We seem to take it for granted that some works of art or fiction have "aesthetic value", which is classed as being of higher value than mere "entertainment value". However, the two don't actually seem that different. Both are values mainly of pleasure, not usefulness or truth; both can criticize or reveal; both can be judged by fixed standards, or based on personal taste. So what is the real distinction between aesthetic and entertainment value, other than that we hold aesthetic value in higher regard?

The way you have framed the question makes it a little hard to answer, as the term "aesthetic" is often used to refer to a wide range of experiences. So, in the broadest sense of the word, the aesthetic properties of an event or thing are its affective or emotive properties, e.g. a melancholy field, joyful music, a haunting conversation. Perhaps most of our experiences have some affective dimension --even our exchange (which I hope is friendly and welcoming). In this broad sense of 'aesthetic,' entertainment films, books, plays all have aesthetic features and values (some are witty, joyful, insipid, sexy, etc). I suspect that the question behind the question concerns what some might call "high art" versus the works one finds in popular or mass culture (the world of entertainment). On this general topic, philosophers today seem to be having a field day doing philosophy in the context of popular culture. There are dozens (at least 50 and growing) books out now by professional philosophers on such...

What is the current general consensus as to the fine-tuning design argument for the existence of God? Thanks.

I suspect that there is no general consensus at this point, though some atheists take the argument seriously (for example, Thomas Nagel in his recent book Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament) and the argument is now often included in stanard anthologies in philosophy of mind. Robin Collins is probably one of the best and clearest advocates of the argument, and I believe he has a book coming out defending the argument. Philosophers who are in the Humean tradition tend to be skeptical about arguments about the cause of the universe, owing to the uniqueness of the universe. In the words of another philosopher, universes are not as common as blackberries --which one might compare and contrast in determining whether our own universe is designed or not. The uniqueness objection does not (in my view) pose a serious problem as there are a range of areas in which we do reach reasonable philosophical conclusions notwithstanding uniqueness (such arguments may be found in epistemology and metaphysics...

While on holiday in Crete, myself and my friends Michael and Daniel began to admire the sparse mountainous landscape. We all agreed that it was aesthetically pleasing, but we all had different opinions concerning the degree of its aesthetic beauty. Michael suggested that the landscape was inferior to a forested mountain-range covered in thick pine forests. Daniel argued that Michael was incorrect because the Cretan landscape had a sparse beauty which was very appealing. He compared the heavily forested landscape of Michael's comparison to a ring with an enormous gaudy diamond, while the Cretan landscape had the minimalist, simplistic beauty of a ring with a smaller but more precious gem. I argued that Michael was mistaken in making this comparison to begin with. The Cretan landscape should not be compared to a landscape from a more temperate region of the world, because they were fundamentally different types of landscape. It is possible to compare the work of a oil-paints artist with those of another oil...

Great case! I think that some of the best current thinking by a philosopher on these matters is being done by Allen Carlson and I believe he would side with you. Carlson identifies different models for natural aesthetics --one can, for example, single out a rock or tree of small formation of objects for appreciation. But he thinks the more important natural aesthetic should be grounded in ecology--it is perhaps more important both because it is truer to seeing the objects themselves (they are, after all, in artistic terms naturally in situ) and more dangerous if you get things wrong. So, Carlson and some other philosophers think that our environmentally destructive behavior is sometimes based on bad aesthetics or a failure to appreciate the beauty of the natural world as when one (for example) destroys a rich wetland to build a golf course that is (let us imagine) not really needed. So, he (and I) would say it would be unfair (as well as perhaps completely absurd) to criticise a forested mountain...

Is religion merely a primitive form of science?

Great question! It may seem quite odd to equate religion and science because the former involves so much more than science. In religious communities and traditions one finds a whole way of life, a set of values and rites that seem to go well beyond the kind of inquiry that make up the natural and social sciences. Still, historically and today, religions do offer descriptions, explanations, and predictions about the cosmos and our place in it. Theistic traditions, for example, understand the cosmos itself to be created and conserved in being by an awesome, omnipresent, good, purposive reality. In today's terminology, however, I think it would be misleading and perhaps wrong to think of such a claim as a scientific one, but it would not be unscientific because there is (obviously) no evidence for such a worldview. The cosmological argument, for example, has some very able defenders today (see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for a good version) and that argument would seek to establish...

When investigating the relationship between works of fiction (literature, film, TV shows, etc) and social issues like racism and particularly sexism, it seems to me that much debate involves judging the work in question based on *possible* interpretations, rather than those interpretations favored by the author or the average member of the public, which can lead to the work being both praised and scorned by people from the same camp. For example, one critic might say a story presents a strong feminist message because that story tells of a woman in the traditionally male role of a warrior using sword and stake to combat, say, evil male creatures emerging from a cave under the town, showing that a woman is equally capable of being a hero and in control of her life. Another critic might, of the same story, say that it is anti-feminist and sexist because it implies that the female warrior is only powerful because she wields a phallic symbol, and that violence is being justified against beings emerging from...

You have raised THE critical question at the heart of the theory of meaning, and one that is central to the philosophy of art. Also: Clever example! Roughly speaking, there are three main schools of thought on the matter. There are those who put primacy on the intentions of the artist or artists. So, if the story was intended to be what you describe first (feminist), then it does not follow that the work of art is a success, but it would follow that the meaning of the work itself is defined by the creators seeking to show women in a compelling, strong light and the success of the piece might be measured by how well (or badly) that intention is evident. Then there are philosophers who utterly repudiate intentionality and seek to focus only on the work itself. These philosophers sometimes allow for multiple meanings (and even allow that the meaning of a work might change from generation to generation) and sometimes not, appealing to the conventions of the art world to nail down the central meaning...

Are values nothing more than priorities and preferences, or is there something deeper at work?

Some philosophers do think that moral and aesthetic values (right, wrong, good, evil, beauty, ugliness) are reflections of proper or correct priorities and preferences. It is proper to prefer compassion, for example, over cruelty. Some seek to articulate the best values in terms of those things (acts, events, properties) that would be approved of by an ideal observer. There are, however, more skeptical philosophers who think values are neither (in some objective sense) proper or improper except in terms reflecting what individuals or communities happen to prefer. This is sometimes a part of what has been called "error theory" because it claims that most people who are committed to moral (aesthetic / religious) values are in error when they take such values to be objectively binding. J.L. Mackie takes up such a stance in the book Ethics; Inventing Right and Wrong. I personally suggest Mackie's position is deeply problematic and the same reasons he offers to be skeptical about the objective...

In everyday common sense, as I've always experienced it, a beaver dam or hut, a bird's nest or a termite mound are generally considered natural, while a human house is considered artificial. Given that beaver dams and beaver huts involve quite a bit of logging and engineering, termite mounds involve digging and using termite-produced chemicals to solidify the material, and bird nests can involve a bit of either technique, what is it that makes a human dwelling, such as a simple log cabin, more "artificial" than these animal-built structures? Where does "natural" end and "artificial" begin?

Good question! Usually we label as "artificial" that which is an artifact of intentional, purposive activity. I am inclined to think that beavers and birds are purposive and they seem to have desires but perhaps we should be reluctant to attribute to them the full blown power of deliberation and intentionality. In any case, it may (as you suggest) seem arbitrary to see the beaver dam as natural and a simple log cabin as artificial even if the latter (unlike the dam) is the result of deliberate planning and creative intelligence. But perhaps there might be some point to arguing that some human artifacts are more natural or, using a related concept, ecological than others. Insofar as I build a log cabin that does not involve laying waste an entire forest, diverting streams, destroying the habitat of significant animals, and so on, perhaps we might see that as more natural insofar as it is more in keeping with the ecology of the region than if I destroy the forest and put up a parking lot that (let us...

What can make a philosophical theory "trivial"? Is triviality different from circularity?

Great question! I do not believe that "trivial" is a technical term in our discipline, unlike the notion that an argument may be circular. A circular argument is one that assumes what it sets out to establish, rather than providing independent reason for thinking the conclusion is right. A textbook example would be if two persons are arguing whether God exists, and "the believer" argues that God exists on the grounds that the Bible asserts God's existence and the Bible is a revelation from God. Presumably the interlocutor is not going to concede that the Bible is God's revelation if (s)he is in doubt whether God exists. A non-circular argument might take a related, but different form in which "the believer" argues (for example) from religious experience or from the contingent cosmos that theism is more reasonable than the best alternative (e.g. secular naturalism). Some famous philosophical arguments are the subject of great controversy over whether they are circular (the ontological argument, the...
Art

Is the natural human body considered art? I guess one would have to define art first, and in what context it is being called art. Also, who is the artist? The creators of the human, or the human? Perhaps art is simply creation with creative intent. Would the parents be the sculptors where the genes would create a piece of art, or is it only a canvas they created? What would some arguments be, for and against this idea?

Well, some theists have considered all human beings as works of art, though in their view the real artist is God. And some artists have made art work out of their bodies (body art) and some philosophers (Nietzsche) have thought that one should view one's whole life as a work of art in which the person is the artist. But our current concepts of art would make it very difficult for parents to understand themselves as actually making artwork when they give birth to and raise children. Our art institutions (currently) have little room for framing or housing children to be observed (as in a gallery or museum or in a theatre or in nature as part of environmental or earth art). Perhaps, though, there is one sense in which a child may be considered LIKE a work of art insofar as it is natural to take aesthetic delight in one's child (finding her or him beautiful, for example). Still, the child has a life of his or her own, and thus the child would be profoundly different from actual works of art. For...

If it is assumed that a person is indeed free to have his/her own opinions, views, perspectives, etc., should this right still be respected even if a person's opinions are demonstrably wrong, misleading, or potentially harmful (to themselves and others)?

Great question! Replying to the question will depend on the kind of "right" you have in mind. Consider three areas: politics, education, and the general issue of integrity. In a pluralistic democracy that respects basic liberties, you may have to tolerate (though to tolerate is not necessarily to respect) demonstrably false beliefs unless there is serious reason to believe that they will lead to actual (not merely potential) harm. So, it seems there is no obstacle for most world democracies today to insure that overt racism is not cultivated by any public institutions and to make it difficult (if not impossible) for private institutions to cultivate racism, especially when this is harming the innocent. But it will not be easy to directly control what people think or believe using political tools (how might a government insure that no citizen ever believes their horoscope?). The government can and most governments do control certification processes involving medicine and health, and so there are...

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