My question pertains to the idea of happiness being induced by a drug. If the drug--like modern anti-depressants--actually changes a person's neurochemistry such that for all intents and purposes the brain looks just like a "happy" brain, then wouldn't you consider that person happy? (Would you give a different answer for a drug like Ecstasy that alters the brain in slightly different ways than classic neurochemical happiness but still brings about a perception of happiness?) And what about the perception of happiness over the long haul? If someone is on anti-depressants for, say, fifty years, and has an over-all sense of peace, purpose, etc that they would NOT have otherwise had, have they, in fact, been happy?

For the reasons that David offers, I agree that subjective feelingsof contentment are not sufficient for well-being: one couldfeel good and not be doing very well. At the same time, I would notconclude (not that David suggests otherwise) either that (1) positivefeelings of contentment are not necessary for well-being orthat (2) the fact that someone’s feeling of contentment was induced bydrugs (anti-depressants, ecstasy) by itself undermines that person’sclaim to well-being. Individuals who are suffering from depression notonly are suffering a loss of good feeling; in addition, they often havea difficult time motivating themselves to form and sustain significantrelationships, to gain a deeper understanding of the world, toappreciate beauty, etc. In other words, without a subjective feeling ofcontentment, humans are often unable to engage in the sorts ofactivities that objectivists about well-being tend to associate with a genuinely goodlife. Additionally, if I were to learn...

Why is there no "happiness"ology? It seems that throughout history philosophy has strived to legitimize and analyze most basic human questions except that of what happiness is and how it is achieved. Is this accurate or am I mistaken?

Many, many, philosophers have thought about this issue. The Ancient Greeks, for example, gave a great deal of attention to what they called “ eudaimonia ”– a word that is often translated as “happiness”. But this translation can be somewhat misleading, since we often use the word “happiness” simply to refer to a momentary state of euphoria, as in, “I was so happy! He finally responded to my e-mail! But then, you know what he said? He told me to stop pestering him. I was so upset.” What the ancients were concerned to understand was not the nature of such euphoric states, but the nature of that state of being that we’ve achieved when we are in a very good state, when we’re doing well, when we’re flourishing. It was such a state that they called “ eudaimonia ,” and it is this state that is often referred to in philosophical literature as “happiness.” On this understanding, it’s then an open question what is the relationship between being happy and the sort of positive mental state that is...

Is happiness (eudaemonia) possible?

The answer to this question will depend on your conception ofhappiness. Not only do different philosophers differ in their viewabout what constitutes happiness (go here ),they also have different views about how much of anything thatcontributes to happiness is required before one counts as happy. Thinkabout it this way. On different philosophical conceptions, differentthings count as good or bad for us. To the extent that we have the goodthings, we are better off. To the extent that we lack the good thingsand possess the bad things, we are less well-off. On a scale from very,very badly off to very, very well-off, there is a point at which onecounts as happy or eudaimon – namely, when one has enough ofwhat is good (and lacks enough of what is bad) to count as living a good life (that is, good foroneself), or as flourishing. Depending on how high on the scale oneplaces happiness and depending on the difficulty of achieving theconstituents of happiness, it will be more or less easy to becomehappy. If...