Recent Responses
In a recent response by Eddy Nahmias, he ended up talking about "the capacities [which] are the grounds for personhood". That made me think about arguments on abortion. Some pro-life people argue that the important thing is not the capacities some being HAS, but those that it can COME TO HAVE in some specified way (e.g., a "natural" way, or a way that is grounded on that being's "essence"). And that, they say, is what makes every fetus a person, and what makes a temporarily unconscious human a person. Both have to undergo some CHANGE before they can display specifically human traits that are important for personhood. Now, I don't find this argument very persuasive, but I really do not have a good answer to it. Could you tell me what is the difference (if any) between a one week human fetus and an unconscious adult that makes the latter a person, but not the former?
Eddy Nahmias
November 5, 2010
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These are really tough and fascinating questions, both about what capacities are and what persons are. I hope other panelists might add to what little I have to say. What I will say (briefly, and without checking to see what the relevant literature has to say) is that one way to understand... Read more
I am reading a book that explains Gödel's proofs of incompletenss, and I found something that disturbs me. There is a hidden premise that says something like "all statements of number theory can be expressed as Gödel numbers". How exactly do we know that? Can that be proved? The book did give few examples of translations of such kind (for example, how to turn statement "there is no largest prime number" into statement of formal system that resembles PM, and then how to turn that into Gödel number). So the question is: how do we know that every normal-language number theory statement has its equivalent in formal system such as PM? (it does seem intuitive, but what if there's a hole somewhere?)
Richard Heck
November 6, 2010
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Peter's explanation is as good as it could be, but let me elaborate on something. You will note that he keeps referring to the "standard proof" of the first incompleteness theorem. There are other proofs, and some of them do not rely upon a coding of this kind. Here's one nice way that stays... Read more
In light of the recent leaking of hundreds of thousands of American classified documents related to the Afghan and Iraq wars by Wikileaks, I have been considering the issue of freedom of information, particularly the right of governments to withhold information from the public. While in some cases such secrecy is easily understandable (releasing the names and homes of Afghan informants, for example, would make the informants useless to the military while simultaneously endangering the lives of the selfsane informants and their families), there are other cases where I cannot understand how the government can morally justify withholding information from the public (for example, the notion that the American military was paying Afghan radio stations to run positive stories about occupation forces). Other cases, pertaining to brutalities committed by enemy forces, seem even less easy to hide away. So my question is, insofar as releasing the information doesn't directly endanger lives, does the government have the right to hide important information pertaining to a war being funded by taxpayer dollars from those same taxpayers? Is there an argument to be made that selective disclosure, rather than full disclosure, is a form of propaganda?
Thomas Pogge
November 4, 2010
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The justification goes something like this. The United States is under various current and potential threats from foreign sources. It is the government's responsibility, as a matter of national security, to keep these threats at bay and perhaps to neutralize them. This task can be made easie... Read more
Generally speaking, rights and responsibilities seem to go hand-in-hand. Yet in the discourse of human rights, there is seldom talk of human responsibilities - although human rights are in a sense responsibilities of the State towards its citizens. On the one hand, this makes sense, because to establish a set of human responsibilities to be taken as seriously as human rights would mean essentially coercing certain behavior out of citizens, rather than merely providing them with a platform for self-realization, as human rights do. It seems, however, that the quality of a society is not dependent merely on the freedom of its members, but also on their involvement and consideration for one another. Given this consideration, I am curious as to whether any philosophers have elaborated on a theory of "human responsibilities", to complement our current human rights scheme. If so, what do these responsibilities look like?
Thomas Pogge
November 4, 2010
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Here are a few things you might want to look at.
In 1997, the InterAction Council drafted a UniversalDeclaration of Human Responsibilities, see www.interactioncouncil.org/
In 2002 the Fundacion Valencia Tercer Milenio published a Declaration of Responsibilities and Human Duties, available at... Read more
Was Zeno unfair toward Achilles in his paradox? Last week I was reading the Croatian edition of Bryan Magee’s “The Story of Philosophy” and he reminded me of Zeno’s famous “Achilles and the tortoise” paradox. Here is how the paradox goes (taken from Wikipedia): “In the paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, Achilles is in a footrace with the tortoise. Achilles allows the tortoise a head start of 100 meters. If we suppose that each racer starts running at some constant speed (here instead of ‘one very fast and one very slow’ I would stick to the original: Achilles is twice time faster than the Tortoise), then after some finite time, Achilles will have run 100 meters, bringing him to the tortoise's starting point. During this time, the tortoise has run a much shorter distance, 50 meters. It will then take Achilles some further time to run that distance, by which time the tortoise will have advanced farther; and then more time still to reach this third point, while the tortoise moves ahead. Thus, whenever Achilles reaches somewhere the tortoise has been, he still has farther to go. Therefore, because there are an infinite number of points Achilles must reach where the tortoise has already been, he can never overtake the tortoise.” Now, I think that the paradox exists only because Zeno is manipulating with the time-component of his paradox. First let’s clarify what Zeno means when he says that Achilles is twice time faster than the Tortoise. If, for example, Achilles runs 100 meter in 10 seconds the Tortoise who is twice time slower than Achilles will run only 50 meters. It is cleat that we cannot talk about the speed without including the time component (speed = distance/time). Zeno says that when Achilles reaches the Tortoise's starting point, the Tortoise will be run only 50 meters. This all has happened during certain amount of time (with proposed figurers, after 10 seconds). Next, Zeno says “It will then take Achilles some further time to run that distance, by which time the tortoise will have advanced farther”. With the proposed figures that mean that when Achilles runs 150 meters the Tortoise will only reach 75 meters (but it is steal 25 meters ahead because of the head start of 100 meters). However, the second sequence lasts only 5 seconds – if it would last full 10 seconds than Achilles and the Tortoise would be side by side. In the third sequence Zeno executes another unmentioned cutting of time – this time he “stops” the race when Achilles reaches 175 meters, while the Tortoise only reaches 87,5 meters. That sequence lasts just 2,5 seconds. Just for the fun let’s go further: 4th sequence: A= 187,5 meters / T= 93,75 meters / time= 1,25 seconds 5th sequence: A= 193,75 meters / T = 96,875 meters / time= 0,625 seconds In the last sequence it is like Zeno gives the signal to start the race – and then instantly (after just 0,655 seconds) shouts: ”Stop! Stop! Achilles, please come back. I now you couldn’t stop on time, but the next sequence starts from this point here (with his finger he shows a spot 193,75 meters from the starting point). Now, we can start the 6th sequence…”, which will last only 0,3125 if we wants to prevent Achilles to win the race. [It sounds like Monty Python’s comedy, isn’t it :)] So, my conclusion is that Achilles was never given enough time to win the race, or that Zeno was (consciously or not) manipulating “behind the curtains” with the time component of his paradox. I am aware that this paradox is not the only one, but at least here we do not have to use complex mathematics to prove that the sum of 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16... is still 1. What do you think? Your sincerely. Robert Slavonski Brod, CROATIA P.S. Sorry for my clumsy English
Marc Lange
November 4, 2010
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Dear Robert,
You are right. The key to understanding the paradox is that although Achilles must complete an infinite number of tasks in order to catch up to the Tortoise, he can do so in a finite amount of time, since each successive task takes much less time than its predecessor (as you noted... Read more
It seems that logical fallacies are regularly committed in the course of daily political dialogue. For example, many politicians support their policy decisions through appeal to the emotions of the electorate rather than their faculties of reason. If philosophers possess the tools to dissect the logic and substance of political discourse, why don't philosophers play a greater role in public life? Why isn't their a panel of philosophers to transparently dissect and scrutinise the speeches, policies and actions of contemporary politicians?
Marc Lange
November 4, 2010
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I do not think that specialized philosophical training is needed to dissect the speeches of candidates for elective office. Only the rudiments of critical thinking, a willingness to follow good arguments wherever they lead, and some knowledge of the relevant issues is needed. In universities a... Read more
Stephen Hawking has claimed in his new book that "...philosophy is dead...(it) has not kept up with the developments in science, particularly physics". What do philosophers think of this claim?
Marc Lange
November 4, 2010
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Well, I cannot speak for all philosophers. But it seems to me that Hawking has not kept up with the developments in philosophy. Of course, he need not do so ... unless he plans to say something about them, as he apparently did.
There is a tremendous amount of very scientifically informed phil... Read more
What schools have the best undergraduate philosophy departments in the US? By "best", I mean most academically rigorous, most qualified faculty, and most extensive course offerings. I've been trying to research this online but every opinion I can find on the subject seems to come from one website - philosophicalgourmet.com - and I have no idea what this site's credentials are. If anyone has an opinion based on their own research or personal experience, I am eager to hear it.
Sean Greenberg
November 4, 2010
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The remarks on the topic at the Philosophical Gourmet website seem to me to be generally on target. (For those remarks, click here.) Generally, I think that liberal arts colleges (such as Amherst, Williams, Oberlin, or the Claremont Colleges), or universities that do not have graduate st... Read more
Is it true that knowledge is the same as truth
Thomas Pogge
November 3, 2010
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You are asking whether it is true that T=K (knowledge and truth are the same). From your asking this, I conclude that you don't know whether T=K. If truth and knowledge were the same, then lack of knowledge would be lack of truth. So, assuming T=K is true, we derive the conclusion that T=K i... Read more
There's a logical scenario which often comes up in discussions around the question of voting. We all know the conversation... Person 1: I don't vote because my vote has no impact on the outcome of the election. Person 2: Not on it's OWN it doesn't, but if everyone thought that, no one would vote, and THEN what would happen?! Person 1: But I don't decide whether all those other people vote, I only have control of my 1 vote! My question here relates not to whether or not one should or shouldn't vote, or to the voting example alone, but rather to the logic of this situation. For this example let us assume (for the sake of the point I am interested in) that it is universally agreed that all people (including Person 1 and 2) agree that nobody voting is an outcome that everyone wishes to avoid. And also assume (despite the conversation above!) that everyone decides privately whether to vote or not, such that their decision cannot influence others decisions) Finally assume that the election involved has never been decided by a margin of less than 1000 votes. To me Person 2's argument is something like the following: There would be negative consequences of a number of people doing X, therefore no one should do X, even if any one of them taken in isolation has no impact. So I guess my question is: Is this a logical fallacy? I've tried to search for discussion of this scenario before on the web but never found anything. There's probably even a name for it! Help... Cheers Pip
Thomas Pogge
November 3, 2010
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I don't think there's a named fallacy here, but I do think the principle proposed by Person 2 is unsound. If this principle were sound, then it would be impermissible to remain childless even in a world as overpopulated as ours.
The principle can be revised to be more plausible. When many p... Read more