Recent Responses

Is prostitution immoral? Can we not think of it as a kind of industry where service (i.e., sex) is given and received while both parties involved benefit?

Thomas Pogge May 27, 2010 (changed May 27, 2010) Permalink Even if both parties benefit from the transaction (relative to the baseline where they do not interact), the transaction can still be immoral. An extreme example would be a mother in Cambodia who works as a prostitute to feed her children. She prefers serving the customer and receiving the money ove... Read more

Could someone elaborate on Nietzsche criticism of shame. In particular when he says 'What is most human about you? - To spare someone shame." I recognize the connection between this, and the falling tightrope walker in the part one of _Thus Spoke Zarathustra_, and that he falls because the buffoon shames him. I conclude from this that Nietzsche means to shame someone is to point them away from the path towards the overman. This, coupled with his belief that admitting you are wrong, even when you are right, is a good thing, leads to the idea that humouring someone, allowing them to persist in false ideas, which could do them harm, is the good thing to do. Does he mean then that we shouldn't correct people in their mistakes for fear of shaming them? This seems at odds with the purpose and practice of philosophy.

Lisa Cassidy May 27, 2010 (changed May 27, 2010) Permalink Dear Friend, You have pointed out perhaps my most favorite Nietzsche quote. It's from The Gay Science: "What do you consider the most humane? - To spare someone shame. What is the seal of liberation? - To no longer be ashamed in front of oneself." I have told many people, including my students, that... Read more

How do you know when you are in love?

Peter Smith May 29, 2010 (changed May 29, 2010) Permalink As I've noted here before, we should surely distinguish loving someone from being in love with them. I might delight in the "sheer goodness and well being of" my daughter, miss her presence, especially when I'm feeling low -- that's evidence of love, but not of being in love. It is only too easy to... Read more

Why should one be moral? Regardless of what ethical system is correct (if there are any), I haven't come across an adequate explanation for why one should act in a morally virtuous manner. It seems to me that though almost all ethical theories implicitly claim that one should always act moral if possible, there is never an explanation why. If one were to claim that acting in a morally virtuous manner will likely improve the satisfaction/happiness/etc. in your life, then it seems that this pragmatic reasoning can allow for someone to act in a morally vicious manner (as long as they are happy). Ultimately, it appears that what I am asking is the following: what reason will I have to value moral obligations over my own desires and satisfactions? Is it even sensible to ask such a question? An analogy can be made with the value of reason: if you have no goal in knowing the truth, valuing reason in that regard will be pointless. So what goal would correspond to morality (if that makes sense)?

Charles Taliaferro May 27, 2010 (changed May 27, 2010) Permalink Good question(s). A range of philosophers have sought to argue that one should be moral out of self-interest. Some philosophers who argue that morality must lead to fulfillment (the virtuous should be happy) combine their ethics with a moral argument for God. Kant thought that for morality... Read more

Is it ok to kill ants for fun.

Oliver Leaman June 4, 2010 (changed June 4, 2010) Permalink I think there is a difference between saying that all that matters is pleasure and pain, and thinking that pleasure and pain is a good place to start when looking at such issues. If it is an open question whether ants feel pain, then we should not kill them, if that might hurt them, it seems to me.... Read more

A friend told me about a philosophical paper he read. The author of this paper claimed that moral truths are necessary. "If pain is bad", he said, "it is necessarily bad". I assume that something being necessary means that we cannot imagine a possible situation where it does not happen. But can we not imagine situations where pain wouldn't be morally bad? Imagine a planet whose inhabitants can feel pain only in very special situations (they have other kinds of suffering). They feel pain only when they communicate with each other. And causing pain is the only way they have to communicate with each other. Different kinds of pain work as words that they combine to build (painful) sentences. Would you say that pain is bad in such a planet? I guess we should say that causing pain without having something relevant to "say" is bad, but not that pain is bad in general. What do you think?

Charles Taliaferro May 27, 2010 (changed May 27, 2010) Permalink Interesting! Your example still seems to support the thesis that pain is necessarily bad, though you have offered a clever example of when it might be good to endure that which is bad. Perhaps the original claim, then, is false if it is understood as: If pain is bad, then, necessarily, it is... Read more

I recently had an argument in an epistemology class about the relationship between facts and human minds. I argued that a fact cannot exist until a human mind knows it. Most of the rest of the class (and the professor) argued that facts can exist independently of human minds. My professor's example: Every human being believes that the world is flat, when it is in fact round. I argued that the fact that the world is round did not exist until someone thought it. Can a fact exist without a human mind?

Charles Taliaferro May 27, 2010 (changed May 27, 2010) Permalink You are adopting a pretty radical position, for it seems like common sense for us to recognize as facts (or truths or as actual states of affairs) all sorts of things quite independent of human minds. Most of us would want to say (for example) that it was true that there was life long before... Read more

I recently had a conversation with a friend who is convinced that morality is simply a human invention, no more than a system of social conventions developed to ensure social stability and ultimately the propagation of the human species. Do you agree? If not, can you outline any arguments for morality being something more than just social convention? For example, are there any arguments for morality as something independent of humans, something which exists objectively, "out there", and does not depend for its existence on our conceptions of it, or our development of its principles?

Charles Taliaferro May 27, 2010 (changed May 27, 2010) Permalink No, I do not think that morality is only a matter of social conventions, no more so than sickness or health. It seems to be an objective (and perhaps even common sense) fact that cancer is bad for a human being, and I think we may similarly see that rape is a wrongful violation of a person.... Read more

I was trying to explain Wittgenstein to a friend using the "if a tree falls in the woods..." question. I suggested that it depends entirely on what you refer to as "sound": vibration or sensation. The person I was talking with insisted that no, only a narcissist would assume it wouldn't make a sound just because there is nobody there to hear it. What about the birds, he asked. First of all, is my use of the tree falling conundrum an appropriate way to introduce someone to Wittgenstein? Was I perverting Philosophical Investigations? What would have been a better way to get across the importance of Wittgenstein in this case?

Andrew Pessin May 27, 2010 (changed May 27, 2010) Permalink I can't answer wrt Wittgenstein in this case -- I don't know his specific views here -- but the general question IS an old one, and received some very provocative treatements in the early modern period (esp 17th-18th century, esp. in the work of the Idealist George Berkeley) -- I'll merely answer t... Read more

Do Catholic hospitals have a right not to perform abortions?

Richard Heck June 4, 2010 (changed June 4, 2010) Permalink Just a brief comment, which is that, even if one always does have a moral right not to do things one regards as morally objectionable, it does not follow that one has a legal or political right to do so, i.e., that one cannot legitimately face legal consequences for not doing so. It is fairly easy t... Read more

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