Recent Responses
Do I have a moral/filial duty to love and respect one of my parents when they have committed a wrongdoing against the other parent? Do I have a moral right to feel outraged at this parent on behalf of the other parent, when this parent has only ever been a good and loving parent to me?
Eric Silverman
July 1, 2010
(changed July 1, 2010)
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One of the most useful relational skills that one can cultivate is the ability to have nuanced moral evaluations of people. Few individuals are complete saints or monsters. Instead most of us are complex and flawed, yet praiseworthy on at least some points. So, I would say that it is wisest to lov... Read more
I am firm believer that life human or animal should be preserved whenever possible. I would also like to believe that had I lived in Nazi Germany I would have stood up for the persecuted. So how can I reconcile my strong moral convictions with my inaction regarding the mass murder of animals everyday. Ironically enough I feel guilty for letting the law and the disappointment of my family stand in the way of stopping the massacre. This guilt is causing me great pain. Please enlighten me on what I should do.
Gordon Marino
July 24, 2010
(changed July 24, 2010)
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I suspect that at some level you do not really believe that the slaughter of animals is at quite the same level as the halocaust, though you seem to think you think that they are equivalent. There are pletny of evils in the world that we should be protesting but I 'm not sure that torturing yours... Read more
There is a general consensus that words are merely made up of arbitrary symbols and are thus themselves arbitrary symbols. I agree with the principle of this (the letter 's' is just a squiggly line...). But I have always held that words are "things" and not just symbols or shadows of thoughts. I suppose words simultaneously can be things and symbols just like any other material object--in fact this is partially why I argue that words are things. I can't fully articulate why I feel that words are things, and it seems reductive to merely designate words as the product of a complex system of signs and symbols which we all agree to. Are there any philosophical works (as opposed to linguistic) that examine this subject at length? Thank You.
Alexander George
July 1, 2010
(changed July 1, 2010)
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Words are made up of arbitrary symbols, letters. I don't see that that threatens the "thingness" of words. We can construct things out of any arbitrarily chosen objects, can't we? The difficult word here, I think, is rather "thing". What qualifies something to be an object? Many people find... Read more
Let's say there is some activity that your significant other wants to do together (going to the movies/opera/a sports event, or any number of things). You, personally, have a neutral attitude towards this particular activity, i.e., the activity itself doesn't give you any particular pleasure/happiness/utility in and of itself. However, you know that this activity DOES have intrinsic value to your significant other; they would be happy doing it in and of itself. However, you also know that they are not willing to do this activity unless a) you are willing to do it with them, and b) you are also getting pleasure out of it (they wouldn't want to do it if they knew that you were only doing it "for them"). My question is this: in this sort of situation, is it better to lie and say that it makes you happy, so that they will do this activity which gives them happiness, because you want them to be happy, or should you instead tell the truth on the principle that you shouldn't lie, especially not to your significant other?
Gordon Marino
July 3, 2010
(changed July 3, 2010)
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I would go with "I'm going to try and learn to enjoy this"- and since you are willing to do that (without whining) your significant other could make the effort to enjoy herself still knowing that this activity does not mean the same to you as it does to her. A little effort on both sides is require... Read more
If God exists, and wants to be known, how is it possible that some open-minded people don't believe in God? In my case, if God existed, I would want to know. Is a theist committed to saying that either I don't really want to know of God's existence, or that God doesn't really want me to know?
Eric Silverman
June 29, 2010
(changed June 29, 2010)
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I suppose there are sophisticated theologies that would take either of the options you suggest. Yet I think a third position is possible. Someone could claim that 'being open-minded' is a necessary but not sufficient condition for discovering God's existence. Perhaps, it requires some more aggre... Read more
Is the death penalty a viable option under the premise that assuming we have apprehended the guilty party, the guilty party, when executed, will never be able to kill again and therefore society has been made that much safer?
Eric Silverman
June 29, 2010
(changed June 29, 2010)
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I think that the problem with that argument is that we can get nearly the same level of safety by sending the killer to jail for life. And given the imperfections of the justice system, there's a chance that we could execute an innocent person which is much worse than sending an innocent person... Read more
Is it morally wrong for a person with a serious illness and reduced lifespan to reproduce, knowing that in all likelihood the child will have to experience the loss of a parent in adolescence? Assume that the other parent is healthy and prepared for life as a single parent. Can the reproduction be morally justified on the basis of it being less of a wrong to bring into existence a child who will likely lose a parent early on than for one person to deny the other the opportunity of experiencing parenthood? Obviously we are talking about two different recipients of potential harm here but I am focusing on the idea of a general moral wrong. i.e. which is the greater wrong?
Jean Kazez
July 1, 2010
(changed July 1, 2010)
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You ask whether it's "less wrong" to create the child than for one adult to deny the other the chance of parenthood. That makes it sound as if the only possible wrong on the adults' side is the willing adult being denied parenthood. Wouldn't it also be wrong for the unwilling adult to be forced into... Read more
We have no evidence whatsoever that the world will not wink out of existence tomorrow, or the day after that, or some other time in the future. Even if it doesn't, we accept that we may all die at any time, even if the chance of it is low for someone young and healthy who doesn't take many risks. Isn't it logical to live each day as if it may be our last? It would not be conducive to the running of a functional society, but nuts to that. One could argue that we must weigh the probability of death or non-existence in the near future and enjoying the present against the probability of it at a much later date and the value of planning and laying the groundwork for things to come. The problem is that it is impossible to compute these probabilities. We can attempt to guess at them, but we are very likely to underestimate the probability of death thanks to the "Black Swan" problem.
Amy Kind
June 29, 2010
(changed June 29, 2010)
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Suppose you just bought a lottery ticket for a drawing tonight. There's not much chance that you'll win, but you could. There is a chance. So would it be rational for you to act, right now, as if you're going to win? Obviously not.
Likewise, it doesn't seem rational for you to act, right now, as i... Read more
I am going under anesthesia in about a month. Once it is administered and I am unconscious, how do I know that the person who wakes up will be me and not a doppelganger with my memories? In other words, how do I know my stream of consciousness will continue after a period of unconsciousness instead of a distinct stream of consciousness starting for the first time?
Amy Kind
June 29, 2010
(changed June 29, 2010)
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The prospect of going under anesthesia is a scary one, for all sorts of reasons. But I don't think you should have much cause to worry about identity issues. I have two comments that might help alleviate your concerns.
First, you might ask yourself: What would be the difference between its being yo... Read more
My question concerns the 20th Century doctrine of "logical postivism" and its apparent refutation. Its distinction between analytic and synthetic statements seems to me straight forward and an important one. Wittgenstein's quote seems appropriate: "On what cannot be spoken of one must remain silent." I understand that logical positivism has been successfully refuted by Quine and others. I cannot grasp that refutation. One of those arguments seems to be the "indeterminacy of translation"); an argument I understand and accept. I also understand that ALL language has different connotations to different people. However, it seems impossible to make an understandable "synthetic" statement about metaphysics. That is, if we cannot verify the existence of something empirically, such as a concept (God, for instance), we cannot come to any agreement about it. In other words what I find valuable about logical positivism, as a materialist, is that metaphysics is simply speculation and cannot be understood similarly across a human population. It has is some way, "no cognitive content" that we can grab hold of and evaluate. It seems to be indeed, what logical positivists called it: "non" sense. The practical result from this appears to me that we can debate claims like the the "moon is made of cream cheese" or that "Washington crossed the Potomac" by means of bringing scientific and historical evidence in favor or not if favor of the proposition. However, the claim that "God wants us to be happy" is a claim without any meaning. Consequently, nonsense. Is it not true that there is a difference in "kind" between those two statements? I certainly see a difference. Now, is it the case that the refutation is only about "language" and not about the "real world." If so, I understand that language only approximates, or pictures reality and is not reality itself. But that's true of ALL statements in language. ??? Thank you.
Alexander George
June 29, 2010
(changed June 29, 2010)
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Yes, many of the logical positivists drew a sharp line between analytic truths and synthetic ones, respectively, those that owe their truth merely to the rules of language that determine meaning and those that also owe their truth to how the world is. The distinction seems to turn on acknowle... Read more