Recent Responses
It seems the general consensus that human dignity is the basis for human rights. However, it seems to me that human dignity makes more sense as the goal of human rights program; that is, in applying and respecting a set of human rights, we ought to be aiming to help everyone live dignified lives. So how is it that dignity shows up as the justification of human rights, rather than their goal?
Thomas Pogge
November 3, 2010
(changed November 3, 2010)
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Why should there be any incompatibility between dignity being both a goal and a justification? On the face of it, there seems to be harmony: if A is a worthwhile goal and B serves this goal, then B can be justified by appeal to A. Example: the goal of having a good job is served by having a... Read more
From an ethical perspective, what does potential count for? My motivation for this question stems directly from a discussion on abortion I once had. In general, it seems to me to be evident that the fetus is not yet a person, but it is a potential person, and it seems that potential might count for something. For example, if we consider the case of a child who has the potential to become a masterful musician, but deny him the ability to ever play music, it seems that a moral wrong has been done.
Thomas Pogge
November 3, 2010
(changed November 3, 2010)
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What does potential count for? I don't think there is a general answer here. One important variable concerns the relation between the potential time-slice person who never came to be and the entity whose development into that time-slice person was disturbed. When these two are closely relate... Read more
Is there an infinite number of colors? It occurs to me that, given our neurophysiology, there is only a finite number of colors that any human can actually see (the same could surely be said for any animal whatsoever). In order to claim that there is an infinite number of colors, then, I think that you would have to be able to talk about colors which are only "in principle" perceptible--but it seems weird to talk about colors which no perceiver can actually perceive.
Thomas Pogge
November 2, 2010
(changed November 2, 2010)
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If you are talking about basic colors, then you are right: there are only finitely many of them, and to get beyond them one would then have to bring in "colors" beyond the visible spectrum, and this is indeed weird in the absence of beings that can actually perceive those "colors".
But here'... Read more
What would we have to know about dolphins in order to conclude they are non-human persons?
Eddy Nahmias
November 2, 2010
(changed November 2, 2010)
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Of course, it depends on how one defines 'person'. If one defines person as an organism with a human genome, then dolphins can't be persons and human fetuses are persons. But personally, I think persons are conscious creatures that are able to think about their own and others' mental state... Read more
Many people attack moral relativism on the grounds that accepting moral relativism implies that there is no more reason to ever consider anybody's behavior to be wrong, and that it therefore becomes impossible to punish wrongdoers (because there won't be any). For example, moral relativism would imply that we can't intervene in an abusive household or protect battered women whose religious believes would have them submit to their husbands or male relatives. Why is tolerance and abstention assumed to be a fundamental quality of moral relativism? After all, if moral relativism implies it isn't wrong for my neighbour to beat his wife because he believes God allows it, then moral relativism also implies it isn't wrong for me to call the police on him, or for the police to lock him behind bars, or even for me to go over and protect his wife myself, physically if necessary. So why is moral relativism assumed to go hand-in-hand with being passive and (essentially) impotent? Is there really some link that I'm missing?
Thomas Pogge
October 30, 2010
(changed October 30, 2010)
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Your argument is fine so far as it goes, and it would be perfectly consistent for you to endorse moral relativism and also to protect the victims of what you consider to be wrongdoing -- for example, by locking up the perpetrators. But it would be difficult to justify such imprisonment as pu... Read more
What is it about some situations that make certain problems ethical or moral in nature, and others not? It can't be merely that different parties are involved in a situation - the decision as to whether to ask a person on a date or not is not an ethical one, but a social/emotional one. Harm doesn't seem to be sufficient either - accepting or refusing an invitation to a date likewise doesn't seem an ethical question, even if the person, if rejected, might enter a deep depression. So what is it that differentiates ethical problems from the rest?
Thomas Pogge
October 30, 2010
(changed October 30, 2010)
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You might draw two distinctions here: between a situation and some way of responding to, or acting in, this situation; and between some situation or conduct requiring moral reflection and some situation or conduct being morally problematic.
Pretty much any social situation requires some mora... Read more
Is it possible to divide something into an infinite amount of parts?
Jasper Reid
October 30, 2010
(changed October 30, 2010)
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I've nothing against Sean Greenberg's answer, but I figured I'd just add a word or two on a further relevant distinction here. Infinite divisibility is not the same as the possibility of dividing something into infinitely many parts. At least, it doesn't need to be understood in that way. The... Read more
I recently read Louis Menand's article in "The New Yorker" entitled "Head Case." In it, he asks this question: "[W]hat if there were a pill that relieved you of the physical pain of bereavement--sleeplessness, weeping, loss of appetite--without diluting your love for or memory of the dead? Assuming that bereavement 'naturally' remits after six months, would you take a pill today that will allow you to feel the way you will be feeling six months from now anyway?" Is this a philosophical question? If so, how would you respond to it?
Jennifer Church
October 30, 2010
(changed October 30, 2010)
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Menand asks whether we would/should choose to be relieved of the physical feelings of bereavement if we could do so without diluting our love for or memory of the dead. Greenberg claims that (a) thoughts, not feelings, are what is essential to emotions (the feelings being merely contingen... Read more
Is it possible to divide something into an infinite amount of parts?
Jasper Reid
October 30, 2010
(changed October 30, 2010)
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I've nothing against Sean Greenberg's answer, but I figured I'd just add a word or two on a further relevant distinction here. Infinite divisibility is not the same as the possibility of dividing something into infinitely many parts. At least, it doesn't need to be understood in that way. The... Read more
One gets the impression that the term "escapism" is used pejoratively to describe literature or other forms of fiction that have no perceived value. Is escapism really something to be looked down upon, however? In the same way that a back massage or a half an hour of meditation might help one unwind and put the stress of a hectic day behind oneself, isn't escapist fiction something valuable and useful to us all, in some form or another? Why is the notion so often pejorative?
Douglas Burnham
October 30, 2010
(changed October 30, 2010)
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An interesting question, thank you. I am certainly not averse to taking a spy thriller, say, on holiday with me! It seems to me that the pejorative sense of the term 'escapism' has to do less with the escape part than what is escaped from. If all that were at stake were the general tensio... Read more