Logically wiser heads (such as Peter Smith) may want to weigh in, but I think we can at least say this much. As you note, the axioms of Zermelo-Frankel set theory don't answer the question. We can add either the Axiom of Choice or its denial and to the basic ZFC axioms. As long as the basic axioms are consistent, the result will be consistent too. The same goes for the Continuum Hypothesis. But by itself this doesn't give us any reason one way or another to think that there's some more agreeable formulation without this ambiguity. And even if we came up with a particularly elegant formulation of set theory that didn't leave these axioms dangling, it's not clear that this would settle the question of truth conclusively. Behind this lies a harder question: what would it mean in the first place for the matter to be settled conclusively? The problem is that just what truth amounts to here is not a settled matter, and not a matter that formulations of axioms by themselves can settle.

My little bit of googling suggests that the word "agnostic" was coined by Thomas Huxley in the mid-19th century. Huxley had grown up in a largely Christian society, but it seems that what he meant by the word was not tied to Christianity; it seems that he was describing a skeptical attitude toward "spiritual matters" in general. Even if that's not the real story, it doesn't matter much. We've come to use the word "agnostic" to mean either skepticism about the existence of a God (skepticism as opposed to outright rejection of the claim) or more generally, lack of commitment one way or another about some claim, as in "I'm agnostic about string theory,"meaning "I neither believe nor disbelieve string theory." Could a Buddhist be an agnostic in either sense? The answer is pretty clearly "yes" on both counts. Even if we define a Buddhist as someone who accepts a certain set of doctrines (not a good definition, by the way), the core "doctrines" would presumably be the Four Noble Truths. Since none of...

I'd like to start with the last bit. You say that you understand living an authentic life as "directed by evolutionary forces that propel me to seek out maximum stimulation in order to realize my potential." I'd suggest some skepticism about that. If you mean by "evolution" what biologists mean, then there are no such forces; evolution isn't goal directed. And in any case, it's not obvious that "maximum stimulation" is the best way for for anyone to realize their potential. On the contrary, it's at least as likely that most of us suffer from too much stimulation as from too little. Down in the foothills, let's start with an example. I don't get along with racist bigots who lard their conversation with vile remarks. I've had all the "stimulation" from such people that my potential calls for. Being authentic doesn't call for inviting them to my dinner parties. On the contrary, doing that would be downright inauthentic. I'd be pretending a friendship that doesn't exist. Tolerance doesn't call for...

Suppose the "technicality" is something that the law pretty clearly entails, even though it's doubtful that legislators had the particular worrying circumstances in mind. In that case, the judge is doing something we normally think judges are supposed to do: deciding cases based on the law. It's open to the judge to point out that this is an unfortunate consequence of the law, and may be open to him/her to adjust penalties accordingly, but if the law actually has a certain consequence, then that's the law. If the "technicality" is an unfortunate one, legislators can fix it, or so the argument would go. Compare: suppose that it's not a matter of a technicality at all, but a matter of a law that the judge thinks is bad. Then it's still the judge's sworn obligation to follow the law. Is this fair? In various senses of the word, the answer may be no. Should the judge do otherwise? That doesn't follow. It's not clear that the cure for bad laws is to have judges substitute their judgment of what's...

Just one footnote to Sean. If homosexuality is a choice, it's not, as Richard Mohr once pointed out, like the choice of what sort of ice cream you're going to buy. Here's a thought experiment to try. Think of someone you find sexually attractive. Now try to choose not to have that response. Part two: think of someone you don't find sexually attractive. Now try to choose to be attracted to them. Step three: repeat steps one and two for broad categories of people where you find you have pretty stable patterns of attraction. If you are anything like me, you'll find that the attempt to choose doesn't get you anywhere. Just how we end up being sexually attracted to the people we're attracted to is not easy to say. What seems pretty clear is that it's not in any ordinary sense a choice, Of course, having predilections is one thing; that may not be a choice. Acting on them is another; that usually is a choice. If a case could be made that it's wrong for homosexual people to act on their...

Sean has correctly pointed out that part of what you are asking calls for empirical answers. But your last sentence - about sports being the least thing humans ace invented - raises an issue of value. And what you seem to be saying is that since sports produce no tangible outcome, in your words, it's hard to see what their value could be. I'd like to suggest that this isn't the best way to look at the matter. After all, why are activities that produce tangible results (making shoes, or painting pictures, or building houses) valuable? The plausible answer is that they contribute in some way or another to human welfare, happiness, or flourishing. Some things we need for basic survival - food for example. But a flourishing life calls for a lot more than mere survival. And if something is a reliable source of otherwise harmless pleasure, that pretty clearly gives it value. I suggest that this gives us at least part of the answer to your question. Playing sports gives many people a great deal of...

It's quite right that more or less any detailed fact is improbable in its detail, but not automatically in need of explanation on that account. But we need to be careful lest we turn that point into a rejection of the need to explain anything. I don't have a set of criteria to offer, but we do take some cases of apparently improbable structure to call out for explanation. We don't always say: well things had to be arranged in some way; might as well be this way as any other. We also tend to see the fact that some hypothesis makes sense of apparently diverse facts in a unified, elegant way as a scientific virtue (though hardly the only one.) Whether we should say anything of this sort about the "fine-tuning" hypothesis is another matter; it may well be that we shouldn't. But let's consider a comparison: we could say that morphological similarities among species are a brute fact, needing no explanation. But we take the fact that evolution makes sense of these similarities to count in favor of...

You're right that there needs to be a distinction that goes with the word if it's to be of much use. And there are no doubt some sense of the word "special" (meaning something like rare or unique ) that don't allow for all of us to be special. But there's still logical room for a sense in which we're all special. Here are two ways. The first is simply this: it could be that each of us possesses some distinction, though not the same one for all. You may be the world's greatest kazoo player; I may make the world's best Jello salad. And so on. You'd be special in the kazoo-playing way, I in the Jello-making mold and each other person in their own (dare I say) special way. But there's another possibility. It doesn't make sense to say that we're special, period . If any of us are special, it's because of something about us. But suppose some characteristics are intrinsically valuable -- that is, have value all by themselves, without reference to anything else. Perhaps being conscious...

I'm always a little worried about broad generalizations about society. That said, I'm willing to grant that there is a real bias of the kind you describe. And I would also agree that many very worthy people get overlooked on that account. As for why it happens, that's an empirical question and as a philosopher I have no special insight into the answer. But I can offer a hypothesis: it's a time-saver. No doubt there are many people with no degrees who are smarter and more knowledgeable than people with Ivy-League credentials. But if I'm an employer, I don't have the time or the means to figure out who among all the applicants is really the most capable. So I will use things like educational achievement as a proxy. If someone got a degree, there's a good chance that they have at least a certain basic level of intellectual ability and stick-to-itiveness. And if their degree is from a prestigious school, that inference may be a little more solid. At least, I'd guess that this is what many employers...

It's pretty clearly possible to look without verbal labeling, since animals and infants do that. But whether we can just look at something 'as it is' isn't so clear. One obvious problem: our sensory systems (brain included) do a lot of processing of the information they take in, and this starts early in the process - long before we get to anything over which we have conscious influence. So if that doesn't fit the "seeing as it is" bill, we're already out of luck. But there's another problem: what would count? My cell phone sits beside me. What would it mean to look at it as it is? Among other things, it is a cell phone. If I don't recognize that, there's an obvious sense in which I don't see it as it is - or at least, not for what it is. But even if we stick to the intrinsic characteristics of the thing apart from its uses, which of the countless many count? There are far more physical facts about my cell phone than my beleaguered brain could ever cope with. Not only that; many of the...