia. If you are seeking to do something on the philosophy of science there are a range of special journals that...

Interesting! I think to answer your question one would need to distinguish philosophy as an institution (recognized professors and associations designated as philosophical) and the practice of philosophy at large. In terms of the latter, I suggest "philosophy" is inescapable, so even those who think "philosophy" is foolish only do so because what they think of as philosophy is pointless from the standpoint of their own philosophy. In this sense, having a philosophy is simply to have a view of the world and values. But in terms of the institutional life of what is considered philosophy, there have been some able critics. Marx complained that philosophers only talk about the world, whereas he (and other activists) try to change the world. The poet William Blake thought that much of philosophy involves vanity and some of those who are considered great philosophers like Wittgenstein have condemned much of the history of philosophy as a matter of self-inflicted be-whichment. In all this, however, you...

Thank you for the question and your reflections on some possibilities and suggestions! I believe that in our ordinary usage in English, the term "understand" often suggests both a level of comprehension as well as some degree of empathy or sympathy (but not necessarily endorsement). A policeman might say: "I understand why you were driving dangerously. If I caught my husband cheating on me, I would probably drive quite dangerously myself. But in that case, we would both be wrong in endangering others." In philosophy, when we speak in terms of understanding some state of affairs, we usually are speaking in terms of comprehension, rather than expressing any sympathy. What kind of comprehension is involved will vary depending on the state of affairs. I might understand that 6 is the smallest perfect number by knowing that a perfect number is equal to the sum of its divisors, including one, but not itself and 6 equals 1+2+3. I might rightly claim to understand that my colleague is a materialist, but...

I suggest that when a person calls or describes a gender or species or event or thing as beautiful, this implies or signals that the person believes the gender etc is worthy of aesthetic pleasure or delight. There need not be anything sexist or demeaning in this, and it does not suggest that the object of delight is merely an object of delight or that the beautiful "object" (or the object of beauty) is in some sense passive. One might claim 'the women Olympic athletes swam beautifully today' or 'the women soldiers performed beautifully in their rescue of the orphans yesterday when they met with severe resistance from the hostage-takers' without any sexism coming into play. Going a bit further: I suspect the phrase "women are beautiful" is somewhat odd. I suppose one might first want to know the scope of the reference: are all women beautiful or the majority or a significant number of women are beautiful? Are women all beautiful in the same way? What are the reasons for thinking all or many or...