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Most people believe that if slavery were universally accepted, it would still be wrong. But let's suppose that, contrary to our beliefs, slavery is actually morally acceptable. Would anything be different? Surely the physical laws would be the same. Sodium would still bond with chlorine, and earth would still pull at 9.8 Newtons per kilogram. And according to the first statement, societies views do not have a casual relationship with morality. So when someone says slavery is wrong, what exactly are they asserting?
Allen Stairs
September 18, 2008
(changed September 18, 2008)
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The feat of imagination here isn't quite as straightforward as it seems. Do the slaves have the same basic capacities as the slaveholders? Would the slaves vastly prefer not to be slaves? Would the slaveholders really, genuinely agree, after thinking it through, that had luck turned ou... Read more
Consider the argument: I am more than six feet tall. Therefore, I am over five feet tall. Is this a sound argument? Is it circular? Tautologous?
Peter Smith
September 18, 2008
(changed September 18, 2008)
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Let's call the argument about Allen's plastic jug "argument (A)". Then consider the following claims:
(1) Kripke's doctrine: It is impossible that something should contain water without containing H2O.
(2) The classical account of validity: An inference is valid if and only if it is impo... Read more
Consider the argument: I am more than six feet tall. Therefore, I am over five feet tall. Is this a sound argument? Is it circular? Tautologous?
Peter Smith
September 18, 2008
(changed September 18, 2008)
Permalink
Let's call the argument about Allen's plastic jug "argument (A)". Then consider the following claims:
(1) Kripke's doctrine: It is impossible that something should contain water without containing H2O.
(2) The classical account of validity: An inference is valid if and only if it is impo... Read more
Decisions are (usually) based on information. It seems to me that flawed information would lead to a flawed decision. Yet people with incomplete or flawed information often succeed. How is this possible?
Andrew N. Carpenter
September 17, 2008
(changed September 17, 2008)
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First, I believe that factors other than rational assessment of information help guide decisions and greatly affect the success of human decision-making. Sociologists and psychologists probably investigate this more than do philosophers, although an approach to critical thinking c... Read more
I'm not sure if this is the right place for a question about an introductory, and supposedly non-academic, philosophy course, rather than for an actual philosophical question, but here goes. There's an organisation in the UK called the School of Economic Science that is offering a 10 week Practical Philosophy course (www.practicalphilosophy.co.uk), which on the surface appears to cover all the kinds of (high level) introductory subjects that you'd expect from a Western philosophy course. However the history of the School seems to be based on Indian philosophy, and specifically Advaita Vedanta, so I was wondering if anyone knew of the school or its teachings, and specifically is the course one to attend for someone interested in Western philosophy please?
Peter Smith
September 16, 2008
(changed September 16, 2008)
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Certainly not one to attend for someone interested in Western philosophy. You'll do vastly better to check out courses run by the extra-mural departments of local universities.
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I have a question about Cartesian skepticism. One of the premises of the argument is something to the effect of: (1) I don't know that I'm not dreaming. My question is: What justifies this proposition? My intuition is that the evidence for (1) cannot possibly be empirical; for the upshot of the skeptical argument is precisely that all empirical claims are dubious. (Maybe it's helpful to rephrase (1) as "It's possible that I'm dreaming," if that is legitimate.)
Peter Smith
September 16, 2008
(changed September 16, 2008)
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You write "One of the premises of [the skeptic's] argument is something to the effect of:I don't know that I'm not dreaming." And yes, as you imply, it would be rather odd for a skeptic to start by being too dogmatic about what he can or can't know!
But perhaps he doesn't need to be. Pe... Read more
I have a question about Cartesian skepticism. One of the premises of the argument is something to the effect of: (1) I don't know that I'm not dreaming. My question is: What justifies this proposition? My intuition is that the evidence for (1) cannot possibly be empirical; for the upshot of the skeptical argument is precisely that all empirical claims are dubious. (Maybe it's helpful to rephrase (1) as "It's possible that I'm dreaming," if that is legitimate.)
Peter Smith
September 16, 2008
(changed September 16, 2008)
Permalink
You write "One of the premises of [the skeptic's] argument is something to the effect of:I don't know that I'm not dreaming." And yes, as you imply, it would be rather odd for a skeptic to start by being too dogmatic about what he can or can't know!
But perhaps he doesn't need to be. Pe... Read more
Do you think _Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance_ is categorically a philosophy book, or because it's a novel, it cannot be in that classification? Marty C.
Andrew N. Carpenter
September 15, 2008
(changed September 15, 2008)
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To add to Kalynne's answer, once you have identified a work of philosophy "broadly speaking," a useful thing to do is to reflect on whether or not that specific work is likely to meet your specific objectives for engaging with philosophy -- that question can be much more useful, I... Read more
Consider the argument: I am more than six feet tall. Therefore, I am over five feet tall. Is this a sound argument? Is it circular? Tautologous?
Peter Smith
September 18, 2008
(changed September 18, 2008)
Permalink
Let's call the argument about Allen's plastic jug "argument (A)". Then consider the following claims:
(1) Kripke's doctrine: It is impossible that something should contain water without containing H2O.
(2) The classical account of validity: An inference is valid if and only if it is impo... Read more
On the back of my teenage daughter's school textbook is a statement (by the publisher) "Do not over analyze". My daughter asked me what it meant but although I have come across this statement before I am not sure what it means - I think it means not to keep analyzing someone else's behaviour in order to find a motive but I'd like to be sure. In the case of philosophy aren't we meant to analyze thoroughly - so does one come to the point of over analyzing in this context?
Andrew N. Carpenter
September 15, 2008
(changed September 15, 2008)
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I think that Jennifer's answer is well-stated: with respect to intellectual inquiry, there are many topics and objectives which can best be pursued through methods other than analysis, and for those cases where analysis is appropriate there is great benefit in understanding how to... Read more