Recent Responses
I am perplexed by Alexander George's recent posting (http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/2854). He says "Your observation that we sometimes take pleasure in beliefs even if they have been irrationally arrived at seems correct but beside the point: it speaks neither to the truth of (1) nor to that of (2)." (2), in this case, is "(2) that actions guided by false beliefs are not likely to get us what we want. " I believe the science of psychology has shown us that we form many beliefs entirely irrationally. The mechanism for their formation is often a defense mechanism. The purpose of their formation is often to hide some truth about ourselves from ourselves - to hide some unpleasant information that we would have gleaned had we formed our belief rationally. I just can't see how the above information is "beside the point". The point is: 1) I want to be happy. 2) My beliefs are formed irrationally in order to reach that desired end. Perhaps what is beside the point is that the belief-forming mechanism is unconscious or subconscious rather than deliberate. Professor George also seems to take offense at the questioner's tone. Perhaps this is why he ignores the questioner's question: has the site lost some of its rigor since the days of 8 responses when the panelists routinely qualified each other's positions and called each other out when answers were not sufficiently rigorous? Regarding this offense at the questioner's tone: wasn't Socrates put to death because people were offended by his questions? It seems anathema to philosophy to take offense at questions. That the questioner did not display enough rigor in saying that a panelist's position "seems utterly preposterous" is to be expected - after all, the questioner is not a trained philosopher! As a frequent visitor to this site for many years I can say that, to me, it resembles Democracy: a place that should welcome critics as patriots.
Peter Smith
September 3, 2009
(changed September 3, 2009)
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Just a footnote to Mark Collier's helpful post. I actually said that irrationally formed beliefs are not likely to lead to actions which get us what we want (rather than cannot get us what we want). And that claim is enough to explain why we should in general care a lot about forming our be... Read more
We always say that "is" or "doing" instead of "looks" or "I think". For example, when I am cold I say that it is "cold". Would not it be more correct to say that "I feel cold"? When we say that a car is green, is it because we see it green - but who says that there will be another who sees it blue? Siempre decimos "es" y "hacer" en vez de "parece" y "me parece". Por ejemplo, cuando tengo frío digo que hace frío. ¿No sería más correcto decir que "me parece que hace frío"? Cuando decimos que un coche es verde, es porque lo vemos verde, ¿pero quién dice que no habrá otro que lo vea azul?
Jennifer Church
September 3, 2009
(changed September 3, 2009)
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If you assume that the air might really be cold, and the car might really be green, then I can think of two situations in which it is more appropriate to say "I feel cold" and "The car seems to be green":
1. You have doubts about whether the temperature really is low (perhaps you are... Read more
Do the dead have rights? Example: suppose my father dies and leaves me his house in his will, on the condition that I never sell the house to anyone outside the family. If I were to take the house, and later sell it to someone outside that family, it is not clear that my father is harmed (he is dead!). Yet it seems wrong. Why?
Oliver Leaman
September 3, 2009
(changed September 3, 2009)
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Of course, you might think that although his body is dead, his soul lives on somewhere and would be horrified at what you did and so would be harmed. Otherwise, I suppose it would be relevant to ask whether you had agreed to his demand, since if you did and then reneged on it, you would b... Read more
Donald Baxter's recent reply (http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/2837), in which he writes "Then these attempts must be put to the test by trying to convince others, and then taking into account their incomprehensions and objections" suggests that Philosophy is about convincing people and alleviating their confusion. If that is the case, it seems Philosophy is more about rhetoric and psychology than truth or big issues. Do Philosophers believe, then, that they have succeeded if 1) people understand their positions perfectly and 2) people agree with it? This doesn't seem to me like the best standard for deciding what is true, and I thought philosophy was love of truth, not love of persuading people of clearly articulated positions.
Donald Baxter
September 3, 2009
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Trying to convince people (and oneself) and alleviate their confusion (and one's own) and learning from the responses is our best way to approach the truth about matters for which observation and calculation are little help in resolving controversies. It is an imperfect way to the goal of... Read more
We all wish that we die before a person we love a LOT (our parents is an example), because we think that we'll be very sad and cry all the time. But, isn't it more moral to wish that this beloved person dies before us, so we would support the extreme sadness and not them ?
Gordon Marino
July 24, 2010
(changed July 24, 2010)
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I don't think that we have a lot of control over what our wishes are. If you are asking what is the more loving wish than I suppose it would make sense to say that you would want to spare the person you love so much the pain. But I don't think these kinds of moral calculations are useful. The imp... Read more
Does infinity exist?
Peter Smith
September 3, 2009
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Well, mathematicians all the time talk about infinitary structures. To start with the very simplest examples, they talk about the set of all natural numbers, {0, 1, 2, 3, ...}: and they also talk about the set of all subsets of the natural numbers. And they introduce "infinite cardinal numb... Read more
A long time ago - Jan 2006 if I'm not mistaken - Alan Soble wrote (http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/875): "Finally, the heart and soul of philosophy is argument, providing reasons for claims, including claims about morality and duties. In the answer to the question above, I cannot find a shred of argument. We should also avoid, that is, pastoral or friendly counseling. Without rigor, philosophy is nothing." That was back in the days when there was routinely more than 1 response to a question. Today's responses seem more and more to be becoming "pastoral or friendly counseling" without rigor. The panelists do not argue with each other - the responses are just accepted. Here's an example: Peter Smith wrote very recently (http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/2823): "For irrationally formed beliefs are not likely to lead to actions which get any of us what we want -- including a decent life, lived well in the knowledge of our all-too-explicable mortality." This statement - simply put out there, with no argument behind it - seems utterly preposterous. Beliefs will make us happy or not based on their content - not how they are formed. In fact, I might even choose to believe something JUST BECAUSE it will make me happy. They say the truth is often ugly and hard to take. Surely not the sort of thing that will make me happy. Of course it depends on what we mean by "happy". But Professor Smith doesn't think it's important to point this out in his friendly and pastoral and dogmatic response. Neither do any of the other panelists. Has the site lost some of its rigor?
Sally Haslanger
September 12, 2009
(changed September 12, 2009)
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I don't agree with Soble's claim that "without rigor, philosophy is nothing." Philosophy can be a source of insight, a glimpse into a completely different way of thinking about things, a moment of doubt, an invitation to reflection, the introduction of a new concept, and much more.... Read more
Why are the laws of logic considered to be truth preserving? I would have trouble accepting any theory that says these are mere conventions of men since they all seem to have a universal application and do describe realtiy as we know it. Did God make these laws like other grand laws of the universe or did they just appear or create themselves?
Peter Smith
August 30, 2009
(changed August 30, 2009)
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A logically valid inference is one that is necessarily truth-preserving. That's pretty much a matter of definition. We just wouldn't count an inference as logically valid if it didn't meet that condition. (In other words, necessarily preserving truth is a necessary condition for an inference to... Read more
I have been reading the recent discussion about whether "facts" can be "rational" or "irrational" http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/2829). Professor Rapaport suggests that philosophers use facts differently than most non-philosophers. Facts, he says, "simply 'are'". They are not like beliefs, which are more like sentences. His statements have left me very confused. The Earth is round. Is that a fact? We all die. Is that a fact? Seems to me that it is. And it's simultaneously a sentence. I don't see how a fact can be anything but a sentence. But suppose facts are not sentences. They are situations. One big fact would be the way the world is, I suppose. A smaller fact might be the way my room is right now. Fine, why can't situations be "rational" or "irrational"? I think very often we come upon a situation and say things like "This situation is totally crazy", by which we mean, it is irrational. As the questioner said, dictionary.com defines "rational" as "agreeable to reason". Certainly many situations are agreeable to reason; others are not.
William Rapaport
August 28, 2009
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I'm happy to try to clarify: I don't think that philosophers use facts differently from most non-philosophers. Rather, I think that philosophers use the word 'fact' differently from the way most non-philosophers use it. I think that most non-philosophers use it to mean more or less the... Read more
I read recently a comment by a philosopher that Karl Popper's "falsifiability" theory is considered obsolete. Is this so? I always found it to be quite useful. If it's obsolete, what rendered it so, and by what was it replaced?
Eric Silverman
August 28, 2009
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I'll add a third problem to Popper's views... it classifies obvious psuedo-sciences as sciences such as astrology, so long as they make potentially falsifiable predictions. Furthermore, it does nothing to distinguish something radically implausible like astrology from something more plausibl... Read more