Recent Responses
Can the theory that everything that exists exists in time and space, which is materialism as I understand it, explain how things have motion as well? Motion is not itself a thing that can be located within time and space it is only the word that we apply to the effect of something changing position in a continuous manner. But if the only things which exists exists in time and space what is there to move the things that is in motion? Certainly not something else which is in time and space since that demands as well an explanation for it's movement.
Charles Taliaferro
January 8, 2012
(changed January 8, 2012)
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This is a deep question or set of questions! The history of the philosophy of motion is fascinating as is the general philosophy of space and time. There are historically significant arguments to the effect that to account for motion in the cosmos, one needs to posit an unmoved mover -... Read more
If every person can interpret a work of literature differently, by linking the depictions with experiences in their life or knowledge they have acquired, how is it possible for literary critics to "analyze" the meanings of works of literature?
Charles Taliaferro
January 8, 2012
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This is a great and complex matter. There are a few philosophers of art who come close to an "anything goes" approach to the meaning of a work of literature, but most of us think there are some boundaries in terms of historical context, the intentions of the artists, and most importantl... Read more
What is the difference between the idea that we can control our bodies in conformity with our will and magic? Aren't they suspiciously similar ideas?
Charles Taliaferro
January 8, 2012
(changed January 8, 2012)
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Wonderful question!There are some philosophers who are very committed to a form of determinism that rules out free agency and a thesis that seems quite contrary to common sense, namely that the self is an illusion or construct and not a real, substantial individual thing. For some of th... Read more
Is an emotional reaction to a fact/situation a logical conclusion that follows from observed premises? Is it logical, for instance, to mourn the death of a loved one, or is mourning a phenomenon independent of logical analysis of a situation?
Charles Taliaferro
January 8, 2012
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Great question that gets to the heart of a current debate! If you have a very narrow concept of logic (in which logic only refers to the laws of identity, non-contradiction, and the law of excluded middle) and if your notion of observation is again narrow perhaps only allowing in empiri... Read more
Hello. This submission will include two questions. The panelist´s are of course free to answer only one of them, if the other turns out to be of no interest. I´m no student of philosophy in the conventional sense, but lately it does consume much of my time. I remember reading Frege´s "The thought: a logical inquiry" a while back, and his answer to "an unusual objection" he thought he heard, puzzled me; "what if it were all a dream?" It seems to me that questions of this kind are unanswerable, and that Frege´s answer to this question is unsatisfactory. The (short) reason for this is simply that the question is one of fact, and one would have no possible way of empirically proving that one is not. What is your take on my objection? (I am aware that it is not one of the sections in the article that did the most impact on future philosophy) The second question relates to the distinction between analytic and extra-logical statements. After reading "Two dogmas of empiricism" by Quine, I am left wondering about whether the word "analytic" remains unexplained. The question relates then to what objections Quine´s article met and what the general take on this issue is today. Thank you very much.
Charles Taliaferro
January 8, 2012
(changed January 8, 2012)
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Thank you for these interesting reflections! As for your first point, there are a number of philosophers who address radical skepticism (e.g. can any of us know with certainty that we are not, as we seem to be, wide awake and acting in the world rather than, say, dreaming?) in the way y... Read more
Imagine some activity in which all affected parties have given their free and informed consent to the activity. Is this activity now ethically neutral/permitted, no matter what it is, insofar as it only affects those who consented to it in the first place? Suppose a person joins a fraternity that advertises itself as being organized around (for instance) learning from older peers, sharing and helping one's fellow students, making friends and participating in extracurricular sports. After being initiated, though, the person finds that there is an informal tendency of older fraternity members to bully new initiates, to make constant unreasonable demands of them and ostracize them if they refuse, to take their things without returning them and to use the new initiates as a less experienced opposing team for easy victories in sports competitions. Does the person who joined the fraternity have any right to complain about how he is being treated? Or can he, since the behavior engaged in is all nominally part of the fraternity's "mission," do nothing besides either accept the abuse or quit?
Nicholas D. Smith
January 6, 2012
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It sounds to me as if the notion of "informed consent" is being stretched past reasonable limits in your case. If it is well-known among members of the fraternity that new initiates are bullied, etc., it does not seem to me as if consent can be informed adequately if this is not made kno... Read more
On December 9, 2005, Nicholas D. Smith wrote a response that said in part: "For the ancient Greeks, prostitution was entirely socially acceptable... whereas free males were expected never to commit oral sex (on any sex partner, male or female)." From what text(s) do we know this? Is there some text in which it is explicitly forbidden? Or do we infer it from stories and plays?
Nicholas D. Smith
January 6, 2012
(changed January 6, 2012)
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The gounds for my claim are twofold. On the topic of committing oral sex on females, it is an inference based upon the practice being treated as shameful in Aristophanic comedy. (See the note on this in Jeffrey Henderson's The Maculate Muse on p. 185; though compare what Henderson has t... Read more
What's in a name? Recently, Ron Artest, a member of the world famous NBA LA Lakers team changed his name, officially, to "Meta World Peace". Apparently the sports announcers have been rebuked by the league for calling him by his former name, what someone might consider a "real name" or legitimate name. So now, when he does something great, the announcers excitedly shout what some might consider a slogan rather than a name: "World Peace!" I suspect there are a tangled network of issues involved here, and I'd appreciate some untangling. One issue that occurs to me, for instance, is whether the league's insistence that the announcers call this player "World Peace" is genuinely motivated by a respect for his choice of name. If he had named himself something offensive (a name involving a curse, for instance), would they insist the same? Ethically, as a society, do we prioritize respecting his choice of name over our taboos involving language? Is this even the right way to think about this issue? Are there other dichotomies to draw, or other issues involved here?
Nicholas D. Smith
January 6, 2012
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This is an interesting one. One rather tangential aspect of your question is the fact that the backetball player formerly known as Ron Artest (whom I have watched play numerous times) seems a very poor role model on the topic of peace (or peaceful demeanor)!
Anyway, such sniping aside,... Read more
Have philosophers before the 20th century had anything good to say about women? Schopenhauer and Nietzsche obviously did not have very nice things to say and Kant said they were better for matters of beauty and Hegel compared them with plants but I don't know if that is a bad thing since he compared men with animals but I don't know if any philosopher ever said anything good. (I just remembered Mill said good things but I don't who else.)
Thomas Pogge
January 6, 2012
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Plato calls in his Republic for women to participate as equals in the activities of citizenship, saying that surely many women are more excellent than some men and that less excellent women should be disqualified from various roles (along with less excellent males) on account of their lesser e... Read more
Philosophers debate persistence conditions for personal identity because everything about us seems to change, including our cells, our memories, and our bodies. But DNA doesn't change and it codes for specfic traits in every cell of the human body. It's true that we experience changes in the way phenotypes are expressed in particular experiences or memories, but why not conclude that DNA is the ultimate source of personal identity? Philosophers don't seem to give this biological candidate serious consideration. Can you tell me why?
Jonathan Westphal
April 5, 2012
(changed April 5, 2012)
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DNA does change. There are "point mutations", for example, in which say a single nucleotide changes, say from guanine to cytosine. . . . CTG TCA . . . becomes . . . CTG GCA . . . If there is a strand of DNA that suffers such a change, is it then not the same strand of DNA? This is exactly li... Read more