Recent Responses
Is a "slippery slope" argument the same as a reductio ad absurdum?
Nicholas D. Smith
June 3, 2010
(changed June 3, 2010)
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No, they're not the same. A "slippery slope" argument is one that tries to show that attempting to make a determination about one sort of case will "slide" into another case very like it, and then another very like that one, and so on, until we reach a point where we are no longer willing to e... Read more
Is there anything of value philosophically in the contentious politics of the day?
Eddy Nahmias
June 3, 2010
(changed June 3, 2010)
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Sure! On the one hand, you see people presenting some strong arguments for competing political philosophies and different moral values, and ideally we get to vote based on a more informed understanding of these competing views, to the extent that different candidates (or referendums or amendments)... Read more
I suggested to a friend that atheists and theists were rather similar, in that they take a position on god's existence ahead of time and argue it dogmatically, whereas philosophers are willing to evaluate the arguments and to tentatively adopt the one that they prefer for whatever reason. It's not to say that philosophers can't have a deep faith in a god or a lack thereof, but they don't see their work as defending that belief in the face of any possible objection. But if this is true, and I think it is, how about someone who refuses to budge from what seem like moral truisms? Must a philosopher, in order to maintain integrity, put every principle on the chopping block: that if it's wrong for you to do something, all else equal, it's wrong for me to do it, or that causing people pain is wrong? Must a philosopher at least be open to the possibility that these notions are fundamentally flawed?
Charles Taliaferro
June 19, 2010
(changed June 19, 2010)
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I agree with the two other replies, that neither theists nor atheists need be dogmatic. I would, however, like to offer a brief word on behalf of certain convictions that one seems to know (with or without argument) and such convictions are beyond negotiation. For example, I think all of u... Read more
I suggested to a friend that atheists and theists were rather similar, in that they take a position on god's existence ahead of time and argue it dogmatically, whereas philosophers are willing to evaluate the arguments and to tentatively adopt the one that they prefer for whatever reason. It's not to say that philosophers can't have a deep faith in a god or a lack thereof, but they don't see their work as defending that belief in the face of any possible objection. But if this is true, and I think it is, how about someone who refuses to budge from what seem like moral truisms? Must a philosopher, in order to maintain integrity, put every principle on the chopping block: that if it's wrong for you to do something, all else equal, it's wrong for me to do it, or that causing people pain is wrong? Must a philosopher at least be open to the possibility that these notions are fundamentally flawed?
Charles Taliaferro
June 19, 2010
(changed June 19, 2010)
Permalink
I agree with the two other replies, that neither theists nor atheists need be dogmatic. I would, however, like to offer a brief word on behalf of certain convictions that one seems to know (with or without argument) and such convictions are beyond negotiation. For example, I think all of u... Read more
I'm really struggling to comprehend soft determinism/compatibilism. How can free will be compatible with determinism? Surely by definition, they both necessitate exclusivity to each other?
Jonathan Westphal
June 3, 2010
(changed June 3, 2010)
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Here is a side note to your question. Soft determinism consists of two propositions: (1) the the thesis that determinism is true; (2) that it is compatible with freedom. Compatibilism on the other hand is merely (2). So soft determinism includes compatibilism, but there is more to it. I am a co... Read more
Hello, do you think experiences of the world are structured by gender? If you have read Young's 'Throwing Like a Girl,' that is what I'm getting at.
Miriam Solomon
June 3, 2010
(changed June 3, 2010)
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Iris Young's "Throwing Like a Girl" is a wonderful description of gendered experience. Our experiences of the world are influenced by many factors that have to do with our positions in the world, both our physical positions (biological sex, physical disabilities) and our political positions (race... Read more
I'm really struggling to comprehend soft determinism/compatibilism. How can free will be compatible with determinism? Surely by definition, they both necessitate exclusivity to each other?
Jonathan Westphal
June 3, 2010
(changed June 3, 2010)
Permalink
Here is a side note to your question. Soft determinism consists of two propositions: (1) the the thesis that determinism is true; (2) that it is compatible with freedom. Compatibilism on the other hand is merely (2). So soft determinism includes compatibilism, but there is more to it. I am a co... Read more
Do Catholic hospitals have a right not to perform abortions?
Richard Heck
June 4, 2010
(changed June 4, 2010)
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Just a brief comment, which is that, even if one always does have a moral right not to do things one regards as morally objectionable, it does not follow that one has a legal or political right to do so, i.e., that one cannot legitimately face legal consequences for not doing so. It is fairly easy t... Read more
I am interested in the philosophical implications of the two competing views of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. It is often contended that an "individualist" view of what equal protection requires can't explain why only classifications based on race or sex require "heightened scrutiny," instead of the ordinary rational basis test. In some sense, this objection seems dead on. If what equal protection prohibits is the use of morally invidious classifications by state actors then certainly race and sex can't be the only two that we ought to be concerned about. On the other hand, it seems like the "hierarchical" view is fraught with similarly serious problems. Who counts, nowadays, as a "discrete, insular minority" that equal protection ought to help? Does the fact that women are a majority mean that they should not benefit from heightened scrutiny, but men should? Or, if "discrete, insular minority" is just short-hand for politically handi-capped, how do we know how politically handi-capped a group must be to qualify? I understand that this question is rooted in Constitutional Law, but I would appreciate a response exploring what the competing views logically require, as opposed to how they have developed in our case law. Thanks! Best, Sam
Kalynne Pudner
May 30, 2010
(changed May 30, 2010)
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While it doesn't address the Equal Protection clause specifically, Tom Nagel's "A Defense of Affirmative Action" comes to mind here. It isn't so much the "minority" as the "insular" that calls for heightened scrutiny or preferential treatment. Nagel argues that a pervasive, deeply-rooted percept... Read more
Does the "ethics of care" have a special relationship with Feminism? It seems that Feminism can be justified under lots of ethical theories. A Utilitarian could argue that since women experience pain and pleasure, their welfare should be factored into our felicific calculus. A Deontologist could argue that women have rights, and it is wrong to violate those rights. So what makes the ethics of care a more Feminist theory than other moral theories, like Utilitarianism and Deontology?
Kalynne Pudner
May 29, 2010
(changed May 29, 2010)
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To expand a little on Charles' answer, some theorists draw careful distinctions between "ethics of care," "feminine ethics" and "feminist ethics." An ethics of care is one in which the locus of moral goodness is in relationship; as such its emphasis is on particular, embodied individuals in concr... Read more