Recent Responses

Psychosis is often characterized as 'loss of contact with reality.' Three questions. (1) What is this 'reality' of which they speak? (2) Does anybody (even psychatrists) really know enough about this 'reality' to be able competently to deliver a diagnosis under that characterization? (3) What is this 'contact' of which they speak

Gabriel Segal June 6, 2012 (changed June 6, 2012) Permalink It is a good question. It is possible that a sane personmight believe that the government is controlling him by means of radio signalssent to his dental filling when in fact that is far from the truth, and that apsychotic person might believe such a thing and the belief be true. Someapparently sane... Read more

It is hard to believe that aesthetical value is objective. Whatever you choose as the most beautiful person, sunset or painting, it seems easy to imagine an appropriate alien who would find it ugly or uninteresting. My question is whether non objectivity of aesthetical value should count as an argument against the objectivity of moral value. After all, there seem to be some important common points to ethics and aesthetics. Isn't ethics concerned with what we should do as aesthetics is concerned with what we should enjoy to perceive?

Oliver Leaman May 31, 2012 (changed May 31, 2012) Permalink There used to be a popular argument in philosophy just like this, and clearly as you say there are similarities between ethics and aesthetics. I don't think that aesthetics is about what we should enjoy to perceive, though, since there are many things we think we ought to see but certainly do not e... Read more

If a person is not afraid of non-existance then if he is afaid of death he is actually afraid of the possible pain involved ; does this seem reasonable?

Gabriel Segal June 19, 2012 (changed June 19, 2012) Permalink Ie he is convinced that death would bring no pain he might still be afraid. Then it would be something else he feared. I don't know what he might rationally fear in such a case. Log in to post comments

I've been thinking about why good people disagree with each other about important things, like whether to support or oppose a particular law.  One, there may be some sort of mental deficiency or some crucial lack of knowledge. (Not truly common causes, in my opinion.) Two, there may be terminology issues. These may be legitimate differences in defining terms being used but sometimes I wonder if this is really more the side-effect of a basic disagreement rather than the cause. Three, and most important I think, there may be underlying differences in values (beliefs, morals, motivations, and even personality) that guide 'good' people to take opposite sides on important social debates. My questions for the philosophers here: A: is this a reasonable scheme to categorize disagreements among people? B: What have philosophers had to say about this topic?

Stephen Maitzen May 31, 2012 (changed May 31, 2012) Permalink Philosophers, especially lately, have had a lot to say about this topic. You might start with this SEP entry, and I recommend looking at this recent anthology. Fortunately (or unfortunately, if you wanted a short answer!), there's a large and growing literature on the topic. Enjoy.... Read more

St. Augustine wrote that he once stole some peaches. When he reflected on that experience he observed that he got a rush from breaking the rules. He then concluded that he broke the rules for the sake of breaking the rules and that more broadly this meant that at least some human sins are committed for the sake of sin. I think that St. Augustine was using this example to refute the Socratic claim that lack of knowledge was the cause of sin. Is St. Augustine's claim valid? Does it follow from the fact that he got excited from breaking the rules that he broke the rules for the sake of breaking the rules rather than the excitement it generated? Are there other reasons why breaking the rules might be exciting other than a desire to break the rules for its own sake? Maybe he got excitement from stealing the peaches because it was risky or because he wanted to challenge authority or to feel less confined by rules.

Stephen Maitzen May 30, 2012 (changed May 30, 2012) Permalink Warning: I grind my methodological ax a bit in these answers. 1. "Does it follow from the fact that he got excited from breaking the rules that he broke the rules for the sake of breaking the rules rather than the excitement it generated?" No: it doesn't follow; the former doesn't logically imp... Read more

Concerning Public Property: Am I morally allowed to do whatever I want so long as it is on public property (and not harming others?) or since it's on public property, can I not do anything unless the public approves? For example, if I wanted to sing a song in public train would I be morally permitted to do so or must I request the 'permission' of everyone else in the train in case they find it annoying or etc? My question is basically how do we reason about public property?

Allen Stairs May 28, 2012 (changed May 28, 2012) Permalink My first thought is that "public property" doesn't mean "property not subject to the rule of law." The National Mall in Washington is "public property" but there are all sorts of thing I'm forbidden by law to do there, whether they harm anyone or not. Public property usually means property that's no... Read more

Why is C.I. Lewis' strict implication not taken seriously in this day and age? Clarence Irving Lewis was known for criticizing material implication and for instead proposing strict implication. Why is he, his criticisms, and his proposed strict implication not taken seriously today? Many contemporary logic, philosophy, and mathematical texts refer to material implication rather than strict implication.

Richard Heck May 28, 2012 (changed May 28, 2012) Permalink It should also be said that there is nowadays a lot of formal, logical work that is devoted to various forms of implication, like strict implication. Part of this is done within so-called "modal" logic; part of it is done in theories of conditionals generally; some of it concerns non-classical logic... Read more

If I see somebody getting robbed on the street and, in order to help them, I confront the attacker, should I be worried ethically (and legally I suppose) about the result of my actions toward the perpetrator? For example, what if simply telling them off isn't enough and, in order to stop the robbery, I have to use force and that force causes the death of the criminal? (I guess, for example I could push the robber away from the victim and the robber might hit his/her head too hard on the ground, etc.) Should I stop and think about the best way to stop the robbery that would avoid potentially killing the criminal (and thus risk being too late to help or try something ineffective) or should I rush in to help but risk excessive harm to the assailant? Would I be morally responsible for the well-being of the perpetrator? Thanks so much!

Thomas Pogge May 26, 2012 (changed May 26, 2012) Permalink Yes, you do have a moral responsibility toward the apparent perpetrator. This responsibility results from two factors. First, what appears to you to be a criminal act in progress may not be one: perhaps these guys a filming a movie, practicing for a play, or just horsing around.Secondly, your respon... Read more

Are there rules we ought to follow (in the absence of coercive institutions, such as the state or an employer) that are *not* ethical rules?

Thomas Pogge May 26, 2012 (changed May 26, 2012) Permalink Yes, we ought to follow rules of logic, rules of scientific method, rules of rational choice, and rules of prudence, for example. Sure, we are often not doing anything unethical by violating such rules, so we may not have a moral reason to obey. But not all good reasons are moral reasons. And we typ... Read more

I wonder about the notion of a masochist as somebody who enjoys suffering. Is it possible, logically, to enjoy suffering? Doesn't suffering necessarily preclude enjoyment and vice-versa? Would it be more accurate to say that a masochist enjoys something that non-masochists consider suffering?

Gabriel Segal May 25, 2012 (changed May 25, 2012) Permalink I think that one definition of suffering is 'pain'. And someone could gain pleasure from pain, physical, or indeed psychological. So to say that a masochist enjoys suffering sees fine to me. Log in to post comments

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