Recent Responses
Is it, say, "reasonable" that philosophers analyse a scientific concept? I was wondering about concepts coming from the social sciences. Would it be a philosophical task to analyse e.g. the concept of "social interaction", as it is used by social scientists?
Allen Stairs
July 15, 2008
(changed July 15, 2008)
Permalink
I suspect I may be missing what's at issue here. Analyzing concepts is part of the philosopher's stock-in-trade, and that applies no less to scientific concepts than to other sorts. Not being a social scientists, I don't have a good, detailed feel for how social scientists use the phrase "social i... Read more
Does Rawls consider inborn abilities an important determinant of social status? I haven't read his entire text in A Theory of Justice, but when he mentions the veil of ignorance, is he considering social status more or less a matter of fate?
Alexander George
July 23, 2008
(changed July 23, 2008)
Permalink
If by "fate" you mean out of your control, then I think Rawls would have answered your first question: "Yes and no". Your social status is determined by elements out of your control such as the aptitudes you are born with, the lucky or unlucky breaks that come your way, and the manner in whic... Read more
Following along from http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/2039: "Does the law of bivalence demand that a proposition IS either true or false today? What if the truth or falsity of this proposition is a correspondence to a future event that has yet to occur?" What's problematical about saying "yes, it's either true or false, but I don't happen to know which"? Is that substantively different from saying the same thing about an open problem in science or mathematics, to which the answer is presumably knowable but happens not yet to be known? The questioner seems to be demanding both that there be an answer, which may be a reasonable thing to want, and to be able to know what the answer is, which isn't necessarily reasonable. Is it reasonable always to expect somebody (other than deity) to know the answer to a question?
Allen Stairs
July 13, 2008
(changed July 13, 2008)
Permalink
The issue about so-called "future contingent" propositions isn't just about whether we're in a position to know whether they're true, but whether there are any facts for them to pick out. And that issue arises from a tempting but controversial metaphysical picture: reality as it were "unfolds" in... Read more
The consideration that harm is inherently related to the perception of the harmed (i.e., s/he who perceives that s/he has been harmed has been harmed) is widely accepted, and I even sometimes see philosophers on this site answering questions of ethics from this position. However, it seems to me that this way of viewing "harm" is too generally subjective. Are there widely accepted objective means for defining harm? What are they?
Allen Stairs
July 12, 2008
(changed July 12, 2008)
Permalink
I wonder just how widely accepted this is. I suspect that most people, including panelists here, would agree that just because someone thinks they've been harmed, it doesn't mean that they actually were. In fact, it's perfectly possible that something someone takes to have harmed them actually did... Read more
I am a very skilled amateur magician. As such I believe I hold a slightly better understanding about perception, deception, belief, conviction, and the human thought process than the average man on the street. One aspect about humanity that continually amazes me is the sheer predictability of actions and the dearth of variation when it comes to responding to a given situation. Case in point: In the middle of presenting a card trick where a chosen playing card continually goes to MY pocket under increasingly strenuous conditions I make the off-handed comment "One time I did this trick and I applied a little too much pressure and the card invisibly shot out and ended up in some other guy's pocket...". 9 times out of 10 after I am done with the initial sequences the spectator I am engaging will challenge me to make the card go to HIS pocket. Needless to say I have already secreted the card to his pocket using technical machinations much, much earlier. To the spectator the challenge was a random one; to me it was a predictable action, one that could be prepared for and exploited. Does this underlying predictability apply to all our actions and endeavors? So how important is the perception of "randomness" and "uniqueness" and "choice" to our day to day lives? What about the relationship between free will and instinct? It seems to me that culture and identity are just illusions masking the true monotony of existing...
Jonathan Westphal
July 11, 2008
(changed July 11, 2008)
Permalink
The fact that our actions are predictable as such or by itself hasno tendency to imply that they are unfree or that they are determinedor not freely chosen. I can predict that I will continue to work on myhouse yet again today, but that is because I very much enjoy it, andthe action's predict... Read more
Is it ethical to "cure" a mentally disabled/disturbed person if they might actually be unhappier when they are "healthy" than they were before when they were living in their own "world"?
Oliver Leaman
July 11, 2008
(changed July 11, 2008)
Permalink
The first problem is in knowing whether being "cured" would make them unhappier or otherwise, and how one would find out. Then there is the issue of autonomy, which we value even if it makes someone miserable, or more miserable than they might be otherwise. After the "cure", presumably the indivi... Read more
I had to deal with some absolutely respectless persons a short while ago. They were very annoying to me, definitely the kind I don't like. This brought me to a question that seems interesting, at least to me: Do people that don't show any respect to other people deserve any respect themselves? Or, formulated else: Should respectless persons still be respected (e.g., by the persons they show no respect to)?
Oliver Leaman
July 11, 2008
(changed July 11, 2008)
Permalink
Annoyingly I suppose they do, since their behaviour may only be temporary, and may have been caused by something that really interferes with their autonomy in any case. On the other hand, they can certainly be treated less well than other people, in the sense that their behaviour can be taken int... Read more
I personally think that abortion is immoral. But I don't think that everything that is immoral should be illegal. Marital infidelity is also immoral, but I feel strongly that it shouldn't be illegal. In the case of abortion, I don't know how I feel (nor what I should think) about the legal question. So my general question is this: is the inference from the immorality of some act X to the claim that X ought to be illegal ever justified? If not, why not?
Oliver Leaman
July 11, 2008
(changed July 11, 2008)
Permalink
I think it depends on the significance of the action. Some actions we regard as immoral but not terribly important. The person sitting next to me in the library on the computer is annoying me giggling at Facebook with her companion, and I suppose this is immoral, since she has a duty not to distu... Read more
Suppose a man commits murder and is then promptly involved in a car crash that leads to complete loss of all his memories prior to the car crash. The police have indisputable proof that the man did indeed commit the murder. Should they prosecute? If you conclude that they should because in some sense he's physically the same person what if a murderer somehow makes a copy of themselves and then commits suicide, should the copy be prosecuted? If you conclude that they shouldn't be prosecuted because the person after the accident is a different person from before the accident what if there's indisputable evidence that all of their memories will return in 5 years? 5 weeks? 5 days? To my mind the person after the accident is a different person from the one who committed the murder and should therefore not be prosecuted. If the memories return then they should be prosecuted but we shouldn't punish them for a crime "they" didn't commit. But I am unsure as to how much of their memories need to return before they again become liable for their past actions.
Eddy Nahmias
July 9, 2008
(changed July 9, 2008)
Permalink
Wow, you have come up with a case I love to use in my philosophy of mind to connect issues of personal identity to moral responsibility and "moral luck." I have students read the Oliver Sacks' case of Donald ("Murder" in The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat). Donald took and, while high, killed... Read more
Can literature "tell the truth" better than other Arts or Areas of Knowledge?
My answer to this is a firm
Jonathan Westphal
July 9, 2008
(changed February 8, 2017)
Permalink
My answer to this is a firm "Yes". Novels, for example, "tell the truth" better than any other written material, with the exception things like diaries and letters, unless you think of the relevant passages of diaries and letters as though they were mini-novels.... Read more