Recent Responses
Is it possible for two people to have a different "worldview" while not disagreeing on any particular fact?
Jennifer Church
January 30, 2010
(changed January 30, 2010)
Permalink
The answer to your question will depend on what counts as a fact.
Certainly it is possible for people to observe the same state of affairs while reacting to it differently. You observe the same wallpaper as I do, but you like it while I hate it. Or we both observe the same behavior on t... Read more
Suppose P is true and Q is true, then it follows logically that P --> Q, that Q --> P and therefore that P <--> Q. Now, suppose that P is 'George W. Bush is the 43rd President of the US' and Q is 'Bertrand Russell invented the ramified theory of types', both propositions are true, and therefore the truth of both guarantees the truth the aforementioned propositions. But it seems bizarre to say that Russell's invention of the theory of types entails that Bush is the 43rd president, as well as the other logical consequences. After all we can conceive of a scenario where Russell invents the ramified theory of types, but Bush becomes a plumber (say), if that is a possible scenario, it would seem that the proposition "If Russell invents the ramified theory of types then Bush is the 43rd President of the US" is false given the definition of 'if then'. But after all, does it make sense to say that a proposition entails another only in the actual world? (That doesn't seem to have as much generality as we intutively ascribe to logic). Maybe a possible solution might be to say that the propositions that are at stake are not what they appear. So, what I am in fact saying is that: If P & Q, then P <--> Q and Q --> P and P --> Q. So, saying that "If Russell invents the ramified theory of types then Bush is the 43rd President of the US" is in fact a false conditional, but not so for the proposition "If Russell invents the ramified theory of types and Bush is the 43rd President of the US then If Russell invents the ramified theory of types then Bush is the 4rd President of the US" which is not only true, but the triuth of the antecedent guarantees the truth of the consequent, as it should, given that the conditional is presumed true. Does this work? What can be said about this? Thanks a lot.
Richard Heck
January 29, 2010
(changed January 29, 2010)
Permalink
To give a similar but somewhat different answer, one might think the problem with the line of reasoning in the question comes here: "But it seems bizarre to say that Russell's invention of the theory of types entails that Bush is the 43rd president...". We were talking about the statement, "... Read more
Suppose P is true and Q is true, then it follows logically that P --> Q, that Q --> P and therefore that P <--> Q. Now, suppose that P is 'George W. Bush is the 43rd President of the US' and Q is 'Bertrand Russell invented the ramified theory of types', both propositions are true, and therefore the truth of both guarantees the truth the aforementioned propositions. But it seems bizarre to say that Russell's invention of the theory of types entails that Bush is the 43rd president, as well as the other logical consequences. After all we can conceive of a scenario where Russell invents the ramified theory of types, but Bush becomes a plumber (say), if that is a possible scenario, it would seem that the proposition "If Russell invents the ramified theory of types then Bush is the 43rd President of the US" is false given the definition of 'if then'. But after all, does it make sense to say that a proposition entails another only in the actual world? (That doesn't seem to have as much generality as we intutively ascribe to logic). Maybe a possible solution might be to say that the propositions that are at stake are not what they appear. So, what I am in fact saying is that: If P & Q, then P <--> Q and Q --> P and P --> Q. So, saying that "If Russell invents the ramified theory of types then Bush is the 43rd President of the US" is in fact a false conditional, but not so for the proposition "If Russell invents the ramified theory of types and Bush is the 43rd President of the US then If Russell invents the ramified theory of types then Bush is the 4rd President of the US" which is not only true, but the triuth of the antecedent guarantees the truth of the consequent, as it should, given that the conditional is presumed true. Does this work? What can be said about this? Thanks a lot.
Richard Heck
January 29, 2010
(changed January 29, 2010)
Permalink
To give a similar but somewhat different answer, one might think the problem with the line of reasoning in the question comes here: "But it seems bizarre to say that Russell's invention of the theory of types entails that Bush is the 43rd president...". We were talking about the statement, "... Read more
What is meant by the question "why is there something, rather than nothing?" Or rather, how can it be put into simpler terms so it can be more easily answered?
Peter S. Fosl
January 29, 2010
(changed January 29, 2010)
Permalink
Or, more generally, "Why do philosophers ask such absurd questions?" The basic issue here is what philosophers have come to call the "Principle of Sufficient" reason. You might say, in the simplest terms, if it doesn't distort things too much, that the principle maintains that there must al... Read more
Why do my parents tell me it is morally wrong to have a "hickey" or love bite on my neck. I am in a socially recognized relationship. Both of us are above the age of sexual consent in our country [several years above]. Neither of us are religious. Neither of us care about the judgment of the rest of the world. No one can see the mark, when my hair covers it. I am not in a professional setting that requires me to uphold any dress code or manner of behavior. I would just like to know what is so wrong about acknowledging that we enjoy giving pleasure to each other. Why is it morally wrong to have passion, and reciprocated enjoyment. Maybe we would be a less uptight society if we spent more time trying to find ways to bring people enjoyment and less time worrying about upholding some sort of stilted Victorian morality. Perhaps he takes umbrage to the fact that I, a woman, am enjoying sex? After all, it should be done for reproductive purposes only, in the dark, with only the man enjoying himself. Can any of you explain to me then, the error of my thinking? Or errors.
Jean Kazez
January 29, 2010
(changed January 29, 2010)
Permalink
From what I recall (and I'm recalling going to a US highschool way back in the 20th century), there's quite a bit to the semiotics of hickeys. The bruise says something--to you personally, but also to the world (if you hair is mobile). It broadcasts "I have a boyfriend and we're intimate,... Read more
Consider the following scenario: I am very good at doing analytic philosophy (though I am not a genius by any means), specially analytic metaphysics, but not limited to that field. I am well acquainted with the literature on the subject, I have an excellent grasp of the arguments and am pretty good at suggesting objections or proposing new arguments (or variations of old ones). Also, I have a pretty good command of the relevant technical material, that is, classical logic, modal logic, mereology and set theory, etc. Suppose I am capable of original and rigorous work. Suppose I profoundly dislike being taught in a university but have a fine time debating with (competent) professors, visiting lecturers and students (outside of the lectures), who, if asked, will acknowledge my philosophical ability. However, since I am not fond of the academy (as a student), I do not have any degrees. Suppose I am still young so I haven't published anything but I have plenty of ideas which, with a little work, might make it into publishable papers. Suppose I don't mind lecturing at all, and devote all my spare time to research. My question is this. Is there no hope for me to become an academic philosopher? That is, is there any possibility that I can devote myself professionally to lecturing and researching within academic circles? Do journals even publish such outsiders? (In theory the editorial board should review anonymous submissions, so no such personal information should be relevant in the process, but I don't know how it goes in practice). I know that people like Raymond Smullyan were unconfortable with "business as usual" as well in the academy but were, in time, able to become accepted in the fold. It may seem inconsistent to dislike the bureacracy and regulations of university life (as a student), yet have some strong desires to be in the academy, however two things may be said with regards to the scenario. The first is that I have a profound passion for the subject as well as a strong wish to contribute research, the second is that a philosopher also needs to have some financial stablity. I want to briefly clarify that I am passionate about analytic philosophy but am trapped in a country were most professors are only interested in Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida and the like (I hope this doesn't ruffle some feathers, I don't mean to offend anyone). I hope my question doesn't strike you as pretentious or wholly misguided. I think the culture of credentialism is profoundly pernicious, though that is a subject for another question. Thanks.
Andrew N. Carpenter
February 1, 2010
(changed February 1, 2010)
Permalink
I think that Allen gives some good practical advice and that Eric discusses well some important bureaucratic/administrative challenges that you would face even if the strategy that Allen lays out went swimmingly. My answer, however, builds on a point that Oliver made.
First, I agree... Read more
Why do my parents tell me it is morally wrong to have a "hickey" or love bite on my neck. I am in a socially recognized relationship. Both of us are above the age of sexual consent in our country [several years above]. Neither of us are religious. Neither of us care about the judgment of the rest of the world. No one can see the mark, when my hair covers it. I am not in a professional setting that requires me to uphold any dress code or manner of behavior. I would just like to know what is so wrong about acknowledging that we enjoy giving pleasure to each other. Why is it morally wrong to have passion, and reciprocated enjoyment. Maybe we would be a less uptight society if we spent more time trying to find ways to bring people enjoyment and less time worrying about upholding some sort of stilted Victorian morality. Perhaps he takes umbrage to the fact that I, a woman, am enjoying sex? After all, it should be done for reproductive purposes only, in the dark, with only the man enjoying himself. Can any of you explain to me then, the error of my thinking? Or errors.
Jean Kazez
January 29, 2010
(changed January 29, 2010)
Permalink
From what I recall (and I'm recalling going to a US highschool way back in the 20th century), there's quite a bit to the semiotics of hickeys. The bruise says something--to you personally, but also to the world (if you hair is mobile). It broadcasts "I have a boyfriend and we're intimate,... Read more
Consider the following scenario: I am very good at doing analytic philosophy (though I am not a genius by any means), specially analytic metaphysics, but not limited to that field. I am well acquainted with the literature on the subject, I have an excellent grasp of the arguments and am pretty good at suggesting objections or proposing new arguments (or variations of old ones). Also, I have a pretty good command of the relevant technical material, that is, classical logic, modal logic, mereology and set theory, etc. Suppose I am capable of original and rigorous work. Suppose I profoundly dislike being taught in a university but have a fine time debating with (competent) professors, visiting lecturers and students (outside of the lectures), who, if asked, will acknowledge my philosophical ability. However, since I am not fond of the academy (as a student), I do not have any degrees. Suppose I am still young so I haven't published anything but I have plenty of ideas which, with a little work, might make it into publishable papers. Suppose I don't mind lecturing at all, and devote all my spare time to research. My question is this. Is there no hope for me to become an academic philosopher? That is, is there any possibility that I can devote myself professionally to lecturing and researching within academic circles? Do journals even publish such outsiders? (In theory the editorial board should review anonymous submissions, so no such personal information should be relevant in the process, but I don't know how it goes in practice). I know that people like Raymond Smullyan were unconfortable with "business as usual" as well in the academy but were, in time, able to become accepted in the fold. It may seem inconsistent to dislike the bureacracy and regulations of university life (as a student), yet have some strong desires to be in the academy, however two things may be said with regards to the scenario. The first is that I have a profound passion for the subject as well as a strong wish to contribute research, the second is that a philosopher also needs to have some financial stablity. I want to briefly clarify that I am passionate about analytic philosophy but am trapped in a country were most professors are only interested in Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida and the like (I hope this doesn't ruffle some feathers, I don't mean to offend anyone). I hope my question doesn't strike you as pretentious or wholly misguided. I think the culture of credentialism is profoundly pernicious, though that is a subject for another question. Thanks.
Andrew N. Carpenter
February 1, 2010
(changed February 1, 2010)
Permalink
I think that Allen gives some good practical advice and that Eric discusses well some important bureaucratic/administrative challenges that you would face even if the strategy that Allen lays out went swimmingly. My answer, however, builds on a point that Oliver made.
First, I agree... Read more
I find the philosophy of religion immensely interesting. Recently I watched a YouTube video in which a well known Christian philosopher/theologian, William Lane Craig, explained how the Anglo-American world had been "utterly transformed" and had undergone a "renaissance of Christian philosophy" since the 1960s (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=902MJirWkdM&feature=related [starts at around the 7:40 mark]). Do you agree with these statements? Moreover, how well respected is Dr. Craig? Is he generally viewed as a top notch philosopher? I also wonder whether the very best arguments on the atheistic side are really being discussed. It seems there is some disdain among philosophers regarding the so-called "new atheists": Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, etc. Who are the top contemporary atheists working in philosophy today? I'd really be interested in reading some of their work. I would really appreciate multiple perspectives on these questions. Thanks a lot.
Charles Taliaferro
June 19, 2010
(changed June 19, 2010)
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PS to the last positing. Here are just some of the theists who are active in the UK or are recently retired, who have impecable credentials philosophically:Oxford: Daniel Robinson, Brian Leftow, Tim Mawson, Brian Davies (now at Fordham), Keith Ward (now in London but formerly Christ Church)... Read more
What was Wittgenstein's contribution to philosophy? He is considered to be one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century, and besides his unique use of truth-tables, what was his contribution? Perhaps his vague writing simply gave opportunities for other philosophers to place their own thoughts? What I mean to say is, does it seem likely that 'Wittgenstein' is nothing more than a vague writer and became famous because a lot of talented minds tried to figure out what he was trying to say, and in the process made his writings vastly more insightful than they really were?
Andrew N. Carpenter
January 26, 2010
(changed January 26, 2010)
Permalink
There are many ways to answer this question, and hopefully panelists with specialized knowledge of Wittgenstein and the history of 20th Century philosophy will chime in with more specific details. From my position as an interested reader of Wittgenstein, two things stand out: (1) the... Read more