Recent Responses
I'm puzzled whenever people say things such as, "I have a high tolerance for pain." How would you ever know whether your "tolerance" for pain were actually a form of insensitivity? In other words, what's the (externally observable) difference between being able to tolerate or endure pain and simply not *feeling* pain? Maybe that guy who seems admirably tough and strong-willed actually just lacks the capacity for really powerful sensations. We talk almost as though there are two parts of a person: one part which feels the pain, and another which resists.
Jennifer Church
January 25, 2010
(changed January 25, 2010)
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Compare the case of pain to the heat of spicy curries or steamy saunas: I recognize certain green curries to be just as hot/spicy as certain red curries, but I have a higher tolerance for the heat/spicyness of green curries; and I can tolerate steamy saunas better than in dry saunas even... Read more
Often times, a common argument offered to stop people from complaining about their problems is to tell them to "be thankful for what they have and not complain too much". This can be quite irritating and annoying to a person that hasn't really found life to be all that enjoyable. Firstly, no one has asked for them to be brought into the world. As much as it seems hard to function in a world without a clear purpose or a sense of meaning, the thought of having to be 'thankful' for being alive, is hard to arise, perhaps even offensive when times are tough? How does one deal with this dilemma? Does the evaluation of life always have to be relative to other less fortunate beings in the world in order to feel better about one's situation?
Oliver Leaman
January 24, 2010
(changed January 24, 2010)
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There is a discussion of this issue in rabbinic Judaism, whether it is better to have been born, suffer and then die, or to never have been born at all. The answer they come to is that the latter is preferable, but since we are alive, we might as well behave well. From a secular point of vi... Read more
The intolerable earthquake in Haiti that took thousands of lives brings up an important question: What obligations do we owe to other people? Virtually all of us believe that, when no comparable sacrifice is required, we have a moral duty to help those we encounter in dire need. If one were to let a child drown he would be unanimously regarded as a morally reprehensible individual, yet those who do precisely the same thing when they ignore the plights of those in distant countries are not viewed negatively by many. How can we account for this inconsistency? What are we morally obligated to do to help those in Haiti?
Oliver Leaman
January 24, 2010
(changed January 24, 2010)
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I wonder why you think that those outside Haiti who ignore the disaster there are letting harm happen which they could otherwise prevent. They might think that aid can do no good, they might think that they are better to give money to causes they genuinely understand and can supervise more... Read more
I find the philosophy of religion immensely interesting. Recently I watched a YouTube video in which a well known Christian philosopher/theologian, William Lane Craig, explained how the Anglo-American world had been "utterly transformed" and had undergone a "renaissance of Christian philosophy" since the 1960s (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=902MJirWkdM&feature=related [starts at around the 7:40 mark]). Do you agree with these statements? Moreover, how well respected is Dr. Craig? Is he generally viewed as a top notch philosopher? I also wonder whether the very best arguments on the atheistic side are really being discussed. It seems there is some disdain among philosophers regarding the so-called "new atheists": Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, etc. Who are the top contemporary atheists working in philosophy today? I'd really be interested in reading some of their work. I would really appreciate multiple perspectives on these questions. Thanks a lot.
Charles Taliaferro
June 19, 2010
(changed June 19, 2010)
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PS to the last positing. Here are just some of the theists who are active in the UK or are recently retired, who have impecable credentials philosophically:Oxford: Daniel Robinson, Brian Leftow, Tim Mawson, Brian Davies (now at Fordham), Keith Ward (now in London but formerly Christ Church)... Read more
What is emotional suffering? I know that I feel that I suffer, but in what sense am I suffering? I cannot place anywhere, the source of emotional suffering in any causal terms from the external world. The external world can bring me physical pain through physical action, but it seems absurd to think that external objects can also cause emotional pain. Does this mean that emotional suffering is generated from within me? Am I the cause of my own suffering? If so, does this mean that one can choose not to suffer?
Allen Stairs
January 21, 2010
(changed January 21, 2010)
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Saying just what emotional suffering amounts to wouldn't be easy, but there may be no need. Even if we find it hard to spell out what it is, all of us know emotional suffering from the inside. Some emotional suffering may be internally generated -- endogenous, as it's sometimes put -- but wh... Read more
I find the philosophy of religion immensely interesting. Recently I watched a YouTube video in which a well known Christian philosopher/theologian, William Lane Craig, explained how the Anglo-American world had been "utterly transformed" and had undergone a "renaissance of Christian philosophy" since the 1960s (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=902MJirWkdM&feature=related [starts at around the 7:40 mark]). Do you agree with these statements? Moreover, how well respected is Dr. Craig? Is he generally viewed as a top notch philosopher? I also wonder whether the very best arguments on the atheistic side are really being discussed. It seems there is some disdain among philosophers regarding the so-called "new atheists": Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, etc. Who are the top contemporary atheists working in philosophy today? I'd really be interested in reading some of their work. I would really appreciate multiple perspectives on these questions. Thanks a lot.
Charles Taliaferro
June 19, 2010
(changed June 19, 2010)
Permalink
PS to the last positing. Here are just some of the theists who are active in the UK or are recently retired, who have impecable credentials philosophically:Oxford: Daniel Robinson, Brian Leftow, Tim Mawson, Brian Davies (now at Fordham), Keith Ward (now in London but formerly Christ Church)... Read more
What makes conspiracy theories improbable?
Andrew N. Carpenter
January 18, 2010
(changed January 18, 2010)
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I think the more interesting question is what makes wildlyimplausible conspiracy theories seem plausible to so many. I think that part ofthe problem is that it takes some specialized training to be able to compute probabilitiesaccurately, and most without that training tend to overest... Read more
I find George Berkley an insightful philosopher in many ways. One puzzle I have is over his view of time as 'the succession of ideas'. Would he contend that our calendar and daily clock times are due to both God's direct imprinting of sensory ideas according to regular natural laws on our minds, and making the structure of human minds similar in their receiving of those perceptions/ideas? (We all receive ideas at the same basic rate). Also, when we dream or people are in a coma, do perceptions somehow continue unabated in our minds?
Donald Baxter
January 15, 2010
(changed January 15, 2010)
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Berkeley's view of time as the succession of one's ideas is indeed very puzzling. Berkeley seems committed to the claim that there is no common time; there is just time for you and time for me, etc. God does give each of us successions of ideas that can be roughly coordinated, just as you s... Read more
Hello. How do you prove that a certain logical fallacy is a fallacy indeed? Are there "fallacies" about which there is a controversy if it is a fallacy or not? And if in the future, a new fallacy will be discovered, what will be the outline of the proof that one will have to use to prove that it exists? (Just an application of the first question.)
Nicholas D. Smith
January 14, 2010
(changed January 14, 2010)
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From the point of view of deductive logic, your question is very easily answered: a fallacy is an argument form in which the premises may all be true, but the conclusion false. To prove this, one provides what is called a "counterexample," which is simply a substitution instance that h... Read more
I think that in cases of horrific crimes, the death penalty is acceptable, or even required by retributive justice. However, I think this only applies to cases where there is absolutely no room for doubt. I also think that there really are such cases where there is 100% certainty e.g. the perpetrator was seen by many witnesses and confesses, plus as much additional evidence as you need. Unfortunately, if we only make convictions where we have the luxury of this certainty, we set the bar too high, and many guilty people escape conviction. Inevitably, under any reasonable judicial system there will be people charged for crimes they didn’t commit. But when you are charged with a crime, you are thereby unequivocally guilty, and there’s no way of charging someone with being guilty with the qualification, “he might not have done it” and another “he’s guilty of the crime and there’s no doubt”. In the eyes of the law, a guilty verdict is definitive; you did it, end of story. Is there a problem with this either/or approach nature of being charged? Shouldn’t the law recognise that someone is viewed as guilty on the basis of a balance of probability and not, or not always, because the truth has been uncovered as to guilt and innocence? A related problem is that maybe the situations in which there’s 100% certainty are those in which “everyone knows who did it” but there’s no code we can lay down to specify when those situations will occur, you just know it when you see it, kind of thing. But it seems bizarre that we can all clearly recognise cases in which the guilt of a person is not in question, but not be able to use capital punishment just in those cases without risking innocent people being treated in this way.
Thomas Pogge
January 14, 2010
(changed January 14, 2010)
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You make two good points. On the first, re death penalty, I would agree that there are cases where it's crystal clear that the accused is guilty. But this is really beside the point. The question is whether we can design a mechanism that correctly identifies these cases. In the absence of su... Read more