Recent Responses
What do people mean when they say (as when cautioning against the validity of a scientific study, for example) that "correlation does not imply causation"? Isn't causation just perfect correlation? And if so, doesn't that mean that the caveat in question does not concern causal claims per se, but inductive claims more generally?
Richard Heck
July 3, 2013
(changed July 3, 2013)
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Suppose there is a single type of event A that always causes two other events, B and C. Suppose, moreover, that, whenever B occurs, it is always caused by A, and similarly for C. Then B will be perfectly correlated with C, but by hypothesis is not caused by it.This is typically what people worry abo... Read more
On a Philosophy Bites podcast I heard Daniel Dennett mention the following thought experiment, which he attributed to Galileo. Suppose that heavier objects fall faster than light ones. Take two objects, A and B, where A is lighter than B. Connect A and B with a string and drop them. Since A is lighter than B, A will act as a drag on B, and B will fall more slowly than it would have alone. Yet since A and B are jointly heavier than B, and heavier objects fall faster than light ones, B will fall faster than it would have alone. We have a contradiction. Therefore, heavier objects do not fall faster than light ones. I thought that this was really marvelous and also very surprising. I had been under the impression that one could not arrive at ostensibly substantive empirical claims like the one in question just by considering thought experiments. I was hoping that one of the panelists could explain exactly how Galileo's thought experiment works here.
Richard Heck
July 3, 2013
(changed July 3, 2013)
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One way of thinking of this kind of thing is that it uncovers a subtle contradiction between views we already hold. But it doesn't, by itself, prove anything positive. It's conceivable that one could deny, for example, that A and B are "connected" in the right way for them to fall faster together.Th... Read more
Descartes's argument: ''I think, therefore, I exist'' is an ontological argument? If Descartes said that It is, if he did (?), where (book) he says it? Thank you very much.
Jasper Reid
July 3, 2013
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No, Descartes never called it an ontological argument. He wouldn't even have known what such a claim was supposed to mean, because the expression simply didn't exist in his time. The term 'ontological argument' was introduced (or at least popularised) by Immanuel Kant, more than a century after Desca... Read more
For a while now there have been controversies about professional sports teams that use Native American characters or tribes as mascots (the Washington Redskins, for example). One point often made by people that support keeping the mascots is that there are surveys that indicate that Native Americans themselves don't find the mascots offensive. Ironically, they say, it is only white liberals who seem upset about this alleged racism. Suppose it were really true than a strong majority of Native Americans did not find Native American mascots offensive. Would this show that there is indeed nothing objectionable about them? Or might we dare to say, "Well, Native Americans don't think that they are being insulted or harmed by these mascots, but they're just wrong about that."
Oliver Leaman
July 1, 2013
(changed July 1, 2013)
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Just because a group or even a person does not recognize they are being disadvantaged by a particular practice it does not follow that they are not being disadvantaged. Feminists have the notion of false consciousness, and ethnic minorities often internalize society's view of them so that this does... Read more
Immanuel Kant remarked that the Jews lived in a culture that encouraged selfishness and dishonesty in business dealings. More recently it is generally accepted that gypsies produce a culture that centers on cheating gullible non gypsies into spending money on fortune telling while also engaging in other forms of cheating or theft. The latter assertion is generally regarded by both academics and the public as truthful but the claim made by Kant is regarded as anti-semitism. When we attribute anti-semitism to Kant is that because we know a priori that his remarks were in egregious error over facts or is it because the historical record shows that Jews were not a part of a culture of a kind that Kant imagines that culture to be? If he was wrong then could he be simply misinformed? Why should we believe what is said by supposedly reputable sources about gypsies if people have been so wrong about the Jews or conversely why should we be disposed to doubt Kant's claim since he may be simply conveying what was considered to be fact just as we do no with gypsies.
Oliver Leaman
July 1, 2013
(changed July 1, 2013)
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Everything you say about gypsies, including that word, is objectionable. Whatever is "generally accepted" about those people who are often called gypsies, is a stereotype that cannot be used as reliable information about the behavior of this group of people. Kant is similarly just wrong on Jews, he... Read more
I have been reading a recently published book about the existence of all things (e.g. addressing the question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?"), and am struck by an interesting issue I see in the book and others like it. The author interviews philosophers (among other professionals) who often speak about the existence of things based on what one can imagine (e.g. one imagining something about possible worlds). It seems to me that there should be some kind of theory about how thoughts relate to the universe before anyone can conclude things about its nature. I know there are philosophers who have raised the question that the "laws" that govern thought/logic may be very different than the physical laws that govern the universe (and hence whatever theories we have about the world may be nothing more than our own ideas); so why is there such emphasis placed on imagination when discussing metaphysical issues? Why is the intelligibility of an idea about the universe (e.g. whether there are many universes) a criterion for determining the truth-value of the idea? Perhaps another way to say this is: why is the way we think about things somehow a true representation of how things are? Is it because this is about all we can ultimately do in philosophy (as opposed to, say, science)?
Stephen Maitzen
June 30, 2013
(changed June 30, 2013)
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You asked, among other things, "Why is the intelligibility of an idea about the universe...a criterion for determining the truth-value of the idea?" I wouldn't say that an idea's being intelligible to us is a criterion for its being true: that would be thinking too highly of ourselves! But an i... Read more
Not that I would do this, but is murdering five people randomly (e.g. shooting into a crowd) less immoral than planning beforehand to murder persons A, B, C, D, and E? How would a philosopher of law treat this as opposed to a moral philosopher?
Allen Stairs
June 29, 2013
(changed June 29, 2013)
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I have a feeling I'm not getting the intuition behind your question. Offhand, it's hard to see why random killing would be less immoral. In fact, depending on the case it could be more immoral. Suppose A, B, C, D and E are all murderous villains. While that doesn't justify taking the law onto one'... Read more
What is value of knowledge?
Miriam Solomon
June 27, 2013
(changed June 27, 2013)
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Knowledge may be valuable in itself i.e. for its own sake. When you ask "What is the value of knowledge?" you may be asking what else is it valuable for. There is hardly any human activity that is not aided by relevant knowledge. Medicine and technology are the result of applying scientific k... Read more
How would you respond to the following argument against tolerating gay athletes on sports teams. The problem with gay athletes is that they may be attracted to their teammates. Even if a particular athlete is not attracted to his teammates, or does not act on his attraction, the mere possibility of such an attraction is enough to create a distressing environment. Heterosexual players may reasonably feel uncomfortable undressing and showering in the presence of someone that might view them with sexual interest. To put this another way: gay athletes should be kept out of locker rooms for just the same reason that we do not allow men to be present in women's locker rooms. What matters is not that we separate different sexes, but rather that we separate groups that are liable to sexually objectify each other.
Miriam Solomon
June 27, 2013
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This argument seems to be one against tolerating gay athletes in locker rooms (not on sports teams). And if the argument is correct, we'd need a lot of locker rooms....two for avowed heterosexuals (with some cutoff for bisexual attraction) and one each for everyone else! I think it is far more... Read more
I have often heard it argued that moral relativism prevents us from agreeing that our moral advances (e.g. civil rights, Gandhi, etc.) are conclusively good. I was of the belief, however, that moral relativism merely states that morality is a human construct and is defined by individual experience -- not that there is nothing that can be held to be fundamentally good. That is to say, I judge actions based on a utilitarian, distinctly non-theist ethic, but I do judge them. Does this argument refute moral relativism and, then, am I not a moral relativist?
Stephen Maitzen
June 27, 2013
(changed June 27, 2013)
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It sounds to me as if you're not a moral relativist according to the usual definition of the term. I don't know any utilitarians who classify themselves as moral relativists. On the contrary, utilitarians regard the moral status of actions, institutions, etc., as objective rather than relative... Read more