Why can't I remove my emotions (such as falling in love) by rationality?

The relationship between reason and the emotions is one that has been wondered about for a very long time--going back to our most ancient literature, including the Old Testament and Homer's Iliad . I doubt that I will be able to resolve this one for you, but I do have a suggestion to make. I'm not sure this is a philosophical question, but I also think that you (or most people) can do what you say you can't do. If you think that you are feeling a certain emotion that is not compatible with a rational assessment of things--for example, you feel as if you are falling in love with some movie star whom you will not likely ever meet--then there are various rational steps you can take to get rid of the emotion. Ever heard the one about taking a cold shower? OK, maybe it is not as simple as that, but we certainly can look for things that will divert our attention from an emotion, or will use the energies of the emotion in different ways (and thus serving to deflect it, as part of a strategy...

Some would consider mathematical patterns found in nature, such as the Fibonacci Sequence and the Golden Ratio, as indications of a higher deity, God if you will. Is this a sound belief?

I guess I would like to know from someone who thought such things were indications of the workings of a deity what sorts of patterns would count to them as not being indications of a deity. I'm inclined to think that some sort of order is a simple requirement of there being a universe at all, and so it seems that some indications of such order--whether highly complex or simple--would inevitably be evident in that universe. As a result, it is difficult for me to see why some particular patterns would indicate anything religiously significant--after all, it is not as if the patterns themselves are divine signatures or fingerprints or the divine equivalent of DNA evidence. That one can have a religious response to such things, as Richard Heck proposes, I don't doubt; but that such a response is somehow rationally supportable, I do doubt.

What obligations do we have to our parents and families? I guess this is really a range of questions: because they cared for us in the formative years of our lives, how obliged are we to continue to accept their advice and care and offer the same back later on? Can being borne to two people bind you to them forever? What right do we have to criticise the methods they used to bring us up: should we just be thankful that they raised us at all? If someone looks after you, do you always owe them something?

I am probably not the right person to answer this question, because I am not entirely comfortable with talk about moral obligations. But perhaps I can start a conversation (or dispute). I don't think you strictly owe your parents anything at all, just on the basis of their giving birth to you or raising you. They made these decisions, in most cases, without consulting you at all (obviously, in the case of deciding to give birth to you, and often, too, in their decisions of how to raise you). So, it is not as if you agreed to some exchange: "give me these things and I will care for you in your old age." You never made any such agreement, so they can't really suppose you now owe them for decisions that they made (mostly without your consent or equal participation). I don't see how you can incur a debt without consenting to the transaction that creates the debt. But again, I am generally uncomfortable with deontological analyses of most moral issues. As a virtue theorist, I would...

I think that one of the coolest things about intellectual projects dealing with the "big" questions is that different disciplines can all bring something to the discussion (for example you might invoke quantum mechanics in talking about free will and determinism, or you might talk about the anthropric principle having something to say about religion). As philosophers, do you spend much time (or feel that you should or want to spend time) studying disciplines other than philosophy (physics, biology, pscyhology, economics) in order to bring different sorts of insight to bear on your work? Do you ever worry that if you don't reach outside your specialty, you might be handicapping yourself? Is it troubling to think that philosophy, in this way, might not be self-sufficient, so to speak? -j. santana

Anyone who supposes that philosophy (the word means "love of wisdom") is self-sufficient is probably not a very good philosopher. Most philosophers continue throughout their careers to learn everything they can about cognate disciplines, and what these disciplines have to say about the issues we study. In some fields (philosophy of physics, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of mind, for examples) one can hardly function at a professional level these days without substantial learning in "non-philosophical" areas. Those who love learning, I think, are the most likely to advance knowledge in any field.

Isn't it more morally acceptable that we use consenting, informed adults in scientific tests rather than animals? The adults would at least know what they were being tested for and the possible benefits. Added to which the tests are likely to be safer as scientists would be more likely to value a human life rather than that of an animal. Plus this way would fulfil the moral criterion for both utilitarianism as it decreases suffering for the reasons aforementioned and Kantianism but using no one as a mere means, human or animal (although Kant himself argued that an animal cannot be used as a mere means I will ignore this as it is arguable and that if we can avoid using them as a mere means then we should). Could it also be argued that testing on animals is even worse when no consenting, informed adult volunteered? And that such tests shouldn't be done under any circumstances? Many thanks :)

I think the PETA people will think I have a very blind moral eye, but I am inclined to think that your question makes the issue far more simple than it is. For one thing, I think there are morally significant differences between different species of non-human animals. I wouldn't think of causing gratuitous suffering or death to a wild primate, for example, but gladly crush mosquitoes to death whenever given the chance. For another (and related to the first, in fact) I think the very idea of whether animals do or do not consent and how this notion may apply to them is hardly obvious, and perhaps simply otiose. If animals (or some species) do not and cannot give consent or refuse it, then it seems to me this is not a useful more indicator for them.

This afternoon I experienced the following: while driving home through busy traffic I passed under a railway bridge, at which point traffic from another lane attempted to filter into mine. I had the opportunity to wait, and allow a car to filter in. However, I kept driving, and the car behind me waited, allowing the other driver into the main lane. Then I began wondering about whether providing someone else with the opportunity to perform a 'good' act (good here understood as referring to an act that is arguably beneficial to at least one other person, and does not cause harm to anyone) is itself a good act. Put more generally (and in the form of a question), if in performing an act that is detrimental to another we allow a third person the opportunity to perform a beneficial act where they would not otherwise have been able, can our first act be seen in a more positive light, or is still to be considered negatively?

Looks to me as if you were rude and the guy behind you was polite. I really don't think there is any positive value added to a negative act if it happens to result in--indeed, even if it can predictably lead or contribute to--some other agent being given the chance (and taking it) to do something good. If I shoot you while we are standing near a paramedic, whom I have every reason to believe will leap to your aid, does that make my shooting you a good thing, or somehow positive? So I am inclined to give the guy behind you credit...and that is all the credit to be given in the case you describe. In the meantime, you might think about who "owns" the road. If it isn't you, maybe you would do well to share it?

A few years ago I completed a masters degree; however, since that time I have been employed at a job that tends not to incorporate masters (and indeed undergrad) level philosophy. As a result, perhaps, of this I have found myself reading less and less intellectual work (and spending less and less time with literature in general). I long to get back into an intellectual mindset, but am having difficulty 'reading'. I have tried various different approaches - from attempting to get through Russell's History of Western Philosophy , to simply trying to read at least one text by each of the 'greats', but each time I find myself glancing at the texts for about half an hour and then losing concentration. Ideas that I would once understand quite quickly have become hieroglyphs that I cannot translate. Put simply, I am having trouble reading philosophy philosophically. I am not looking for a 'quick fix' solution to this problem (as I do not think that there exist such things) - however, do you have any...

Reading philosophy can be difficult even for those of us deeply engaged in the profession, so don't feel bad that you are finding it difficult. In fact, most of us who do lots of reading of these materials actually don't "go it alone" in the way you are trying to do--we read, then discuss with others, which often helps us to avoid misunderstanding (as well as motivates us to continue, when the going gets slow). So here are a couple of suggestions: (1) Find others who are interested in reading these kinds of materials. Then figure out what you want to "assign" to yourselves as readings, and meet once a week (or once a month, or...the main thing is to have a regular schedule that works for the people involved, and to which they can commit themselves) to discuss what you have read, and to consider what you want to read and discuss next. (2) Take an evening class at your local community college. This will get you back into practice, and will give you (in the classroom and in the person...

What was the ethical way to handle the mountain-climber on Mt. Everest, David Sharp, who was passed over by 40 climbers as they left him for what they thought was dead?

I'm not entirely sure the facts are straight here. In the stories I read, many of the people who passed him by did not think he was dead. They could see that he was in trouble, but passed him by because they felt that if they attempted to help him, they would be denied the opportunity to reach the summit. If they really supposed he was already dead, I would be much more comfortable with their decision to reach the summit before coming back and helping to return his body to his loved ones. Those who passed Sharp by had gone to great expense and effort in getting as far as they had, but it still seems as if stopping to make some attempt to help a fellow human being in desperate trouble is morally mandated by any proper conception of ethics. I read that some who were there did provide Sharp with oxygen, and did what they could to comfort and save him--despite their own interests in summiting. I find it difficult to imagine how those who passed him by, knowing that he was still...

Dear philosophers, I would just like to ask if you think "common-sense arguments" are "unphilosophical". I know it depends on what we mean by those two terms, so if you could give me some idea, I'd be very thankful. More power, Selene

I see nothing at all about "common sense" that would make it inherently "unphilosophical." In fact, periodically throughout the history of philosophy there have arisen movements among philosophers in which "common sense" was embraced as providing the very best grounds for philosophical views. I think the only concern any serious philosopher would have about the use of "common sense" within philosophical contexts would be when whatever is counted as "common sense" becomes valorized in a way that puts it beyond dispute. Philosophers, most of all, are required to "think outside the box," as the saying goes. Just because something is widely accepted does not make it immune to philosophical criticism--indeed, the more widely and uncritically accepted something is, the more likely it is to mask some error that will lead us astray. "The unexamined life is not worth living for a human being," as Socrates said (Plato, Apology 38a). That does not make what most people take for granted wrong or...

Pages