Recent Responses
When it comes to relationships between opposite sexes, there is the 'platonic' relationship. Does this have anything to do with Plato? And secondly, after advancing further in life, I find myself more drawn towards this type of relationship. It seems to have more meaning and depth. It transcends beyond any physical desires. Is there any research you could lead me to that uncovers some truths about these types of relationships?
Charles Taliaferro
June 10, 2013
(changed June 10, 2013)
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Great question. Today, I think most people do think of a Platonic relationship as an intimate friendship without sex. The first time such a notion was explicitly identified was in the Renaissance when the philosopher / translator of Plato, Marsilio Ficino coined the term. Marsilio first c... Read more
More of an observation than a question, about "compatibilism" in the free will "versus" determinism debate. In the short run, there is a strong correlation between life expectancy tables and the number of people who die in a calendar year. Somehow, even though on the level of the individual, many of these events may be due to "luck" (wow, that train just missed me; or wow, what a freak combination of factors to lead to such a bizarre accident); on the level of the population, the total number of deaths in a year can be "predicted" fairly well even if no individual death can be predicted. In the long run, life expectancy tables do change over time: collectively, each individual person uses what they learn about diet, exercise, cigarette smoking, etc. and makes adjustments in their day-to-day lives; and the aggregate results over time do reflect these changes. It seems to me that there is a good question buried here in this analogy but I can't quite figure out how to unearth it. Any thoughts from a panelist or two? Thanks!
Jonathan Westphal
August 8, 2013
(changed August 8, 2013)
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You make an important observation for compatibilism. What your analysis does is to show that we can have predictability and law (in a regularity sense) with no implications for individual freedom. My decision to cross the railway track might lead to my death, and it might produce a number t... Read more
DESCARTES AND RUSSELL Can anyone please explain how Russell thinks there is an error in saying 'I am a thing that thinks' (Descartes). I understand he talks about language, substance theory etc but his whole argument still remains unclear to me. HERE IS THE PASSAGE FROM THE BOOK (PORTRAITS FROM MY MEMORY): What I wish to emphasize is the error involved in saying "I am a thing that thinks." Here the substance philosophy is assumed. It is assumed that the world consists of more or less permanent objects with changing states. This view was evolved by the original metaphysicians who invented language, and who were much struck by the difference between their enemy in battle and their enemy after he had been slain, although they were persuaded that it was the same person whom they first feared, and then ate. It is from such origins that common sense derives its tenets. And I regret to say that all too many professors of philosophy consider it their duty to be sycophants of common sense, and thus, doubtless unintentionally, to bow down in homage before the savage superstitions of cannibals. What ought we to substitute for Descartes' belief that he was a thing that thought? There were, of course, two Descartes, the distinction between whom is what gives rise to the problem I wish to discuss. There was Descartes to himself, and Descartes to his friends. He is concerned with what he was to himself. What he was to himself is not best described as a single entity with changing states. The single entity is quite otiose. The changing states suffice. Descartes to himself should have appeared as a series of events, each of which might be called a thought, provided that word is liberally interpreted. What he was to others I will, for the moment ignore. It was this series of "thoughts" which constituted Descartes' "mind," but his mind was no more a separate entity than the population of New York is a separate entity over and above the several inhabitants. Instead of saying "Descartes thinks," we ought to say "Descartes is a series of which the members are thoughts." And instead of "therefore Descartes exists," we ought to say "Since 'Descartes' is the name of this series, it follows that 'Descartes' is a name." But for the statement "Descartes is a thing which thinks" we must substitute nothing whatever, since the statement embodies nothing but faulty syntax.
Charles Taliaferro
June 7, 2013
(changed June 7, 2013)
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I think you are quite right to be puzzled. I believe that, when Russell wrote the above (he changed his mind on all sorts of topics, so one has to deal with-- as it were-- more than one Russell), he rejected a philosophy of substances and, instead, proposed that the concept of an event is mor... Read more
Is it rational to believe that some of my beliefs are false? This seems like a reasonable claim. After all, most people have some false beliefs, and I know that I've had plenty of beliefs in the past which I later learned were false. On the other hand, I obviously believe that each of my beliefs is true (otherwise, they wouldn't be my beliefs). So how could I also believe that some unspecified beliefs among them are false?
Stephen Maitzen
June 7, 2013
(changed June 7, 2013)
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It certainly looks like the height of rationality for you to believe that at least some of your beliefs are false. Yet, as you point out, there's no particular belief of yours that you regard as false. Any given belief of yours you regard as true; otherwise, it wouldn't be a belief of yours. This... Read more
Would it be logically coherent to have a world in which everything that happened was bad or have a world in which everything that happen was good? Can good and evil exist independently of each other? Do we need one to define or contrast the other? Can each of them be definable in their own right? Is there any arguments that can be put forth to show that good and evil are not polar concepts?
Stephen Maitzen
June 7, 2013
(changed June 7, 2013)
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You've raised a large and complex set of issues. I'll address just one part of one of your questions. It seems to me that the burden of proof rests with whoever claims that good can't possibly exist without evil. For one thing, the claim implies that the monotheistic God is impossible, since God... Read more
In mathematics numbers are abstract notions. But when we divide number say we do 1 divided by 2 i.e. ½ does this mean abstract notions are divisible. It gives me a feeling like abstract notions have magnitude but then it comes to my mind that abstract has no magnitude.1=1/2 + 1/2 can we say the abstract notion 1 is equal to the sum of two equal half abstract notions? How should I conceptualize the division? The other part related to abstract notion is that how is the abstract notion of number 1 different from the unit cm? how can we say that the unit cm is abstract when we consider it a definite length. How is the unit apple different from unit cm if I count apples and measure length respectively? I am in a fix kindly help me to sort out this. I will be highly- highly grateful to you.
Stephen Maitzen
June 7, 2013
(changed June 7, 2013)
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You asked, "Does this mean that [these particular] abstract notions are divisible?" I'd say yes. But that doesn't mean they're physically divisible; instead, they're numerically divisible. Abstract objects have no physical magnitude, but that doesn't mean they can't have numerical magnitude. The... Read more
Let's say when we measure the brainwaves of someone who is actually deluded and the brainwaves of someone who is fervently religious, they match up to an extraordinary degree. Are we justified to say that the religious person is deluded base on this observation of matching brainwaves alone? Can we judge the propositional content of a belief as to its truth value by brain activity? Can scientific neurological experiments determine the truth and falsity of propositional content or are arguments the only way to determine the truth and falsity of propositional content? Can we appeal to brainwave activity to invalidate theism? Galen O.
Charles Taliaferro
June 7, 2013
(changed June 7, 2013)
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Interesting question(s)! I'm afraid that it will be very difficult to replace arguments and the different "tools" philosophers use with neurological data. First, I assume that in identifying a subject as "deluded" we would have to know the falsehood of her belief and perhaps identify which fa... Read more
Free Will vs. (and) Determinism I have been having a tireless debate with a friend about freewill and determinism. We have researched and regurgitated some of other people's arguments but it seems that our arguments never confront one another's. My description of the argument will be biased (I believe in determinism - kind of). I believe there are four possibilities 1. we have a determined future: We have our brain, biology, environment, and they interact in a specific way. What can possible change that? 2. at some level, particles move completely randomly, so our future isn't necessarily set, not because of free will, but because of those pesky little particles. 3. God asserts his will, but with rationality: our future is set, because a rational God is destined to make the same decisions (that argument might be incomplete, but we don't care about this one anyway. 4. God acts randomly, same outcome as 2, but because of a chaotic God. For arguments sake, we stick only to number 1 - we have a determined future: (we have our brain, biology, environment) and they interact in a specific way. What can possible change that? I may be missing some variable here, but whatever the variable, I can't see anything that would change the path (we are always going to do what we are going to do. We will still make decisions and will have to live with the consequences of those decisions, but we were bound to make those exact decisions. His argument is, we have free will and the outcome of our lives is not set. He makes a better and more complex argument, but I don't think any of it refutes number 1. Our question: What is the best and most concise way of putting my argument (number 1), and what is the best rebuttal to it? I know this is a complicated and timeless debate, but we would love two concise arguments that actually confront each other if possible. I don't think random occurrences change anything, because that isn't free will (maybe my opinion). Thank you so much guys, we appreciate it! - Free Willy and Deterministic Dan
Allen Stairs
May 29, 2013
(changed May 29, 2013)
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My first thought is that your four alternatives don't carve the territory up adequately.Let's agree: either our futures are determined or they aren't. The way you've set up the debate, you've assumed that if determinism is true, we don't have free will. But that leaves out an important position: com... Read more
Why should we accept compliments as the truth but accept insults as lies? Self-help books, quotes on the Internet, and average people in everyday life, often try to comfort those who have been severely insulted by saything things like: "They're just saying that because they're jealous," "They're just trying to bring you down because they're unhappy with their lives," "They don't know what they're talking about," and my favorite, "What people say about you says more about who they are than who you are." These sort of statements invalidate the insult, giving the insulted person no real reason to be upset. However, if all that is true, what about all the times that we have been complimented? They could very well falsely be trying to "bring you up" for whatever reason, it's still possible they don't know what they're talking about, and if it says more about them than it does about you, then good for them for being a "good person," but it really has nothing to do with you. But this isn't what we're told. We're told to be grateful for any compliment we receive. We're told to take them with pride, not shame. We're told that maybe if we get a certain compliment a lot, like being good at painting, then that's a determining factor in what our talents are, and even take it into consideration when choosing a career path, like becoming a professional painter. Some people even recommend writing down any "positive message" you receive in a journal, so when you're feeling down on yourself you can look through it and suddenly remember your self worth. If you think about it, a compliment and an insult are basically the same thing: somebody else's opinion of us. Are supposed to disregard something just because we don't like it? Wouldn't it make more sense to treat both kinds of statements as equals, and either accept both as being true or accept neither as being true? Of course, always thinking that an insult is true or always thinking that a compliment is false sounds like a pessimistic extreme, but wouldn't doing that make the most sense? Why should we accept compliments as the truth but insults as lies?
Ian Kidd
May 29, 2013
(changed May 29, 2013)
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This is a very interesting question! The social practices of complimenting and criticising are both extremely important - and of course philosophically rich (for instance, they invite both ethical and epistemological reflection). There is - in my view - no simple answer to the question of whether we oug... Read more
Do prenuptial agreements imply a lack of trust, or even a lack of love?
Charles Taliaferro
May 27, 2013
(changed May 27, 2013)
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Great question! Consider, with apologies for the homeliness of this analogy: Does fastening your seat belt in a car or on an airplane indicate a lack of trust in the vehicle(s) or a lack of love for the pilot or driver or other pilots and drivers? I suspect one might have lots of trust and... Read more