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In Kant's metaphysics, he claims that the world of human experience (phenomena) is categorically different from things in themselves (noumena). He states that there is no reason to believe that the world as we experience it is the same as things are "in themselves." Doesn't the fact that the way we have experienced the world as human beings has led to evolutionary success reveal that while phenomena may not exactly duplicate noumena; it must certainly resemble it very much? The fact that we successfully manipulate the external world through our knowledge that comes from experience,seems to suggest that they way things are in themselves is very much like we experience them. Even to the extent that phenomena may give us a lot of information about how things are in themselves.
Douglas Burnham
October 29, 2010
(changed October 29, 2010)
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There is certainly something of Hume's reasoning in your question (see the end of section v of the first Enquiry). And, this way of thinking about knowledge becomes a basic definition of knowledge in pragmatism (Pierce, James et al). However, it is inappropriate in Kant. We must take what... Read more
While on holiday in Crete, myself and my friends Michael and Daniel began to admire the sparse mountainous landscape. We all agreed that it was aesthetically pleasing, but we all had different opinions concerning the degree of its aesthetic beauty. Michael suggested that the landscape was inferior to a forested mountain-range covered in thick pine forests. Daniel argued that Michael was incorrect because the Cretan landscape had a sparse beauty which was very appealing. He compared the heavily forested landscape of Michael's comparison to a ring with an enormous gaudy diamond, while the Cretan landscape had the minimalist, simplistic beauty of a ring with a smaller but more precious gem. I argued that Michael was mistaken in making this comparison to begin with. The Cretan landscape should not be compared to a landscape from a more temperate region of the world, because they were fundamentally different types of landscape. It is possible to compare the work of a oil-paints artist with those of another oil-paints artist, but not to the work of a pencil artist. Similarly it would be possible to compare the aesthetics of a forested mountain-range in Canadian to a similarly forested landscape in Europe, but the Canadian landscape could not be compared to a desert landscape, such as that of North Africa. Can a philosopher make sense of this discussion?
Charles Taliaferro
October 29, 2010
(changed October 29, 2010)
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Great case! I think that some of the best current thinking by a philosopher on these matters is being done by Allen Carlson and I believe he would side with you. Carlson identifies different models for natural aesthetics --one can, for example, single out a rock or tree of small form... Read more
Is religion merely a primitive form of science?
Charles Taliaferro
October 29, 2010
(changed October 29, 2010)
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Great question! It may seem quite odd to equate religion and science because the former involves so much more than science. In religious communities and traditions one finds a whole way of life, a set of values and rites that seem to go well beyond the kind of inquiry that make up th... Read more
Any thoughts on being for or against bullfighting?
Eddy Nahmias
October 28, 2010
(changed October 28, 2010)
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I am against needless animal suffering, such as factory farming, so I should probably be against bullfighting. But it offers an interesting test case for a purely utilitarian response to animal cruelty. Basically, utilitarians believe that an action is wrong if it leads to a net decrease i... Read more
Why do so many Anglo-American philosophy departments still prefer to teach ideas that depend on symbolic logic? Or in another light, why is so much contemporary philosophy in America still dedicated to analysis and ideals of "clarity" that depend on "higher order" languages?
Peter Smith
October 28, 2010
(changed October 28, 2010)
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I'm not sure what is meant by "prefer to teach ideas that depend on symbolic logic". Most departments teach e.g. aesthetics, political philosophy, the history of early modern philosophy, the philosophy of mind, and so on and so forth -- and symbolic logic features little if at all in those co... Read more
The issue of immortality is a tricky one, ethically speaking, since death has a stabilizing effect on our population and for everyone to be immortal would result in overcrowding and shortages far faster than would happen otherwise. However, if one were to look past the simple economics of immortality (say immortality is only possible for those who have no children, and that it implies permanent sterility), are there any other ethical problems related to it? What other ethical issues would crop up if we were to gain the ability to halt the aging process?
Allen Stairs
October 28, 2010
(changed October 28, 2010)
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It's a lovely question. Let me start by recommending a couple of things to read. One is Bernard Williams' classic paper "The Makropoulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality" (in his book Moral Luck.) Another is Larry Temkin's paper "Is Living Longer Living Better?" (in Journal of... Read more
It seems that many philosophers use the "socrates" argument to explain a simple deductive argument. This argument is P1: All men are mortal P2: Socrates is a man C: Therefore, Socrates is mortal. However, is this not begging the question because P1 assumes that Socrates is mortal?
Peter Smith
October 28, 2010
(changed October 28, 2010)
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In response to the original question. We might have general grounds for thinking that all men are mortal -- e.g. general beliefs about the structure of human beings and about the relevant biological laws -- which we accept on inductive grounds (in a broad sense of inductive) and where our su... Read more
I have been working on a theory of aesthetics and wished to have the input of someone more well versed in the philosophical literature. I have mostly centered upon music, as in: what makes one form of music, e.g. Classical, superior than another, e.g. Pop? Using Nietzsche's idea of genealogy, I determined that Rock and Roll could never be truly great art because of its development from slavery, much as Nietzsche attacked the Christian religion due to its association as a slave religion. The main quality that defines great art, I argue, is nobility. And this is a quality which servitude, or a spirit of art arising from servitude, cannot comprehend. Also, would it be possible to recommend reading that might aid me? Currently I am reading Hegel's Introductory Lectures in Aesthetics, and Kant's Critique of Judgment.
Jennifer Church
October 28, 2010
(changed October 28, 2010)
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You should look at Theodor Adorno's essay "Popular Music", for a controversial criticism of popular music by an important music critic and philosopher. Also, you should look at John Fischer's "High Art verus Low Art" for a careful analysis and criticism of this very distinction.... Read more
I believe we do something unethical by leading children to believe in a grossly simplified version of the world where right and wrong actions are clearly marked, and good and bad people similarly so. We tell them nothing of good intentions leading to evil actions through stupidity, the every day small compromises to our integrity and the submission to authority that people make every day at their jobs, etc. Do you agree that there is something unethical in this, and if so, are there any forums out there where this is voiced? Any books to recommend? Any remedy available?
Gordon Marino
October 28, 2010
(changed October 28, 2010)
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I don't know that I would come down with the same moral judgment that you do but I strongly agree that we do not do enough to prepare people for the ambiguities in life. And you are on the mark with your small compromises. One of the greatest impediments to the moral life is our "ability" t... Read more
Is identity determined by your physical appearance or something like a "soul"? If someone was to receive a brain transplant and be inside another body, would they really be the same person they were before even if they had the same thoughts, ideas, and memories? Would the new body with the same brain just be a fake duplicate?
Sean Greenberg
October 28, 2010
(changed October 28, 2010)
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This is a deep and interesting question, which goes to the heart of the topic of personal identity, and reflects a tradition that stretches back to John Locke's treatment of the topic in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. A preliminary note is in order, however: most contemporary t... Read more