Recent Responses
Would it be accurate to say that the relationship between scientific theory and the material world is like the relationship between a map and the territory it represents?
Miriam Solomon
January 6, 2012
(changed January 6, 2012)
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This is an interesting analogy and it is one that some philosophers of science (e.g. Ronald Giere) have developed. It captures the idea that scientific theories represent the world by naming its objects and relations. But it is just an analogy, and like all analogies, the similarities only... Read more
Would it be accurate to say that the relationship between scientific theory and the material world is like the relationship between a map and the territory it represents?
Miriam Solomon
January 6, 2012
(changed January 6, 2012)
Permalink
This is an interesting analogy and it is one that some philosophers of science (e.g. Ronald Giere) have developed. It captures the idea that scientific theories represent the world by naming its objects and relations. But it is just an analogy, and like all analogies, the similarities only... Read more
As it's the holiday season I've had a definite overdose of holiday mythology. The bit that got me thinking the most was re-encountering the character E. Scrooge, of Dickens' "A Christmas Carol", particularly in light of recent political/economic events in the US. How would a thoughtful philosopher characterize him and Dickens in this book? I'd not like to think that Dickens was engaging in mere sentimentality, that Scrooge is a character suitable merely for children, with no complexity to interest adults (though I'm aware "ACC" is mostly taught at the elementary school level). One of the talk-show hosts, I think it was Bill Maher, recently tried to cast Scrooge as simply a Republican, economically conservative. Is this a fair characterization? If we read the situation sentimentally, it's a moral tale against excessive greed. But the extent to which we should have a sentimental reaction to the economic plight of other people is an unanswered philosophical question, to my view. Is Dickens just being a moralist, trying to indoctrinate us with a simple message, or can Scrooge be read as an interesting character whose beliefs (prior to his conversion) have integrity and consistency?
Oliver Leaman
January 5, 2012
(changed January 5, 2012)
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I know exactly what you mean, I have always thought that poor old Scrooge got a rather bum deal from Dickens. The trouble with being uncharitable, though, which Dickens gets right is that it harms far more the potential giver rather than the recipient. Scrooge holds onto his money but is mise... Read more
Some people say that time only began when the universe began. I think that is because they equate time with movement. I disagree. I think that time is measured by movement but it isn't movement per se. I think that time is that ever present hypothetical or actual possibility of change. I hope that makes sense. What says you philosophers?
Andrew Pessin
January 5, 2012
(changed January 5, 2012)
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At least movement is relatively clear, and in principle perceivable. But what is a "hypothetical or actual possibility of change"? (Are you distinguishing two different kinds of possibility here, one hypothetical, the other actual, or does this phrase somehow refer to one thing?) ... You'd... Read more
I was combing through the recent questions and, although it has not yet been answered, noticed one about a person and his ex-philosophy-inclined-friend. This question in term led me to wonder about a more general question: the role of feelings in philosophy in general. Is philosophy just about reasoned argument, or would any credibility be given to a prominent philosopher who said something like: "I can't pinpoint what's wrong with this paper on the nature of friendship, but it just feels off to me". Or would a prominent philosopher not dare to say something like that? When a professional philosopher reads a paper, does s/he ever have an emotional response, is it suppressed, or, after years of training, does one learn simply to have no emotional response whatever. And, if there is one, does that in turn guide the thought process to any extent? At least as an impetus?
Oliver Leaman
January 1, 2012
(changed January 1, 2012)
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Emotion is very important in all human activities, philosophy included. Many arguments are fashioned as they are not in a disinterested desire to attain the truth but to get promoted, impress a potential partner, do down an enemy and so on. These might be regarded as cynical comments but then... Read more
Is it philosophically possible to "be" a plant in the same way that it's possible to "be" a human being?
Oliver Leaman
January 1, 2012
(changed January 1, 2012)
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Why not? Both vegetables and us having being, albeit rather different.
I recall a show many years ago which had a very human plant in it, but the trouble with it for our purposes here is that really it was a human being dressed up as a plant, as far as I could see from its behaviour, and so... Read more
Recently a question was asked about the nature and value of philosophy. I was surprised that only one panelist chose to respond. In his response, Gordon Marino wrote the following: "There are people who make their living doing philosophy who are really into it because they enjoy unlocking intellectual puzzles and building models." By not replying, is the implication that the other panelists agree with this assessment of what professional philosophy is? And if this is an accurate characterization of professional philosophy, why is it a department at the college level? It sounds more like the description for one of the many enrichment activities offered after school at the local elementary and middle schools. It seems to me that this cannot be an accurate description of the field, as the amount of professional philosophy done would not thereby be accounted for by the economic demand for it. Thoughts?
Alexander George
December 30, 2011
(changed December 30, 2011)
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Readers might be interested in some of the attempts by philosophers to explain their work, their problems, their philosophical passions to a non-professional audience that have appeared in The New York Times blog "The Stone": http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-stone/.... Read more
Is it a logical contradiction for something to come from nothing? I've heard that this causal principle is intuitive and something a rational person cannot deny. However, is it metaphysically possible for something to indeed come from nothing? Is that a logical contradiction concerning cause and effect? If we're not strictly talking about cause and effect, is it still possible for something to come from nothing? Is an event always contingent upon a cause?
Andrew Pessin
December 29, 2011
(changed December 29, 2011)
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Great question. I don't have an answer. But some thoughts depend on how you frame things. If by "causation" you have a certain model in mind (e.g. where something is transferred from cause to effect) then it does seem contradictory to say that 'something comes from nothing' -- if that... Read more
Recently I tried to explain to a friend what interested me about Hume's 'problem of induction.' I told him how if we want to give an argument for the superiority of inductive reasoning (concluding x's are always P, based on observed instances of x's that are P) over, say, anti-inductive reasoning (concluding x's are not always P, based on observed instances of x's that are P) then we would have to give either an inductive argument or else a deductive argument. We cannot give such a deductive argument, I told him, and to give an inductive argument like 'inductive reasoning has led to good results in every observed instance' would be circular. He replied with the question 'why is there no problem of deduction?' He asked why he couldn't give a similar argument that any defense of deductive reasoning (concluding C based on premises that logically entail C) over, say, anti-deductive reasoning (concluding not C based on premises that logically entail C) needs to be either deductive or inductive. A deductive argument would be circular, and an inductive argument is inadequate because of Hume's problem. I can't shake the feeling that something is wrong with his reply. Is there - or is there something wrong in both of our arguments? If not, then why is 'the problem of induction' so much more famous than 'the problem of deduction'?
Andrew Pessin
December 29, 2011
(changed December 29, 2011)
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Rather than offer a response to this excellent question, let me just refer you to a paper whcih essentially raises and discusses the very same problem: Susan Haack's "A Justification of Deduction," from the journal Mind in 1976 (try vol 85, n. 337 I believe). Also, Lewis Carroll (as in "... Read more
What is the difference between a word having two meanings and a word that has an "alternative" meaning? For intance, is MOUSE a word that has two meanings (first meaning: "a small rodent of a species found all over the world that has a brown or greyish-brown coat and a long mostly hairless tail"; second meaning: "a hand-held device for working with a computer by controlling a pointer on the screen") or does it have only one meaning ("either a small rodent of ..... or a hand-held device for ....")?
Andrew Pessin
December 29, 2011
(changed December 29, 2011)
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Interesting question. But I'm wondering what rides on the answer. And what is connected to the question. Of course, we begin by wanting to distinguish the meanings of the two relevant clauses you give ("small rodent," v. "hand-held device"). So, separately, you obviously hold that the... Read more