Recent Responses
Hello, If someone proposes an idea, an idea that cannot be objectively proven in no way, as fact, and I ask them what is their education and credentials for them to speak with authority on the subject, could that be considered a fallacy on my part? More specifically is it an appeal to authority?
Allen Stairs
February 11, 2010
(changed February 11, 2010)
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No fallacy that I can see. People have a striking tendency to give their own casual and uniformed opinions a lot more weight than they deserve. Asking someone whether there's good reason to believe what they're saying is perfectly appropriate, though doing it too bluntly may not be the be... Read more
Presuppositional apologetics arguments attempts to show the logical inconsistencies in non-Christian world views. Is it not the case that, by beginning with the the presupposition that the Christian world view and the bible are the absolute truth, thereby beginning with the desired conclusion as part of the premise, this form of apologetics commits the fallacy of circular reasoning or begging the question?
Allen Stairs
February 11, 2010
(changed February 11, 2010)
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Not necessarily. On the one hand, if a world view disagrees with Christianity, then it's obviously inconsistent with Christianity. However, it need not be internally inconsistent. And if it is internally inconsistent, then this can be shown without assuming Christianity.
A bit more general... Read more
Is it immoral for a person in a rich country to adopt a child from a very poor country, while the parents are still alive. Often, the parents in poor countries will beg rich people to take their children, so consent is not an issue.
Eddy Nahmias
February 11, 2010
(changed February 11, 2010)
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Since your question is so timely, given the arrest of the missionaries in Haiti who were illegally taking 33 children out of the country, the first thing to point out is that it might be immoral to adopt such children, even with parental consent, if the adoption was made possible by action... Read more
Why are parents said to have the right to teach their children whatever they want? What are the underlying philosophical justifications and explanations for this right?
Andrew N. Carpenter
February 9, 2010
(changed February 9, 2010)
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I don't know of any society where parents can teach their children whatever they want without regard to laws and social norms. With respect to laws, for example, a parent could not teach a child that it was okay to act out sexually in a way that the law would regard as involving inces... Read more
Has philosophy really been transformed into petty qualms about semantics? I haven't been studying it for very long, but a lot of recent talk has led me to believe that 1.) Philosophy is pretty much completely analytic now, and 2.) Analytic philosophy might as well be called 'rigorous linguistics'. I've learned that there are even philosophers who believe that all philosophy can do is help us clarify what we already know, and it *should* just be rigorous linguistics (Ayer, Wittgenstein, Russell). I thought (and would still like to believe) philosophy was about finding the truth, not narrowing the scope of what could potentially be solved...until there is nothing left but the sentence itself! I totally understand that it is necessary to clarify propositions and arguments before they can be given their deserving assessments, but I'm worried that philosophy has become some kind of unrecognisable monster that will never revert back into truth-finding and reality-understanding. I want to major in philosophy, but what am I getting myself into? Should I be worried? Can you quell my fears? A million thank you's.
Eric Silverman
February 4, 2010
(changed February 4, 2010)
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Wow, there is quite a lot in your question here. First, I think it is true that a broadly 'analytic' approach is probably dominant in the English speaking world, but I wouldn't say that all of philosophy is 'analytic'. Also, I don't think that the broadly analytic approach is reducible to... Read more
I go to church regularly and say things I don't believe. I justify this by saying that it's necessary to support an institution that I believe does more good than harm and that the usefulness of a statement is more important than its truth. I think my grounds are utilitarian and pragmatic, and do not share the vulnerability, among skeptics, of belief in the statements. I am satisfied with my justification until I am asked to teach a seventh-grade Sunday School class. If I decline I leave it to somebody else, maybe as much a skeptic as I am, to give the support I want given. I can't do that, and don't expect a philosopher to give me a justification for it. If I accept the job I do the things that make me ask for help from a philosopher. My question: How I can avoid harm, and if I can't will I do enough to tip the utilitarian balance and remove me from the church? As I see it, I risk doing three kinds of harm. First, pedagogical harm. I will be teaching credulousness. They can't believe what I say (or repeat from the Nicene Creed) without suspending the tests for belief they know, or will soon learn, in general science. I, with the authority they still grant adults, will be teaching them "readiness to believe." Second, the harm this leads to, civic harm. My church is in the Midwest, the Heartland, where the electorate’s readiness to believe President Bush’s statements about threats from Iraq had such dire consequences. I had to ask whether it was a coincidence that the region labeled by some British periodical (I think it was The Economist) “Jesus Land” after the election was also the region that carried Bush to victory for a second term. With all the other harm credulousness has done to nations (pogroms, etc.) I really shouldn't need the Iraq example to make me sensitive to it, but there it is, close to home. Third, linguistic harm, the least clear to me but maybe the most important. I do this harm when I try to avoid the harm above by teaching my seventh-graders the non-literal ways of reading that skeptics attending the service upstairs use. I see it coming out like this: "There are ways to take these words, children, and ways you can use them to each other. The expression A doesn’t have to mean A and B doesn’t have to mean B. And C, that’s best left vague. Forget giving it a referent. You can be adult about this." It seems to me I am teaching linguistic misbehavior, and I feel supported in my discomfort by what I remember J. L. Austin (I was a philosophy minor) calling the double performer: a backstage artiste. (HTDTWW, p. 11) So there's my pain: I teach my thirteen-year-olds to be credulous dunces or I teach them to be backstage artistes. Is there consolation in philosophy? Ohio English Teacher
Jean Kazez
February 4, 2010
(changed February 4, 2010)
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I have struggled with similar dilemmas, as a non-believing member of a Jewish religious congregation. It looks like you have four options--(1) leave the church entirely, (2) teach in the normal fashion, (3) teach non-literally, and (4) remain in the church but don't teach.
You've made up you... Read more
How can someone know that a question has an answer before knowing what the answer is? Or more specifically how is it possible that someone can place parameters on the possible answer faster than they can produce that answer?
Lisa Cassidy
February 3, 2010
(changed February 3, 2010)
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This is a very nice question because what you are asking speaks to the heart of all inquiry, not just philosophical: How will I know I have the answer to a question if I truly don't know what the answer is?The logician might say you are asking about the difference between testing for local s... Read more
If we turn up to spectate a sport for instance a football match is the outcome of the game any different to what it would have been, had we not been there?
Eddy Nahmias
February 3, 2010
(changed February 3, 2010)
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Alas, probably not, especially if (a) the crowd is very large and (b) your seat would have been filled by another fan, especially if (c) that fan would have been cheering for your team and about as loudly as you. But even if a-c are not true, it's not clear how much the cheering of the fans... Read more
Consider the following scenario: I am very good at doing analytic philosophy (though I am not a genius by any means), specially analytic metaphysics, but not limited to that field. I am well acquainted with the literature on the subject, I have an excellent grasp of the arguments and am pretty good at suggesting objections or proposing new arguments (or variations of old ones). Also, I have a pretty good command of the relevant technical material, that is, classical logic, modal logic, mereology and set theory, etc. Suppose I am capable of original and rigorous work. Suppose I profoundly dislike being taught in a university but have a fine time debating with (competent) professors, visiting lecturers and students (outside of the lectures), who, if asked, will acknowledge my philosophical ability. However, since I am not fond of the academy (as a student), I do not have any degrees. Suppose I am still young so I haven't published anything but I have plenty of ideas which, with a little work, might make it into publishable papers. Suppose I don't mind lecturing at all, and devote all my spare time to research. My question is this. Is there no hope for me to become an academic philosopher? That is, is there any possibility that I can devote myself professionally to lecturing and researching within academic circles? Do journals even publish such outsiders? (In theory the editorial board should review anonymous submissions, so no such personal information should be relevant in the process, but I don't know how it goes in practice). I know that people like Raymond Smullyan were unconfortable with "business as usual" as well in the academy but were, in time, able to become accepted in the fold. It may seem inconsistent to dislike the bureacracy and regulations of university life (as a student), yet have some strong desires to be in the academy, however two things may be said with regards to the scenario. The first is that I have a profound passion for the subject as well as a strong wish to contribute research, the second is that a philosopher also needs to have some financial stablity. I want to briefly clarify that I am passionate about analytic philosophy but am trapped in a country were most professors are only interested in Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida and the like (I hope this doesn't ruffle some feathers, I don't mean to offend anyone). I hope my question doesn't strike you as pretentious or wholly misguided. I think the culture of credentialism is profoundly pernicious, though that is a subject for another question. Thanks.
Andrew N. Carpenter
February 1, 2010
(changed February 1, 2010)
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I think that Allen gives some good practical advice and that Eric discusses well some important bureaucratic/administrative challenges that you would face even if the strategy that Allen lays out went swimmingly. My answer, however, builds on a point that Oliver made.
First, I agree... Read more
Consider the following scenario: I am very good at doing analytic philosophy (though I am not a genius by any means), specially analytic metaphysics, but not limited to that field. I am well acquainted with the literature on the subject, I have an excellent grasp of the arguments and am pretty good at suggesting objections or proposing new arguments (or variations of old ones). Also, I have a pretty good command of the relevant technical material, that is, classical logic, modal logic, mereology and set theory, etc. Suppose I am capable of original and rigorous work. Suppose I profoundly dislike being taught in a university but have a fine time debating with (competent) professors, visiting lecturers and students (outside of the lectures), who, if asked, will acknowledge my philosophical ability. However, since I am not fond of the academy (as a student), I do not have any degrees. Suppose I am still young so I haven't published anything but I have plenty of ideas which, with a little work, might make it into publishable papers. Suppose I don't mind lecturing at all, and devote all my spare time to research. My question is this. Is there no hope for me to become an academic philosopher? That is, is there any possibility that I can devote myself professionally to lecturing and researching within academic circles? Do journals even publish such outsiders? (In theory the editorial board should review anonymous submissions, so no such personal information should be relevant in the process, but I don't know how it goes in practice). I know that people like Raymond Smullyan were unconfortable with "business as usual" as well in the academy but were, in time, able to become accepted in the fold. It may seem inconsistent to dislike the bureacracy and regulations of university life (as a student), yet have some strong desires to be in the academy, however two things may be said with regards to the scenario. The first is that I have a profound passion for the subject as well as a strong wish to contribute research, the second is that a philosopher also needs to have some financial stablity. I want to briefly clarify that I am passionate about analytic philosophy but am trapped in a country were most professors are only interested in Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida and the like (I hope this doesn't ruffle some feathers, I don't mean to offend anyone). I hope my question doesn't strike you as pretentious or wholly misguided. I think the culture of credentialism is profoundly pernicious, though that is a subject for another question. Thanks.
Andrew N. Carpenter
February 1, 2010
(changed February 1, 2010)
Permalink
I think that Allen gives some good practical advice and that Eric discusses well some important bureaucratic/administrative challenges that you would face even if the strategy that Allen lays out went swimmingly. My answer, however, builds on a point that Oliver made.
First, I agree... Read more