Recent Responses
Does strict materialism imply there is no such thing as intrinsic value? If we say something has intrinsic value, I take it we mean that it is 'good' in itself, for its own sake. I'm not using 'good' to mean 'morally good' - but just "good from at least someone's point of view" in the sense that the experience of of eating an ice cream seems good to me. I think conscious experiences, in general, have intrinsic value - at least in this personal-point-of-view way. I also think this aspect of my experience is crucial to rational decision-making; without it, I'd have no clear basis for deciding between, say, eating an ice cream and setting myself on fire. I also think that if we go a bit further and say that that experiences have intrinsic value, period (i.e., objectively, from everyone's point of view), then we might have the basis of a theory of morality. Now, I gather that some philosophers might object to such a theory, on the grounds that ideas like "ought", "should" or "morally bad" cannot be construed as natural, physical properties; so given the widely accepted truth of materialism, they have no real meaning at all. However, it seems to me that if this argument is correct, it applies to subjective intrinsic value too. I know how it feels to be aware of the intrinsic value of my own experience - but I can give no definition or explanation of this impression, in terms of purely physical properties, nor can I derive such a description from what I know of the physical world (which is rather a lot). Hence, if I assume that materialism is true, I cannot rationally justify my choice of ice-cream over being on fire. I think this argument gives reasonable grounds for doubting materialism -- but I'd very much like to know what professional philosophers make of it! In the meantime, I think I'll go out for an ice cream.
Stephen Maitzen
April 6, 2012
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I don't see how materialism as such bears on the existence of intrinsic value. The issue of whether anything has intrinsic value, and if so which things have it, seems independent of whether the world contains any immaterial substances (such as immaterial minds or souls). I think of values as... Read more
I don't drink alcohol. I have a few reasons - I rarely enjoy the taste, it's expensive, it's not really healthy, and I don't like letting my behavior be influenced by the substances I drink - but mainly I've just never felt any kind of desire to drink. Yet when I am out with people I don't know particularly well, they tend to be insistent that I drink alcohol with them - remarkably insistent. I've even had people get frustrated with me because I won't drink, frowning and telling me "Stop making a big deal about it, just have a drink!". I've had to make up excuses such as "I used to be an alcoholic," "I'm taking medication" or (if I am desperate) "My religion forbids me from drinking alcohol" - only then will people finally, grudgingly, leave me to my tea. Is it wrong of me to insist not to drink alcohol, or should I, for the sake of not offending my colleagues, suck it up and drink? Is it acceptable for others to insist so strongly that I do so? Why does it even matter? I've occasionally had to tell people that I don't eat things like licorice or yam, and nobody has ever tried to insist I eat those things. I don't see the big deal. Am I violating some special social norm here?
Stephen Maitzen
April 6, 2012
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I think these questions are as easily answered as you seem to think they are. You're clearly within your rights -- to put it mildly! -- when you decline alcohol despite being pressured. Is it acceptable for others to pressure you? Morally acceptable, yes, in that it's not morally impermissib... Read more
I have been conflicted over abortion for a long time, and I've reached a sort of stable state in which I accept that especially in early pregnancy a fetus does not have the same rights that an infant does outside of the womb, but later in pregnancy it does. For instance, it seems clear to me that a fetus the day before birth should have equal rights to an infant born the day after, since as has been noted that difference in residency does not seem particularly significant to moral standing. And, of course, the problem with that gradualist view - the inability to assign a time in which such full rights are obtained - continues to trouble me. But, another issue that concerns me is how practices like sex-selective abortion inform the debate. If a women really has the right to choose who or what may reside within her body, and has the right to choose whether or not to carry a pregnancy to term, shouldn't it be immaterial to a third party on what basis she makes those decisions? In this case, sex-selective abortion is not morally wrong. I feel, however, uncomfortable with this, and think it could very well be wrong. But doesn't that imply I believe the fetus has the right not to be terminated because of its sex? That the fetus has some right against discrimination? If I believe a women has the right to make that choice for whatever reason she may find compelling, then certainly the sex of the fetus can't change the moral question, can it? How can I both believe the woman has a right to choose whether or not to carry a pregnancy to term, and also that sex selective abortion is discriminatory and wrong?
Miriam Solomon
April 5, 2012
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You have clearly done a good deal of thoughtful and critical thinking about abortion, and I suggest that you take a look at some of the philosophical literature, starting with Judith Thomson's essay "A Defense of Abortion" (widely reprinted in philosophy anthologies.) She questions some seeming... Read more
Why are scientists so keen on unification in their theories? Do we have reason to think that unified theories are likely to be correct? Or are they just desirable for other reasons--convenience, aesthetics, etc.?
Miriam Solomon
April 5, 2012
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SOME scientists are keen on unification--and some are not. Philosophers of science have generally focussed on unification, typically viewing unified theories as more deeply explanatory (e.g. Hempel, Kitcher) or just as simpler or more elegant (e.g. Van Fraassen, Quine), and many scientists--par... Read more
What does it take to be a philosopher? What are requirements if there are any? Can anyone just proclaim themselves to be a lover of wisdom and be able to make dedicated claims on controversial subjects? I have always felt myself to be a Jr. philosopher if that's the case for I simply want to observe life as i lead it. But then this all boils down to one point, what is a philosopher then?
Charles Taliaferro
April 5, 2012
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Great question! For years, I have worked with the following ideas. Simply to have some view of the world (its nature and values) is to have a philosophy. So, in a way, everyone who has some understanding of themselves and values has a philosophy. Beyond that, I suggest the practice of ph... Read more
It seems that when a person commits a heinous act, that act is in no way "compensated for" by any amount of good they may have done prior or since. A firefighter who has saved dozens of lives, lives frugally and volunteers all his spare time for those in need is nonetheless damned if he commits one murder. It is clear that the crime itself is a terrible thing and cannot be excused, and should definitely be sanctioned, but it seems we go further and label the firefighter *himself* a terrible person, regardless of anything else he might have done. Is that really the case?
Charles Taliaferro
April 5, 2012
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Very interesting! In the case you describe, the conclusion seems quite plausible. We might even think the firefighter worse than an "average person" or a gang member because we (perhaps rightly) think the firefighter should know and act better, especially given that he has in the past show... Read more
Philosophers debate persistence conditions for personal identity because everything about us seems to change, including our cells, our memories, and our bodies. But DNA doesn't change and it codes for specfic traits in every cell of the human body. It's true that we experience changes in the way phenotypes are expressed in particular experiences or memories, but why not conclude that DNA is the ultimate source of personal identity? Philosophers don't seem to give this biological candidate serious consideration. Can you tell me why?
Jonathan Westphal
April 5, 2012
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DNA does change. There are "point mutations", for example, in which say a single nucleotide changes, say from guanine to cytosine. . . . CTG TCA . . . becomes . . . CTG GCA . . . If there is a strand of DNA that suffers such a change, is it then not the same strand of DNA? This is exactly li... Read more
It is said that average IQ in prisons is well below the average among the whole population. The most selfish people I know are either very young children or mentally impaired adults. Do you think it probable that there is a positive correlation between intelligence and morally correct behavior?
Thomas Pogge
April 4, 2012
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It's credible that morally correct behavior is less common among very young children and the mentally impaired than among the rest. But your point about prisons does not seem to me to lend sufficient support to the larger positive correlation you suggest for at least three reasons.
First, a great... Read more
It's absurd to say "If I were him I would have behaved differently" right? I mean, if you were him you would BE him, all his atoms and neurons and flesh, etcetera, and you would have the same thoughts, desires, impulses, everything. (Unless there's some transference of my Cartesian Ego or soul or something that can rise above the fact that I'm simply just him now, but at this point that seems ridiculous unless there's a god, although I know some dualists might disagree). We so often speak as if we can judge other people's actions by just inserting ourselves into "their shoes", but can we really do that and make any sense? Thanks a lot!
Stephen Maitzen
April 3, 2012
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You're right to detect absurdity in the literally construed antecedent "If I were him." (It's also ungrammatical: "If I were he.") There's good reason to think that statements of identity and distinctness (i.e., non-identity) are noncontingent: they never just happen to be true. So, given th... Read more
Hi, First let me say that I truly appreciate the time you all put in to answering questions from the public. Hopefully I can add one more decent inquiry. I've been reading Parfit's fascinating "Reasons and Persons" and there's something that's been nagging at me. Since I'm reading it for pleasure and I'm not a formal student of Philosophy, I don't have access to professors for assistance. I was hoping one (or some) of you might be willing to help me out. In general I find the book brilliant and, needless to say, illuminating. I think my life will be changed by it. However, I'm struck by several sentences in which Parfit seems to let his personal judgements guide the direction of his work after he says many times in the book that we might need to shelve certain personal judgements in light of the strength of the arguments. For example, at the end of section 105 (page 318 in my copy), where he is discussing a particular "discount rate" applied to our actions' effects on our future selves, he writes: "But the important point is that, even if this rate is not too steep, all such acts need to be criticized." He is referring in particular to smoking and other "imprudent" acts. While I agree that smoking is harmful, he clearly acknowledges that the discount rate in question might not be too steep and then lets his dislike for smoking tell him that it NEEDS to be criticized (instead of simply saying that he'd like to find a way to reasonably criticize it if possible). There are several other examples of this in the book and I'm struck each time by how out of place they sound compared to the tone of the rest of the text in which he relentlessly attacks (succesfully) many of our intuitions. (This isn't to say that I'm not glad he can find ways to criticize behaviors or other social situations that most of us would consider unfortunate.) I guess I'm just wondering what you think about this... Thank you so much in advance for any comments. This is such a great site!
Charles Taliaferro
April 1, 2012
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Thank you for your kind words about this site! And I congratulate you on taking on Parfit's work. It is not easy! Parfit is very keen to avoid confusing personal (even eccentric) likes and dislikes from an appeal to what he sees as objective, normative reasons that should appeal to all pe... Read more