Do you think every person has a moral obligation to work at the best paying job they can attain, live off as little as they can manage, and donate the rest to the most efficient charity they can find?

Given the way many in the wealthy parts of the world live, this is a compelling question. I think, however, that as posed the answer must be "no." For one thing, the best paying jobs may sometimes contribute more bads than goods to the world. For example, in some circumstances criminal activity or highly polluting industry may offer the best paying job. Also, it is not morally obligatory to live off as little as one can manage, giving away the rest to charity. People have obligations to themselves as well as to others, and one must balance what one owes to others against what one owes oneself. Finally, it's important to understand that some acts are morally admirable without being morally obligatory; and from where I sit extraordinary self-sacrifice for the sake of charity to others counts as just such an act. Having said that, it remains true, I think, as a matter of judgment, that many people in wealthier parts of the world live in ways that have tipped the balance excessively in the direction of...

Is it wrong to lie when we're questioned on matters of our intimacy? I mean cases where the other reasonable option would be to refuse to answer but for some reason we prefer not to. More specifically, I mean cases where it was wrong to ask in the first place.

While in general truth-telling is morally preferable to lying, I suppose it might depend upon what precise reason one has for preferring not to answer or precisely how wrong or in what way wrong the question was. But as a general matter, no, I don't think it reasonable to hold that it would always be wrong to lie in circumstances of the sort you describe.

Was I right or wrong in marrying out of a sense of duty as opposed to marrying for love? Some years ago I fell in love with an unavailable woman. We did not have a relationship but while still in love with her I met, had a long term relationship with and married a woman I was fond of and needed. My wife believes that I love her and she loves me. I am aware that if I had not had a long relationship with my wife she might have met and married someone who truly loved her. However, I stayed with her in the hope that she would help me get over the unavailable woman and that I would eventually grow to love her. This did not happen. Had I told her after being with her for a few years that I did not love her and that I wanted to end our relationship it may have then been too late (we are both in our late thirties) for her to meet another man and have children with him. Also deep down I must have felt that I had used her and did not want to admit this to myself. I felt I was obligated to marry her. Was...

The texts of intimate relationships are generally too complicated to make judgments about using simple moral principles. But as a weakly stated general rule, I'd say that it's not wrong to marry or simply remain in a marriage out of a sense of duty. In fact, I would say that a sense of duty is a desirable element of a good foundation for marriage. It is, however, wrong to marry or remain married for the sake of duty but do so deceptively--that is, it is wrong to marry or stay married only or principally for sake of duty when your partner in marriage believes otherwise.

Do you think that it is morally wrong to store the DNA of innocent people on a central database? Living in Scotland, the law says that people who have been charged of a 'violent or sexual offence' can have their DNA stored in a database for 3 years (with the possibility of extending that to 5). This isn't the DNA of people who have been convicted, but the DNA of people who have been charged and subsequently released (essentially innocent in respect to the law). In discussions with friends, I often come across the argument as follows: 'if you haven't done anything wrong, then you don't have anything to worry about'; at which point I often reply: 'if I haven't done anything wrong, then you have no need to hold my DNA'. Do you feel that a government has a duty to hold the DNA of 'potential' criminals like this in order to benefit society at large?

I'm with you. There is a security interest in having as complete as possible a database of DNA, but there is a contrary interest in privacy that I believe trumps the security interest. One reason for this is that, alas, your friends are simply wrong to think that simply because one is innocent one has nothing to fear from the government. Innocent people are convicted perhaps more often than your friends think. I recommend a book called Actual Innocence , which along with the Innocence Project explores how false convictions occur. One way they seem to occur is through the misuse of biological evidence. Or Google "Fred Zain" and "Ralph Erdmann" to learn more about the laboratory misconduct. The case of the Guilford Four in Britain is instructive, too. Sadly, the most prudent course and the course that best protects innocent people is not to allow the state access to the DNA of people charged but found to be innocent. This will, of course, in some cases diminish people's security; but the...

Where moral codes come from? Are they something to aquire or are they inherently in our genes?

Both. General capacities and inclinations for thought, feeling, and conduct are biologically based (not just in our genes but in virtually all our tissues). But the specific way those capacities and inclinations are conceptualized and formulated in principle, narrative, argument, and prohibition shapes, limits, and cultivates them--often in different ways by different people and societies.

Peter Singer has popularized the term "speiciesism." It's the idea that we are biased or prejudiced towards our own species. Therefore, the argument says, we should have equal consideration for animals. However, this won't apply to animals. The lion will still eat the gazelle, the sharks will eat the dolphins, and any carnivore will eat any animal. I can imagine Singer replying that animals don't have the rational capacity to do ethics. The ideas that Singer presents only applies to us humans. But if this is the case, isn't that a form of speciesism?

You've landed upon what I think of as the reciprocity issue in morals. Do moral agents like us have obligations towards beings that do not or cannot reciprocate? One thing to keep in mind is that even among human beings we don't require reciprocity. We recognize moral obligations to treat criminals in morally acceptable ways even when those same criminals won't reciprocate. We recognize moral obligations to treat children, the mentally ill, the comatose, and even the dead in morally proper ways even though they can't reciprocate. So, why should it be problematic that humans recognize moral obligations towards non-human animals that can suffer even when those animals are incapable of reciprocating? One has to, I think, distinguish between beings that I would call "moral agents" from beings that have "moral standing." Beings that are moral agents are beings that are capable of understanding and acting on "moral considerations." Beings that have moral standing are beings to which...

Research in anthropology and related disciplines reveals that there is no strong evidence of any universal morals; there are no set of moral beliefs that are found uniformly across all existing countries or cultures. This has often been interpreted to mean that morality is unrelated to the existence of a deity. Some, however, believe that while the lack of universal morals is true it does seem that there is a universal sense of “oughtness”, or a universal tendency to justify what we do, or to place value judgments like “right” and “wrong” on behavior. From a philosophical perspective is this universal tendency toward morality better explained by a need to “get along” to increase fitness in our world (roughly a sociobiological explanation of morality), or is it perhaps better explained by our possessing an intrinsically moral nature, i.e. one that may exist because of the existence of a deity or deities (or even because life may continue after physical death without the existence of a deity). Sociobiology,...

About universal morality: while it's true that among cultures (as among individuals within any culture) there are variation in moral beliefs (as well as scientific beliefs), there are general (nearly universal, so far as I can tell) moral categories. One finds incest regulations, for example, in every society (though the boundaries of those prohibitions vary). Rules concerning possession, killing, and even, arguably, the sacred are more or less universal. I would be pretty reluctant to walk into any human society and start taking bites out of people's children. Moral beliefs and conduct do exhibit variation, but variation by itself doesn't disprove the existence of universal commonalities. Any pharmacist will tell you that different people respond to different drugs differently, but that doesn't refute the universal laws of chemistry. Human moral life, then, exhibits both remarkable variation and remarkable commonality. As you say, there are various possible explanations for this. ...

Is it wrong to discriminate against people that are racist, homophobic or sexist, etc.?

Well, it would, I think, depend upon the context. Discriminating among people isn't itself an objectionable thing. One discriminates among different job applicants and among whom to marry or pursue a friendship. In cases like friendship, where moral discriminations are proper, there is generally nothing wrong with discriminating "against" those who are immoral. But the phrase, "discriminating against," usually has a sort of public policy connotation. In those sorts of cases, discriminating against the racist, homophobic, and sexist may be objectionable. For example, I think it would be wrong to deny the vote to racists (even though I often wish they wouldn't vote) or to tax them differently. The question of employment discrimination, on the other hand, is a thorny one, but I'd say that a reasonable general principle to use is this: people holding immoral beliefs should not be discriminated against in employment so long as their objectionable beliefs are not manifest in conduct that...

How far do we have a duty to protect others from themselves? Does it extend from, say, removing alcohol an alcoholic has hidden away to telling a relative's children to eat their food politely, when the relative herself is indifferent to such matters? Are we are brother's keepers? To what degree?

As a parent, an ever-older member of an extended family, and as a citizen of a somewhat democratic nation with a remarkably imprudent population, I struggle with this issue a lot. One way I think about this matter is first to make a distinction between (a) forcibly protecting people from themselves, (b) simply attempting to do so through persuasion, and © not acting at all. One general principle to use is that (1) competent and (2) independent people ought to be allowed maximal liberty, even to harm themselves, especially where significant pleasures are at stake. This helps us with clear cases. So, for example, one has a duty to intervene forcibly to protect one's young children from themselves--say by pulling their fingers away from an electrical socket. One's young children are neither competent nor independent. There are, however, people who are competent but not independent. One arguably has a duty to protect one's grown children, when those children remain bound up with a parent...

We are a Muslim couple and it's now 5 years and we don't have childrens. Doctors said that my wife is not having eggs to produce although she is only 32 years old. There is only way to take the eggs from another lady. Please tell me that is it ok or it will be a sin. The answer from the doctors is the final that she will never be able to produce her own eggs so this is the only option for ivf..... Please help me. Rashid

Whether and how to have a child is one of the most intimate and personal matters of life, whatever one's religion. So, ultimately you must make the decision as to what is most fitting for you. I cannot write as a Muslim or as one expert in Muslim theology. As a philosopher, however, I can say that I find nothing objectionable per se in the practice of using ova from a third party in order to generate a baby to which your wife can give birth, that can carry your genetic codes, and that the two of you can raise. I would offer this cautionary note, however. Sometimes the costs of such procedures can be terribly high. That being the case, one ought to consider whether in an (a) already over populated world, where (b) many children stand in need of adoption, and (c ) where many other problems demand attention it is proper to expend so many resources to bring a single child into existence. Conceiving, birthing, and raising a child using a third-party donor may be the best option for you. But do consider...

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