Is mathematics independent of human consciousness?

I'm strongly inclined to say yes . Here's an argument. If there's even one technological civilization elsewhere in our unimaginably vast universe, then that civilization must have discovered enough math to produce technology. But we have no reason at all to think that it's a human civilization, given the very different conditions in which it evolved: if it exists, it belongs to a different species from ours. So: If math depends on human consciousness, then we're the only technological civilization in the universe, which seems very unlikely to me. Here's a second argument. Before human beings came on the scene, did the earth orbit the sun in an ellipse, with the sun at one focus? Surely it did. (Indeed, there's every reason to think that the earth traced an elliptical orbit before any life at all emerged on it.) But "orbiting in an ellipse with the sun at one focus" is a precise mathematical description of the earth's behavior, a description that held true long before consciousness emerged here....

Religious people often claim that human rights must come from God. It seems to me that they could be wrong about their claim because of the objection posed by the Euthyphro dilemma. Am I right about this? Can we have a solid grounding of human rights even if there is no God?

For what it's worth, I'm confident that you're right: moral rights needn't come from God. On the issues raised by the Euthyphro dilemma, let me suggest that you start with the SEP entries linked here and here . As for human rights properly so-called, I'd urge you to question that concept for the reasons that I gestured at in my answers to Question 5602 and Question 5402 .

Isn't evil prove that God exist ? 1. Evil exists. 2. Evil is a departure from the way things ought to be. 3. If there is a departure from the way things ought to be, then there is a way things ought to be. 4. Therefore, there is a way things ought to be. 5. If there is a way things ought to be, then there is a design plan for things. 6. If there is a design plan for things, then there must be a Designer. 7. Therefore, there must be a Designer. If the universe is the product of chance as opposed to intelligence, then there is no design or purpose built into the universe. Since one can rationally apply a standard of goodness to an object only if that object was designed with the purpose of meeting that standard, isn't evil which itself is a deviation from that standard of goodness prove that God exist?

Thanks for the interesting argument. I'd challenge premise (5) for starters. Not all normative truths require a designer or decree-giver. Consider this valid form of reasoning: P and Q; therefore, P. That form is a way that people ought to reason (and fortunately, most do). Or consider this invalid form of reasoning: If P, then Q; not P; therefore, not Q. That form is a way that people ought not to reason (even though, unfortunately, they sometimes do). Who decreed that it ought, or ought not, to be that way? Who designed that? Answer: No one. Or at least we needn't assume that anyone did. Indeed, if "P and Q; therefore, P" is a way people ought to reason only because someone designed things that way, that suggests (and perhaps even implies) that someone could have designed things so that "P and Q; therefore, P" was a way people ought not to reason, or so that "If P, then Q; not P; therefore, not Q" was a way people ought to reason. But those suggestions (or implications) make no sense, as...

Can philosophy speculate as to the likelihood of their being aliens on other planets or intelligent life elsewhere? If so, what do philosophers have to say about this and what do you philosophers on this forum have to say?

Speculate is pretty much all that philosophers, as such, can do about this question. For what it's worth, however, some well-placed astronomers are confident that life (intelligent or not) does exist elsewhere and that we'll discover evidence of it within 20 years: see this link .

I have a question about atheism and semantics, although I'm not sure I can phrase it properly, as it also includes the concept of "belief" separate from "doctrine." Here goes: atheists claim that they do not believe in "God" while they do believe in ethics, morality, a concept of right and wrong. It seems to me that anyone who says they believe in right and wrong also implicitly believes that there is something more important than one's own personal ego gratification (in other words, everyone "should" curtail their own gratification to the extent that such gratification harms other people). To me, that seems semantically equivalent to a belief in God, except that the concept of "God" also includes an association in most people's minds with a particular doctrine. It sounds to me that atheists are merely rejecting all the doctrinal beliefs that accompany organized religion, while at the very root or core of the situation, do accept that they need to defer their own gratification to something greater or...

You asked, "How can a person say on one hand that they believe that something is more important than the self and also say at the same time that nothing exists that is more important than the self?" I agree that a person who said such a thing would be expressing a self-contradictory belief, a belief that therefore couldn't possibly be correct. However, I think it's simply a misuse of language to use the term "god" or "God" to refer to anything that someone regards as more important than gratifying his or her ego at that moment . If I resist the temptation to insult someone because I think it would be wrongfully hurtful, even if insulting him would gratify my ego, I don't thereby count as believing in God or gods. You dismissed "terminology and doctrine," as if they're irrelevant. But the meanings of words , such as "god" or "God," are of course entirely a matter of terminology, and in the case of religious terminology the meanings are often connected to one doctrine or another. By the same token...

Do people have intrinsic value? For several years now I've worked with people with disabilities of all sorts and degrees of severity. It has made me question a lot of things and think about why people matter. There are so many external elements, positive and negative, of these peoples lives I've given consideration: the things that impact our community and others in it but is there something else underneath all these things that gives value to people? I believe they do although I cannot express why. Just by asking these questions I feel uneasy like I'm being disrespectful by discussing peoples existence like a math equation. So my question regards that weightiness I experience and where it comes from. (Could you recommend further reading?)

Where the weightiness you experience comes from is a psychological, psychobiological, or anthropological question and therefore not a question that philosophers, as such, are competent to answer. Having said that, I'll speculate anyway! It wouldn't surprise me to learn that natural selection has favored a tendency in human beings to treat all, and only, human beings as belonging to a morally special category. But, of course, a tendency favored by natural selection might nevertheless be hard to defend with argument. About the weightiness itself: Speaking as a philosopher, I'd urge us to distinguish between persons (i.e., people) and human beings. I regard person as a psychological category: members of the category possess distinctive (if broadly and vaguely defined) psychological traits and dispositions, such self-consciousness and rationality. I think those traits and dispositions make any person morally significant in a way in which any non-person isn't (even a non-person that's morally...
Sex

Is the cause of homosexuality purely a biological and not a philosophical question? Or is there room for philosophical explanation?

What counts as a cause is certainly a philosophical question, and although both laypeople and scientists often confidently talk about causes, philosophers are far from unanimous about the correct analysis of the concept of causation. It's a matter of considerable controversy: see, for example, this SEP entry . But if we achieved a precise enough and plausible enough understanding of cause and a precise enough and plausible enough understanding of the concept homosexual (perhaps easier but by no means easy), then I think the question of what causes homosexuality would be purely empirical rather than philosophical. It may not be a purely biological question (again, assuming we understand biological precisely enough), but I don't think it would be, at that stage, a philosophical question. Still, lots of philosophical work would need to be done before the question became well-enough understood to be answerable empirically. Or so it seems to me.

I am trying to understand the idea behind the question of the meaning of knowledge. I'm confused by why the usual meaning of something we remember having encountered before requires further definition. I guess I'm asking if philosophy has no acceptance of the usual common meanings? How does such a definition as "true verifiable belief" (if I remember that right) satisfy more than our commonly shared meaning? After all, I have knowledge of a lifetime of experiences and feelings and impressions and ideas that cannot possibly satisfy those criteria. Does that mean that philosophers claim that my memories are not knowledge? I have the same problem understanding the need for "defining" existence as {I think therefore I am." It seems more sensible to me to reword it as "I am therefore I think." Can you explain the most basic conception of philosophical inquiry? Is it simply a game?

To answer your last question first: I don't regard philosophical inquiry as a game. On the contrary, it may well be the most intellectually serious form of inquiry there is. What philosophical inquiry amounts to is itself a matter of philosophical controversy, but I'm inclined to say that philosophical inquiry consists in thinking as carefully as we can about the most general and most fundamental questions we can ask. To your other questions: 1. The definition of "knowledge" -- more accurately, the analysis of the concept of knowledge -- has been an energetically disputed topic in philosophy for more than 50 years. Some philosophers defend a version of the "true, justified belief" analysis, with "justified" understood in a variety of ways. Others defend an analysis that doesn't require anything they're prepared to call "justification." Still others think that it's a mistake to try analyzing the concept of knowledge into "more basic" concepts. You'll find much useful information about all of this in...

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