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Philosophically (not legally), how should this fallacy be resolved? A convicted felon is sentenced to both life imprisonment for a drug related murder AND the death penalty for a separate act of terrorism. Should he be put to death or should the life imprisonment override the death penalty? In other words, if sentences cannot be concurrently served, should the more severe one be served first?
Jonathan Westphal
July 11, 2013
(changed July 11, 2013)
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One small point needs attention. If a man is serving a life sentence and is put to death for a different crime, then his life ends and the life sentence has been completed.
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Why are counterfactual claims taken seriously by philosophers? Aren't they just an imaginative way of thinking and talking? For example, why is a counterfactual of the form "If it had been the case that A, then it would be the case that C" supposed to have truth conditions? For if causal determinism is true, then there is a complete specification W of the history of world w in which A would occur such that W entails either the truth of C or the falsity of C, making the counterfactual either vacuously true or a contradiction (and this is so for all possible deterministic worlds which include A); whereas if causal determinism is not true, then the history of w cannot be fully specified because A depends on non-deterministic processes, and the truth or falsity of the counterfactual is not determined. And for a non-deterministic world of which the history is fully specified (i.e. W includes the outcomes of non-deterministic processes) in which A occurs, the vacuous/contradictory result again obtains. Isn't the Lewis/Stalnaker account thus just an attempt to apply logical rigor to a non-rigorous way of thinking-- namely, the everyday talk of counterfactuals that invokes a sort of imaginary time travel?
Allen Stairs
July 11, 2013
(changed July 11, 2013)
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The most obvious reason why counterfactual talk is taken seriously by philosophers is that it's virtually impossible to avoid it. We constantly find ourselves asking -- for good reason -- what would happen in certain circumstances, and so understanding more deeply what that sort of talk might amou... Read more
I've heard philosophers talk about "dissolving" problems and questions. What does it mean to dissolve questions/problems and how do philosophers do it?
Stephen Maitzen
July 11, 2013
(changed July 11, 2013)
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Dissolving a philosophical problem involves challenging the presuppositions -- often unrecognized presuppositions -- that give rise to the problem. Consider two examples near to my own heart. Newcomb's Problem in decision theory has generated enormous controversy since it was first brought to t... Read more
Why knowledge has intrinsic value? Why dow value knowledge for its own sake?
Amy Kind
July 11, 2013
(changed July 11, 2013)
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Not everyone thinks that knowledge has intrinsic value -- after all, many people purport to subscribe to the claim that ignorance is bliss. This was the position taken by Cypher in the movie The Matrix -- he thought he would have been better left in The Matrix, thinking that he was tasting a deliciou... Read more
Why are counterfactual claims taken seriously by philosophers? Aren't they just an imaginative way of thinking and talking? For example, why is a counterfactual of the form "If it had been the case that A, then it would be the case that C" supposed to have truth conditions? For if causal determinism is true, then there is a complete specification W of the history of world w in which A would occur such that W entails either the truth of C or the falsity of C, making the counterfactual either vacuously true or a contradiction (and this is so for all possible deterministic worlds which include A); whereas if causal determinism is not true, then the history of w cannot be fully specified because A depends on non-deterministic processes, and the truth or falsity of the counterfactual is not determined. And for a non-deterministic world of which the history is fully specified (i.e. W includes the outcomes of non-deterministic processes) in which A occurs, the vacuous/contradictory result again obtains. Isn't the Lewis/Stalnaker account thus just an attempt to apply logical rigor to a non-rigorous way of thinking-- namely, the everyday talk of counterfactuals that invokes a sort of imaginary time travel?
Allen Stairs
July 11, 2013
(changed July 11, 2013)
Permalink
The most obvious reason why counterfactual talk is taken seriously by philosophers is that it's virtually impossible to avoid it. We constantly find ourselves asking -- for good reason -- what would happen in certain circumstances, and so understanding more deeply what that sort of talk might amou... Read more
Many philosophers teach courses and/or write textbooks on topics such as reasoning, argumentation, informal logic and critical thinking. And they do so in a world where many people, including politicians, teachers, celebrities, activists, etc., sometimes make specious arguments in a deliberate attempt to persuade listeners about various social and political issues. I am curious to know if there are contemporary philosophers who address the ethics of rational discussion in this context, and if there are philosophers who are concerned about how the "Machiavellian" use of specious arguments may undermine their efforts to teach people to be better reasoners, arguers and critical thinkers.
Amy Kind
July 11, 2013
(changed July 11, 2013)
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You might want to look at some of Jason Stanley's pieces in "The Stone" (The New York Times):http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/the-ways-of-silencing/http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/30/speech-lies-and-apathy/
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According to value theory, does manufacturing an object (e.g. a bicycle) always result in more value than performing a service (e.g. giving a haircut) since the object can be used again and again, can be resold, and cannot be destroyed (by law of conservation of mass). Or is this question out of the domain of value theory and limited to philosophy of economics?
Thomas Pogge
July 6, 2013
(changed July 6, 2013)
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Manufacturing adds value by configuring materials in certain ways; and this value can be lost even if the object's mass is preserved. Thus, destruction of the bicycle cancels the value of manufacturing it, even if the metal and other materials survive the destruction. Conversely, a service can conti... Read more
Is artistic merit necessary for a work of art to be considered art and how can it be assessed? Is a thirty minute pornographic clip of two people having sex merely bad art or is not art at all? If I consider it better than Schindler's List and Roger Ebert does not, how do we determine which view is "right?"
Allen Stairs
July 5, 2013
(changed July 5, 2013)
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The answers to your questions will depend somewhat on which view of art we pick. What follows is vastly over-simple, but here we go:
On one broad class of views, nothing can be a work of art unless it has "aesthetic" properties. One version: it must be able to induce a kind of absorbed contemplation... Read more
Is there a name for a logical fallacy where person A criticizes X, and person B fallaciously assumes that because A criticizes X he must therefore subscribe to position Y, the presumed opposition of X, although A does not, in fact, take that position? For example, if A criticizes a Republican policy then B assumes that A must be a Democrat and staunch Obama-supporter,even though A is in fact a Republican himself, or else an Undeclared who regularly criticizes Obama as well.
Allen Stairs
July 4, 2013
(changed July 4, 2013)
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It seems to be a special case of a fallacy with many names: 'false dichotomy,' 'false dilemma,' 'black-and-white thinking' and 'either/or fallacy' are among the more common. When someone commits the fallacy of the false dichotomy, they overlook alternatives. Schematically, they assume that either X... Read more
Is it possible to make scientific observations through armchair philosophy while bypassing the scientific method? For example, a caveman with a powerful brain might have been able to hypothesize and describe in detail what radio is despite not a single radio message even being sent until tens of thousands of years later. Wasn't that caveman right anyway that radio does exist even though he had no way to prove it? Isn't much of metaphysics like this too?
Miriam Solomon
July 4, 2013
(changed July 4, 2013)
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It is possible to dream up hypotheses in an armchair. But our imagination is limited (especially if we spend too much time in an armchair!) and of course we can't gather evidence for or against a hypothesis without doing some observation or experimentation. We might even dream up a correct hypot... Read more