Recent Responses
Is geometry purely mathematical or does it rely on spatiality which is beyond mathematics?
Sean Greenberg
March 17, 2011
(changed March 17, 2011)
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I take your question to be whether geometry can be axiomatized into a deductive system based on certain definitions, as some philosophers believe mathematics can be, or whether, because geometry is in some way related to space--unlike mathematics--it cannot so be axiomatized.I begin by noting... Read more
Hello. My question is about law and morality. It is commonly assumed that intentionality/ purpose is an important factor in determining how morally 'good' an action is. For example if I give to charity because I honestly care about the cause and hope to improve society by supporting this cause, my action would be considered more morally good than someone who donates to improve their public reputation (why companies are often involved in charity work for example). So an act which is committed for altruistic reasons is often considered more moral than one primarily committed for selfish reasons/ reasons that will directly benefit the person. However, the introduction of laws, with associated punishments for transgressing these laws, can change the intentionality of people’s behaviour from altruistic to self-centred. For example if it wasn't illegal to steal from a shop, people’s reason/justification for not stealing would most probably be a moral one (i.e. stealing is wrong, stealing harms society etc). But since stealing is illegal, people’s dominant/ most cognitively obvious reason for not stealing would often be a far more selfish/ self-centred one of avoiding punishment or perhaps rather more morally neutral desire for wanting to obey laws/ fit into society etc. So since laws often reduce people’s capacity for altruistically-motivated behaviour (due to the added motivation of avoiding punishment), do laws diminish people’s capacity for morally good behaviour in many circumstances? Or is altruistic behaviour often an illusion, and all human behaviour is selfish to some degree? Or does this issue not really matter, since these laws are supposed to bring justice and reduce the incidence of these immoral acts, which far trumps the above possible negative effect?
Sean Greenberg
March 17, 2011
(changed March 17, 2011)
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This is a wonderful and fascinating question, which goes to the heart of the relation between morality and legality. It does seem that the moral status of an action might well be determined by the intention with which the action is performed (in part because depending on one's intention, one... Read more
A colleague of mine is a very devoted vegan. So devoted, in fact, that he argues that it is morally wrong to wear fake fur or fake leather, or to eat any kind of non-meat food that is meant to look or taste like meat. Apparently, doing so symbolically condones tyranny over animals, supports the meat and animal-based fashion industries, and demonstrates disrespect and contempt towards animals. Now, I have nothing against veganism, but this just seems too radical. Is this kind of argumentation sound? Or are there any more sensible arguments against fake fur or leather, or meat-like food items?
Miriam Solomon
March 17, 2011
(changed March 17, 2011)
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The claim that something "symbolically supports tyranny..." is not a claim about the act in itself, but a claim about the meaning of the act. Your vegan friend may see troublesome meanings in the act of eating artifical bacon flavored chips or wearing fake fur. But not everyone does, and the... Read more
A colleague of mine is a very devoted vegan. So devoted, in fact, that he argues that it is morally wrong to wear fake fur or fake leather, or to eat any kind of non-meat food that is meant to look or taste like meat. Apparently, doing so symbolically condones tyranny over animals, supports the meat and animal-based fashion industries, and demonstrates disrespect and contempt towards animals. Now, I have nothing against veganism, but this just seems too radical. Is this kind of argumentation sound? Or are there any more sensible arguments against fake fur or leather, or meat-like food items?
Miriam Solomon
March 17, 2011
(changed March 17, 2011)
Permalink
The claim that something "symbolically supports tyranny..." is not a claim about the act in itself, but a claim about the meaning of the act. Your vegan friend may see troublesome meanings in the act of eating artifical bacon flavored chips or wearing fake fur. But not everyone does, and the... Read more
Hi philosophers, i have a question about indecency. Social norms at the beginning of the 20th century would have considered women who showed any of their skin in public as indecent (and illegal). It would also have been (as one could imagine) indecent and illegal for couples to engage in explicitly sexual conduct in public (i.e. sexual intercourse) By 21st century social norms, it is socially and morally unobjectionable for women to show off their skin in public, but it is still a crime for couples to engage in acts of explicitly sexual conduct. Based on the two examples above, i would like to ask the following two questions: can you imagine some types of conduct that will ALWAYS be considered indecent irrespective of changing social norms? And if so, what properties would these conducts have that makes its indecency distinct from conducts whose indecency will change according to social norms?
Oliver Leaman
March 12, 2011
(changed March 12, 2011)
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I don't think one can define any apriori indecent actions, that is, any actions that would always be taken to be indecent. It is remarkable how standards change, and in fact explicitly sexual behaviour is not anymore regarded as indecent by many people, although it remains illegal in most count... Read more
I am listening to the theme music of a movie soundtrack. While I enjoy the theme music there is nonetheless something about it that strikes me as inauthentic and hallow. The thing is that I can't point to what it is that I find inauthentic. Maybe I might say that the music tries for an unconvincingly and excessively cinematic vastness and grandeur of emotion. But much equally ambitious cinematic music does not strike me as inauthentic. Is it philosophically incoherent to speak of a piece of music as lacking certain virtues such as authenticity when you are not even certain how a piece of music might be called authentic in the first place? How could it make sense? It seems odd to me that I can make such judgments.
Charles Taliaferro
March 12, 2011
(changed March 12, 2011)
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Interesting! The topic of authenticity in music has been a lively one, especially (for some reason) in the 1980s and 1990s. The topic was usually defined by disputes about whether a musical performance of, say, Bach, could be authentic if it was performed with instruments that were unkno... Read more
Dear Philosophers, Can we regard Race discrimination as an aesthetic issue? By this I mean to view the differences among different races as aesthetic preference. So, can we say that when a person doesn't like a specific human race, he/she is just making an aesthetic choice, and, consequently, if we do not allow him/her to express his/her preference we are limiting his/her freedom of speech? Thank you
Sean Greenberg
March 12, 2011
(changed March 12, 2011)
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What seems to be at issue in this question is not racial discrimination, in terms of which the question begins, which would seem to imply that what's at issue is negative bias towards people in virtue of their race, which certainly wouldn't be an aesthetic, but a moral issue; the second senten... Read more
Recently, someone I knew of passed away, and was far too young. He was an incredibly good person, he was empathetic and caring and all the things that are considered "good". It made me realise that there have been many people that were inherently "good" who have died at a young age. I feel almost that I have a "duty" to these people to try to be "good" myself. In a sense, I feel all of a sudden a need to be worthy of life, to be deserving of existence, because so many people who deserved to exist, no longer do. In the past, I must have hurt people, made people uncomfortable, as I guess a lot of people have done. The problem is such a worth is not easy to quantify, and to quantify it would trivialise it. I don't know how to satisfy this yearning, nor do I know how to express it with great enough precision to figure out how to satisfy it. What do you suggest I do? Thanks a lot.
Charles Taliaferro
March 11, 2011
(changed March 11, 2011)
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Thank you for this extraordinary question. The matter is quite profound and I feel quite unworthy to respond, but I will make a few observations that I hope are helpful (or not unhelpful)!First, one might question whether it is best to see your response to those who have died prematurely... Read more
Is it possible to conceive of an irrational entity or can only rational things be conceived of? Can irrational things exist? Of course it depend on how you define rational but maybe vagueness has more creative potential for philosophical thought.
Charles Taliaferro
March 11, 2011
(changed March 11, 2011)
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You are right that the answer or reply will depend on what is meant by "rational" and "irrational." If "irrational" means something (some state of affairs or entity) that defies the laws of logic, this is doubtful. Take the law of identity (everything is itself or A is A) and the law of... Read more
Skeptical hypotheses (Descartes' evil demon, for instance) seem to rely on the following proposition: it is possibly that I am being systematically deceived (that all of my sensory impressions are actually infelicitous, say). My question is: is his proposition known <i>a priori</i>? or is it empirical?
Jasper Reid
March 17, 2011
(changed March 17, 2011)
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I've been racking my brains over this one -- it's a tricksy little question! -- and I'm still not sure what the answer should be. Of course Nicholas Smith would be correct, if the question was about the proposition that I am being systematically deceived. But it isn't. I take it that the question... Read more