Recent Responses
Stephen Hawking, in his recent book entitled The Grand Design, states that philosophy is dead. Without going into the reasons behind his thinking, I'd like to know the response of current philosophers to Hawking's statement. He has laid down a gauntlet of sorts, a challenge to philosophers to make their work relevant to the recent advances and discoveries made by cosmologists, astrophysicists, and others on the cutting edge of scientific discovery and investigation. Are present-day philosophers up to Hawking's challenge?
Stephen Maitzen
March 9, 2012
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Scientists who write obituaries for philosophy forget that science depends on philosophical assumptions. When some lab results or observations of the visible universe confirm or disconfirm a prediction in physics, Hawking and colleagues draw conclusions about the whole universe. But does any... Read more
Can someone help me with this basic argument.I just want it to make sense and than I will look at the major tweaks later. I believe I need to fix the conclusion because when I get around to writing the paper about it I will be proving P2 and have nothing to say by P3 because it is the same thing.I'd appreciate some help thank you very much. (P1) If animals can critically interpret similarly to humans, it makes sense to assume they understand the feeling of pain as well. (P2) Most people agree it is morally unjustifiable to intentionally afflict pain on those who can feel it, especially in cases that are not of self defense. (P3) Animal cruelty is not a case of self defense, therefore animal cruelty is morally unjustifiable.
Charles Taliaferro
March 9, 2012
(changed March 9, 2012)
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Looks very promising! You might want to adjust the first premise. First, you might want to refer to "some nonhuman animals." The notion of "critically interpret" seems a little awkward. Are you here asserting that some nonhuman exercise reason or that they involve higher order evaluation... Read more
What role does a museum play in determining the status of an art object? That is, if a painting, installation, etc. is shown in a museum, surrounded by other art, selected by a curatorial authority for exhibit (like a peer reviewed article in a scinece journal), do we experience or confer aesthetic values differently than if we encountered the same piece displayed on a neighbor's wall?
Charles Taliaferro
March 9, 2012
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This is a central question in the philosophy of art! There is what is known as the institutional theory of art advanced by George Dickie, according to which a work of art is an artifact that is recognized as art by what he called the Artworld (a world that would definitely include museums a... Read more
I'm struggling to reconcile David Hume's critiques of science and religion. On the one hand, he suggests that our application of cause/effect to natural phenomena is problematic since it ammounts to simply equating the present with the past. On the other hand, he warns us against believing in second-hand accounts of miracles since they are interruptions of natural law. Isn't our use of causal reasoning the way we determine the characteristics of natural law? Is this an inconsistency in his argument and, if so, does he address it anywhere?
If I may complicate things a
Stephen Maitzen
May 7, 2015
(changed May 7, 2015)
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If I may complicate things a bit: I don't question the scholarly accuracy of Prof. Baxter's reply on behalf of Hume, but I'd point out that he attributes to Hume a handful of inductive claims, for example: "We instinctively make and believe...predictions, anyway. We can'... Read more
Is internet piracy "theft"? This is a frequent point of debate, with one side saying yes, because the pirate is gaining access to something they didn't pay for, and the other side saying no, because the pirate isn't taking anything *away* from somebody else (i.e. nobody has less of anything than they had before the piracy). I'm not asking whether internet piracy is *harmful,* I'm asking whether it belongs to the category "theft" (as opposed to copyright violation, for instance).
Oliver Leaman
March 8, 2012
(changed March 8, 2012)
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First of all, copyright violation surely is theft. It harms the author since he or she is not paid for the work. With internet piracy it is not a question of money, perhaps, but identification of who is using the service. Since the person paying for the service will be identified with the interne... Read more
Struggling with Wittgenstein. "The World is all that is the case". Does this mean both positive facts ("Paris is the capitol of France") AND negative facts ("Lyon is not the capitol of France") I can say "It IS the case that Lyon is not the capitol of France". Or does Wittgenstein mean only the pos. facts, i.e what has been actualized? Thanks.
Stephen Maitzen
March 7, 2012
(changed March 7, 2012)
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I don't know what Wittgenstein was up to, i.e., whether he'd include among the facts of the world the "negative" fact that Lyon isn't the capital of France. As the questioner says, it plainly "is the case" that Lyon isn't the capital of France, so the first line of the Tractatus suggests that... Read more
I know some philosophers think numbers exist, and some others think the opposite. Do some of you think that this question is or may be "undecidable"? I mean, perhaps both the idea that numbers exist and the idea that numbers don't exist are consistent with all other things that we believe (do not contradict any one of them). Do you think this might be right?
Stephen Maitzen
March 5, 2012
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Not really my area, but until someone else responds...
I can see why you'd be tempted to think so. If numbers -- standardly understood as abstract objects -- exist, they're causally inert, and so they can't affect the world in any way. But I'm not sure that implies that their existence is jus... Read more
Hume stated that there is a gap between "is" and "ought." What about hypothetical imperatives? For example, it seems that, given a certain state of the material world, if I want to arrive on time for a certain meeting, then I ought to leave the house before, say, 8 AM. Did Hume's statement make room for such constructions, or does he not believe that the premises of hypothetical imperatives justify their normative conclusions?
Douglas Burnham
March 2, 2012
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The usual place people look in Hume forthe 'ought'/ 'is' problem is the end of the first section of ATreatise of Human Nature. Essentially, Hume wants to demonstratethat moral conclusions are founded only upon emotional reactions.This means, among other things, that a moral conclusion concernin... Read more
For me the answer to the question of whether abortion is right or wrong depends on the ontological status of the fetus. Is a fetus the kind of being that has a right to live or is it not? I don't know. How on earth can I know that? If I knew then I wouldn't be an agnostic on this issue. Most people, if I am not mistaken, take it for granted that a new born baby has the kind of being that gives it the right to live. So what reason is there to think that a young baby has the kind of being that gives it the right to live? What about an older baby or an adult...if we can stretch this question to its limits.
Stephen Maitzen
March 2, 2012
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Your questions raise a host of difficult issues. What gives anything a right to life? In other words, what in general (if anything) about an individual makes it morally wrong for others to end its life? I've never seen a satisfying answer to that basic question. Does an individual's right t... Read more
Who´s happiness is most important? My own or my family´s wich I have a responsible for as a mother and a wife? I´m used to, and it´s a part of my personality to always make sure that everybody around me is happy and content.But I suddenly realized that I forgotten all about me and what I want and need to be happy. I´m now facing the fact that in order to be happy and content, I need a divorce. Our marrige with two teenagers, is OK, but nothing more- we are like best friends. I suppose that my action will come as a complete surprise to everybody around us. And it will cause a lot of anger, tears and questions. And the only answer I have is- I have to do this for me. Do I really have the ethic right to hurt everybody around me in order for me to be happy.
Stephen Maitzen
March 2, 2012
(changed March 2, 2012)
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Your questions are important and obviously deeply-felt. I hesitate to offer answers to them because I don't think I'm particularly qualified as a philosopher to do that. But there are philosophers who hold themselves out as qualified; they're known as "philosophical practitioners," and you ca... Read more