Is there any distinction between 'god' and 'what people say about god'?

I hope so! Lots of people have been saying quite a bit to what they believe is divine (God or god or gods) and talking about the divine for many centuries, not all of which can be correct. In the Greco-Roman world the gods were very much like us (given over to vice as well as virtue) though immortal, whereas for Jews, Christians, and Muslims there are not many gods but one, and this God (Allah) is thought of (or spoken of being) good, and the source of goodness. Most philosophers of religion today hold that religious believers are realists in the sense that when they pray or praise God or seek to be in a relationship with God, these believers are seeking a relationship with what they believe is a transcendent, real being. What sense would it make to pray that God show loving care for the creation or praise God for God's great goodness, unless one actually believed that God is loving or is great and good. I actually do adopt such a stand (as both a philosopher as well as religious believer) but there...

Why is it that faith, which here I define as religious-based beliefs without or in opposition to empirical or other evidence, is so highly valued, or even central to Christianity (and assumedly many other religions as well)? Perhaps the assumption is that faith is a more 'humble' position rather than over-valueing humankind's ability to rationalise and use logic to understand the world around them, since humility/ lack of pride is highly valued by many major religions ?? Does this mean that philosophy is quite arrogant ? But perhaps that is more a question for psychology and sociology. So in more philosophical terms, I guess I am asking whether faith can be justified from a philosophical point of view, or are the two quite incompatible?

Good question. I suspect that the term "faith" is used in many different senses today! There is a great book called The Concept of Faith in which Lad Sessions distinguishes at least five models of faith in different religious contexts. For theists, "faith" might stand for the body of beliefs (and maybe practices like prayer) that comprise the religion, or it may refer to fidelity (trust) or it may refer to reasonable belief or, finally, it may refer to belief that is at odds with evidence (the meaning you suggest). Philosophers have taken many sides on faith and its different meanings. Chritian philosophers today who are considered "evidentialists" (Richard Swinburne) holds that religious belief must have evidence to be warranted. Some others who are in the tradition of reformed epistemology hold that many of our beliefs (including our beliefs in secular contexts about the world and each other) do not require evidence to be justified. On their view, beliefs that are reliable and properly caused may...

I was politicized early thanks to growing up in a war zone, and such a childhood imposes certain questions on a child's mind. After growing older and nurturing an increasing infatuation with socialism and anarchism, I am now at a new crossroads - totalitarianism. The reason for this is simple: I have no faith in humanity, nor in the so called 'rationality' of Mankind. In my opinion, people are overwhelmingly ignorant of what is best for them. How can they decide what is best for them without proper education? Furthermore, people are overwhelmingly selfish and short-sighted, how can a society function correctly if the majority of people are unfit to decide for themselves, and when they do so, they do so poorly (see George Bush). Another problem is media. Reading Chomsky's "Manufacturing Consent" in my teens nourished in me a deep hatred of privately-owned media, and as we all know: propaganda is rife in all societies. Finally, we come to the financial crisis. If I have understood it correctly, economic...

Interesting! The idea of leaders having to undergo training in different professions (and even being a hobo!) is appealing (though whether it is practical is another matter). The case for democracy historically usually does go hand in hand with a case that human beings are indeed reasonable and are capable of rational debate and decision-making. This was the case in the founding of the democratic republic here in the United States, for example. So, if there are compelling reasons for thinking human beings are incapable of responsible, reasonable reflection and voting, a foundational basis for democracy would be problematic. But note that democracy is relatively recent. In 1900 the majority of political life consisted of Empires and not democratic, and while the majority of political states are (at least on paper) democratic today, it is only recently that voting barriers have been removed that restricted voting on the basis of gender or race or property ownership. Also, education (including civic...

I'm not specifically sure how to word this question, so please pardon my lack of eloquence. What, if any, moral responsibility do we have to those who had hurt us deeply, say, someone who has cheated on their spouse? Should we forgive and forget? Just forgive but never forget? Ought we treat them normally, or is it ethical to hold a grudge? How does one ethically/morally handle the rest of the relationship, whatever it may be, when one has been significantly betrayed?

A very sensitive and important set of questions! There is some divide among philosophers on this matter at present. Some philosophers (Richard Swinburne, for example) think that you should not forgive someone unless they actually ask for forgiveness, repent, and reform. This seems too extreme, in my view. I had a student who claimed she could never forgive her father for comitting suicide, because her father ceased to be and there could be no reconciliation. That seems too extreme, because even if there is no reconciliation on earth or elsewhere, there are still ways in which one may forgive (not hold a grudge or, worse, not be in a rage about) the one who injured you. Other philosophers (I think this would include Jeffrey Murphy) believe that the injured party can forgive (even without confession and repentance by the one who committed the wrong) but that he / she should not forgive right away. Just taking up the "forgive and forget" role right away may be a reflection that one did not really...

While reading through some questions in the religious section, I came across Peter Smith saying [http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/2250/], "What is it with the obsession of (much) contemporary organized religions with matters of sexuality? It really is pretty bizarre. And for sure, if some of the energy wasted on pruriently fussing about who gets to do what with whom and where were spent campaigning on issues of social justice, say, then the world would be a better place. But I digress ...". Can any philosophers, including Peter Smith, tell me if my reasoning is valid regarding this (or come up with their own reasoning as to why an organized religion would have such rules): There are several reasons why organized religions could be "obsessed" about matters of sexuality, about "who gets to do what with whom and where" etc. 1. Disease: STD's are horrible, and the AIDs crisis in Africa is a good example as to why an organized religion might stress sexual relations with only one partner to whom you are...

I agree that dismissiveness of such rules (without carefully considering their grounds and implications) does seem unthoughtful, though I am 100% certain that Peter Smith has indeed been careful to reflect on such matters and shares your concern about the spread of AID s, STD s... Be that as it may, you asked whether your reasoning is valid, and I will respond to that question. I suggest that religions like Judaism, Chritianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism (the list could go on and on...) give attention to sexuality because each of these traditions has a vision (and practices built on that vision) of human fulfilment, and it is not implausable to think that sexuality has a vital role in human fulfilment. These world religions and others may differ in terms of their view of sexual desire, the mind-body relationship, family, sexual orientation and practice, and so on, but I do not think it bizarre (and here, I suppose, I do differ from Peter) that world religions should take seriously the important...

Is it true that all people are beautiful? Or is that just a white lie we tell to make non-beautiful people feel better?

I could not agree more with Peter's point about the down side of being preoccupied with who looks beautiful or more beautiful than others. But I might add that I think the topic of beauty or even the reality of beauty is important. Though a neglected topic for much of the 20th century, the topic made a re-bound in the latter part of that century (Iris Murdoch, Guy Sircello, Mary Mothersill) and today (see On Beauty by Elaine Scary). And it is becoming more appreciated as an important factor in ethics, especially environmental ethics. See the anthology From Beauty to Duty which includes attention to the ethical implications of our aesthetic appreciation of nature (e.g. if we find a wilderness area beautiful, chances are we will see its destruction for short term economic gains as ugly and morally objectionable). So, are all people beautiful? I agree (quite reluctantly) with Peter. But consider a different question: Would the flourishing and well being of all people be beautiful? Of course we would...

Many people say that the world doesn't owe you anything. Is that true? What responsibilities if any does a person have for his fellow human beings?

This is a very deep question! The answer depends upon the existence and scope of what are ofted called positive and negative rights. A negative right involves others having a duty to not do certain things. Arguably, the right to free speech is a negative right, for it involves others restraining themselves from silencing others. If you do have a right to free speech, the world owes you a certain amount of restraint and non-interference (e.g. presumably the right to free speech is not absolute and must be weighed agains other rights such as property rights, the right to life...). Positive rights involve positive duties that others have toward you. Arguably, the right to life would require the world to provide you food if you needed food to survive and this need was not voluntarily assumed (e.g. you did not voluntarily go on a hunger strike) and the world had surplus food. There is controversy over the status of some rights and duties. For example, does everyone have a duty or a right to attain...

Dear philosophers, I have 2 questions: 1. Do you believe that it is morally permissible for an unmarried person (who has no children to care for) and who has battled depression for many years to commit suicide ? 2. What is your opinion of Liberalism which asserts that a person's life belongs only to them, and no other person has the right to force their own ideals by which that life must be lived ? Thanks, William

William: I think Professor Antony's reply is deep and commendable. I would only add a minor point about self-ownership or the thesis that one's life only belongs to one's self. "Belonging" can involve property rights (this house belongs to me) but it can also refer to what is good for a person (e.g. he belongs in a hospital, she belongs in a great school, etc). If you step back from your current state (a very difficult act of abstraction, I agree!), can you see that you belong in a caring, curative therapeutic process? I think if you can begin to begin seeing that, you can see a different path than self-destruction. In a way, part of an answer to your question will involve not just a matter of liberalism versus a conservative, paternalistic form of governance, but it will involve a philosophy of values and one's overall understanding of the cosmos. For example, one of the reasons Christian philosophers historically opposed suicide (even the dignified suicide of Lucretius which was valorized in...

How is it that almost anything that any religious preacher says to prove the existence of God turns out to be typical examples of one or the other of the well known logical fallacies? How is it that they don't realise this simple fact when all such fallacies are enumerated in the Web in such sites as the Wikipedia? Are human being basically very irrational creatures ?

The matter is more complicated than looking at Wikipedia. There are plenty of good reasons for being an atheist, but as I have sought to make evident in replying to other questions in the category of 'religion' there is a vast philosophical literature supporting religious beliefs without what might be called Wikipedia fallacies. You might check out the free online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries Philosophy of Religion and, as an example, the entry for the Cosmological Argument, which contains a pretty plausable (non-fallacious) version of the cosmological argument. Check out, too, the Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Religion. I might also suggest that no philosopher today (or almost none) thinks that they can prove God's existence or non-existence or prove utilitarianism is correct or physicalism or realism in philosophy of science. Today, most of us deal with arguments we take to be plausable or persuasive, but these fall short of proofs.

Does worthwhile Philosophy start with good questions or can it start with the proper mood? I am an International Relations major and have decided on writing my honors thesis on a question of political philosophy, not because I have a burning question, but rather because it was the subject I enjoyed the most and because I want to understand whether or not it is something I'd like pursuing in the future in the form of a postgraduate degree. I often find myself in what I - and some friends- call a "Philosophical mood" -though the friends are not without irony when the employ the term- i.e. in the mood for thinking and discussing dispassionately about what I am passionate about. I think Heidegger privileged moods as a way to knowing. I've decided researching the nature of power and the use of this concept in twentieth-Century political thought because I want to satisfy my mood, not because it seems like a burning question. Can real philosophy come from this? Is it (I know it is unscientific) silly to pursue...

Great questions! In a way, it is difficult to begin philosophy without there being some kind of mood --whether this be openness or inquisitiveness. It has been said that philosophy begins in wonder, and I suppose one may think of wonder as a mood. Some philosophers have interpreted this as philosophy beginning with puzzlement and understood the goal of philosophy to be the dispelling of puzzlement. But I suggest "wonder" might also be fascination or awe or even reverence. I suspect that when you get in a "philosophical mood" you probably are prepared to set aside distractions and work from a whole host of what might be called moods: fascination, awe, reverence, inquisitiveness.... but also possibly anger, love or hate and more. If we follow Socrates and the Platonic tradition generally, there are certain moods or emotions that can aid or that can hinder philosophical reflection. Those impairing philosophical inquiry include jealousy, envy, impatience and vanity. I believe the majority in the...

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