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Hello Philosophers Is there any axiomatized theory of arithmetic that is much stronger to be afflicted by Gödel theorems? I've read that there are axiomatized theories that are weaker than the theorem's criteria, i.e not expressive enough, and their consistency is proved within the same theory. I wondered if there would be something like that, which is stronger than the Gödel theorem's criteria for a axiomatized theory.
Peter Smith
March 18, 2011
(changed March 18, 2011)
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Gödel's first theorem, with later improvements by Rosser and others, tells us that any theory of arithmetic T that is (i) consistent, (ii) decidably axiomatized (i.e. you can mechanically check that a purported proof obeys the rules of the arithmetic) and (iii) contains Robinson Arithmetic (a ver... Read more
What do you mean by philosophy is not being clever?
Charles Taliaferro
March 18, 2011
(changed March 18, 2011)
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Hmmmm. Not sure which "you" you have in mind, perhaps a particular panelist who made this claim? However, I shall venture a reply as to why someone might think philosophy is not merely a matter of cleverness.Beginning in Ancient Greece the practice of philosophy was distinguished from th... Read more
I've encountered people who think that the complex grammar of German or French, or the complicated writing system of Chinese or Japanese, make speakers of those languages more intelligent, on average, than speakers of "simplistic" English. Do such claims make any sense?
Richard Heck
March 20, 2011
(changed March 20, 2011)
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Well said. And, as an empirical matter, there is no evidence whatsoever that it is any more difficult for children to learn Chinese or German than it is for them to learn English or Spanish.
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What do you mean by philosophy is not being clever?
Charles Taliaferro
March 18, 2011
(changed March 18, 2011)
Permalink
Hmmmm. Not sure which "you" you have in mind, perhaps a particular panelist who made this claim? However, I shall venture a reply as to why someone might think philosophy is not merely a matter of cleverness.Beginning in Ancient Greece the practice of philosophy was distinguished from th... Read more
Generally in math and the sciences, theories are studied and given attention only insofar as they are judged correct. In philosophy, however, many historical views are examined which very few modern philosophers would endorse or even take seriously. Why should historical studies in philosophy be more useful than like studies in other disciplines?
Sean Greenberg
March 18, 2011
(changed March 18, 2011)
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While there is progress in philosophy, what counts as philosophical progress is, I think, very different from what counts as progress in math and the sciences. There is no need for working mathematicians and scientists to know the history of their fields in order to contribute to 'state of th... Read more
Marijuana impacts the aesthetic dimensions of human life such as art, nature, and especially the subtleties of human interaction? Have any philosophers talked about the effects of marijuana from a philosophical perspective?
Charles Taliaferro
March 18, 2011
(changed March 18, 2011)
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Yes, there is a book just out that you might like, called Philosophy for Everyone: Cannabis:http://www.amazon.com/Cannabis-Philosophy-Everyone-Talking-About/dp/1405...The sub-title is quite fun: "What were we just talking about?"That book, just published last year, should give you lots to... Read more
Let's say I'm a mad neuroscientist who successfully alters the structure of a person's brain so that they end up with a completely different personality and memory set. Have I killed this person? Should I be tried for murder?
Eddy Nahmias
March 17, 2011
(changed March 17, 2011)
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Yes. Of course, I only think that because I think personal identity depends on continuity of memory and character traits, and I think memory and character traits are constituted by brain states. So, if you could somehow alter my brain enough to wipe out my memories (perhaps replacing them with... Read more
Skeptical hypotheses (Descartes' evil demon, for instance) seem to rely on the following proposition: it is possibly that I am being systematically deceived (that all of my sensory impressions are actually infelicitous, say). My question is: is his proposition known <i>a priori</i>? or is it empirical?
Jasper Reid
March 17, 2011
(changed March 17, 2011)
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I've been racking my brains over this one -- it's a tricksy little question! -- and I'm still not sure what the answer should be. Of course Nicholas Smith would be correct, if the question was about the proposition that I am being systematically deceived. But it isn't. I take it that the question... Read more
Many philosophers think that mental states can be reduced to physical states. It seems to me however that properties such as sadness and happiness are adjectives that apply to a person's mental states. It doesn't make any sense to say "this is happy brain tissue" does it?
Jasper Reid
March 17, 2011
(changed March 17, 2011)
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I might just add one further observation here. At the risk of sounding pedantic, 'happiness' and 'sadness' are not adjectives (as you suggest). They're nouns. The corresponding adjectives here are the words 'happy' and 'sad'. Now, I would agree with you that there seems to be something deeply pec... Read more
Do ethical opinions need to be justified philosophically? Causing someone needless suffering is wrong but is there any indubitable facts that can be obtained through reason and logic that justifies that opinion?
Sean Greenberg
March 17, 2011
(changed March 17, 2011)
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I don't think that there is any need to justify one's ethical or moral beliefs: religion, for example, is a traditional source of the moral commitments of many people, but religion differs considerably from philosophy in that philosophy seeks, unlike religion, to give reasons for certain belie... Read more