Is there a role of mathematics in the development of human consciousness?

In addition to Hofstadter's wonderful writings, you might also be interested in work done on the relationships between mathematics and cognition (more generally than just consciousness). Take a look at these classics in that area: Rochel Gelman & C.R. Gallistel, The Child's Understanding of Number (Harvard University Press, 1986) George Lakoff & Rafael Nuñez, Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being (Basic Books, 2001) Stanislaus Dehaene, The Number Sense: How the Mind Creates Mathematics (Oxford University Press, 2011)

Is it considered possible to be consciously aware of an object or thought without experiencing feelings, or is "feelings" just another word for conscious awareness?. If this question can't be dismissed, which philosophers have explored it?

In addition to the previous replies, you might have in mind the notion of a "philosophical zombie": A person(?) indistinguishable in its appearance and behavior from a human but who has no "qualia" or "conscious (qualitative) experiences". Again, there's been lots written on this, but you might find the opposing views of Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers to be a good place to start. For Chalmers, who thinks that there can be such zombies (at least in theory), take a look at: Chalmers, David J. (1996), The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (New York: Oxford University Press). For Dennett (who thinks that there aren't any such things, or possibly that there are, namely, us!), take a look at: Dennett, Daniel C. (1991), Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown). (Other citations can be found under the heading "Philosophical Zombies" in my bibliography on computational theories of consciousness

What is conciousness? what causes it? is it an external processs or an internal process? (sorry this is a weighty question, and I know there are no concrete answers, but are there any interesting theories out there?) What are your thoughts? Is conciousness a part of the environment as well as a "bodily" process? where does the trigger start? I find this subject matter very confusing, Thanks so much for your help!

Both philosophers and scientists (and, among scientists, both neuroscientists and cognitive scientists (and, among cognitive scientists, both computationally-oriented ones working in AI as well as non-computationally-oriented ones)) have been studying consciousness for many years recently. One main issue is your question of what it is. One way of phrasing that issue, due to the philosopher Ned Block, is as a distinction between "access" consciousness and "phenomenal" consciousness: The former, very roughly, is the kind of consciousness that is involved in information processing (and that, perhaps, can only be studied "externally" from a "third-person", objective, scientific perspective). The latter, again very roughly, is "experience", or "what it is like" to process information (and that, perhaps, can only be studied "internally" from a "first-person", subjective perspective). Figuring out exactly what "access" consciousness is has been called the "easy" problem of consciousness, because cognitive...

I recently had a colonoscopy under an anesthetic that caused complete amnesia. An observer could see I was in extreme pain during the procedure yet I have no recollection. How does a philosopher think about the pain I experienced but do not recall?

Daniel Dennett discussed a fictional drug that he called an "amnestic" that allows you to feel pain, but paralyzes you so that you don't exhibit pain behavior, and leaves you with amnesia. Pleasant, no? For the details and his philosophical analysis, read: Dennett, Daniel C. (1978), "Why You Can't Make a Computer that Feels Pain", Synthese 38(3) (July): 415-456; reprinted in his Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books (now Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 1978): 190-229.