Recent Responses
A long time ago - Jan 2006 if I'm not mistaken - Alan Soble wrote (http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/875): "Finally, the heart and soul of philosophy is argument, providing reasons for claims, including claims about morality and duties. In the answer to the question above, I cannot find a shred of argument. We should also avoid, that is, pastoral or friendly counseling. Without rigor, philosophy is nothing." That was back in the days when there was routinely more than 1 response to a question. Today's responses seem more and more to be becoming "pastoral or friendly counseling" without rigor. The panelists do not argue with each other - the responses are just accepted. Here's an example: Peter Smith wrote very recently (http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/2823): "For irrationally formed beliefs are not likely to lead to actions which get any of us what we want -- including a decent life, lived well in the knowledge of our all-too-explicable mortality." This statement - simply put out there, with no argument behind it - seems utterly preposterous. Beliefs will make us happy or not based on their content - not how they are formed. In fact, I might even choose to believe something JUST BECAUSE it will make me happy. They say the truth is often ugly and hard to take. Surely not the sort of thing that will make me happy. Of course it depends on what we mean by "happy". But Professor Smith doesn't think it's important to point this out in his friendly and pastoral and dogmatic response. Neither do any of the other panelists. Has the site lost some of its rigor?
Sally Haslanger
September 12, 2009
(changed September 12, 2009)
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I don't agree with Soble's claim that "without rigor, philosophy is nothing." Philosophy can be a source of insight, a glimpse into a completely different way of thinking about things, a moment of doubt, an invitation to reflection, the introduction of a new concept, and much more.... Read more
Many animal rights ideologies deny the existence of human exceptionalism. Some going so far as to call the idea, "Speciesism." But, if we drop this idea of human exceptionism for some utilitarian style of ethics, wouldn't the whole idea, as currently understood of human rights, fall with it? The UN charter itself states: "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person..." but if we disregard this inherent "dignity and worth" of the human person, what becomes of human rights? If we take a view that a eating a retarded human is no different than eating a retarded pig (an opinion I read in one of the responses here), then what becomes of human rights, and our inherent "dignity and worth"? And aside from the utilitarian implications of human exceptionalism (inherent human rights) don't you think that humans do inhabit a special place in the world? Are we not, something more than mere animals? Basically does the human soul exist?
Sally Haslanger
September 12, 2009
(changed September 12, 2009)
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There's a lot that has been and can be said about this issue, but maybe I can suggest one helpful thought.
There are really two different questions implicit in your question. One is whether anyone or anything has rights, thinking of rights as bringing with them strict obligations t... Read more
In a hypothetical situation I am a vegan talking to a meat eater who buys his meat from a supermarket and has no interest in where it came from. I say that I don't think people have the right to eat meat unless they are willing to learn about what it takes to provide that meat, witness it first hand or even produce it for themselves. He says that he doesn't want to know where it came from and is quite happy for someone else to do the dirty work if they are happy to and does not feel at all guilty. Is he morally wrong and do I have a valid argument?
Jean Kazez
September 18, 2009
(changed September 18, 2009)
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The phrase "insensitive to suffering" might mean--(1) "culpably unaware of it" or "unsympathetic to it." Or it might mean (2) "trivializing it" or "giving it too little weight."
If you shoot a rabbit, that's got to cause the rabbit to suffer quite a lot. Surely there's a good chance o... Read more
Is it possible to understand "left" without understanding "right"?
Thomas Pogge
September 12, 2009
(changed September 12, 2009)
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This is a clever and interesting question. Much depends on how we understand the word "understand."
In one sense of "understand" the answer to your question is yes: we can train a guide dog (or a robot or a child) the command "left" -- and successfully so, in the sense that the dog (or... Read more
What is there to say/suggest that truth is nothing more than an agreed common perception of reality? I would really appreciate any type of response to this question, whether it be a reply, some suggested reading material on the matter or whatever it may be. Thank You, Christopher
Thomas Pogge
September 12, 2009
(changed September 12, 2009)
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If you wanted to say something in favor of this view, you might point to the absence of observed discrepancies between what we all believe and the truth. But, on reflection, this isn't a strong argument because there are observed discrepancies between what is commonly believed now and wh... Read more
Is racial profiling immoral because it is ineffective? For instance, would the racial profiling of blacks become increasingly justifiable if blacks increasingly became criminals?
Thomas Pogge
September 12, 2009
(changed September 12, 2009)
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I've argued for an affirmative answer in my response to question 2466. This appears also to be the view of Joseph Levine (response to question 2535). If these earlier responses leave you unsatisfied, then please write in again and say what these reasons are.
Log in t... Read more
Can our social perceptions or cognition be subject to ethical judgement? I am thinking of a particular case here; let's assume, for instance, that in a certain country black people are extremely negatively portrayed by the media, in a stereotypical way. If somebody sees a perfectly innocent black person who has never done him harm, but because of widespread stereotyping sees him as dislikeable/dangerous/guilty, can we argue that he is morally responsible/guilty for such perceptions? Is the act of perceiving an innocent person as guilty immoral or, in terms of virtue ethics, unfair? What I'm wondering here especially is: since we can only be morally responsible for what is within our control, do we have enough control over our perceptions to consider them subject of moral judgement?
Thomas Pogge
September 12, 2009
(changed September 12, 2009)
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What's outside the agent's control is, I think, somewhat narrower than what you call "perceptions or cognition." Suppose new DNA evidence reveals that a black man on death row is actually innocent. And suppose the jurors who declared him guilty say that they couldn't help seeing him as g... Read more
When I say "strawberries are delicious" am I saying something about strawberries, or am I just saying something about my tastes?
Thomas Pogge
September 12, 2009
(changed September 12, 2009)
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About both, I would think: about their relation. Your quoted sentence says something about tastes (that they respond positively to strawberries) and also something about strawberries (that they evoke a positive taste response). Still, there is something to your deflationary "just": What... Read more
At this point I am so familiar with a) The human propensity for religious belief b) The history and basis of the world's major religious belief systems and c) The apathetic functioning of the universe, that intellectually I am unable to adopt the anthropocentric vision of the universe as presented by the monotheistic traditions. However, watching my muslim friend pray and fast during this month of Ramadan, I am struck by how much peace, happiness and purpose her beliefs bring her and contrast it with the emptiness and meaninglessness which I feel. The fissure between our worldviews is a constant source of alienation between us. 1) Would it be ethical for me to attempt to persuade her of the veracity of atheism (regardless of whether or not she is won over to this worldview), despite my knowledge that this may adversely effect her positivity about life? 2) Failing this, should I try to swallow the blue pill of theism and attempt -emotionally rather than intellectually- to force myself into believing it's true? (by adopting the rituals, etc. as proposed by Pascal.)
Jean Kazez
September 12, 2009
(changed September 12, 2009)
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You seem to want to get closer to your friend by eliminating the difference between your beliefs, but there are other ways to get closer. It sounds like you are attracted to the ritual aspects of her religion. So perhaps you could ask your friend if you can join in celebrating Ramadan in... Read more
In a hypothetical situation I am a vegan talking to a meat eater who buys his meat from a supermarket and has no interest in where it came from. I say that I don't think people have the right to eat meat unless they are willing to learn about what it takes to provide that meat, witness it first hand or even produce it for themselves. He says that he doesn't want to know where it came from and is quite happy for someone else to do the dirty work if they are happy to and does not feel at all guilty. Is he morally wrong and do I have a valid argument?
Jean Kazez
September 18, 2009
(changed September 18, 2009)
Permalink
The phrase "insensitive to suffering" might mean--(1) "culpably unaware of it" or "unsympathetic to it." Or it might mean (2) "trivializing it" or "giving it too little weight."
If you shoot a rabbit, that's got to cause the rabbit to suffer quite a lot. Surely there's a good chance o... Read more